

THE
TITLE

OF A

Thorough Settlement

EXAMINED;

In ANSWER to Dr. SHERLOCK's

Case of the Allegiance

DUE TO

SOVEREIGN POWERS, &c.

WITH AN

APPENDIX

In Answer to

Dr. *Sherlock's* Vindication.

by M^r. Fenkin atheno^s D.D. & a Compiler.

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THE

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P R E F A C E.

PART of the following Papers were written before Dr. Sherlock's Book was published, without any design of Printing them: But I was much more confirmed in my Opinion, when all that the Dr. had said was very far from giving me any Satisfaction. And as I was engaged in this Subject before, so I have kept close to it, not concerning my self with any thing else that the Dr. has said in his Book: And I have been so far from Prejudice and Partiality, that I must confess, before I had fully considered it, I could not but think much the better of Dr. Sherlock's Notion because it is his; and I am not sensible that I have been wanting in any respect, which is due to the Dr's Learning and Worth.

And this is all that needed to have been said by way of Preface, if a Weekly Retailer of Politicks and false History, after a very certain and positive Account, out of Manuscript (as he told us) and Original Papers, given by him of that Convocation; the Acts and Canons whereof gave occasion to the present Controversy, had not at last produced Letter pretended to have been written by King James I. to a Member of the Convocation; which contradicts what I have said in relation to it, and which some perhaps may give Credit to, if it be not shewn that it deserves none.

But this Letter is a Contradiction to all that he had said before of the Convocation, and serves only to expose the Vanity of this Pretender to secret History. For before he informed us from his MSS. that the King was not inclined to favour the Dutch, but the Clergy were for it; and in this Letter the King is resolved to espouse their Cause, but the Clergy are under mighty

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Scruples about it. This Observator is wont to leave his other Rarities with his Bookseller to be viewed and examined; but we are only told that he had this Letter no body knows from whom, and that it was written no body knows when, nor to whom: It is to Good Dr. Abbot, but who this Dr. Abbot was is uncertain, and he tells us it has no Date, tho in his Contents he sets it down as written in the year 1604. What! had he forgot himself? or was he not yet resolved, whether he should date it or not? A Letter of King James to Archbishop Abbot concerning the Convocation, 1604. How comes he to be here so positive, that it was written to Archbishop Abbot, when he afterwards confesses it is only his Conjecture? But the Convocation was in 1604. True, for it began in 1603. and was continued by Adjournments and Prorogations till 1610. But Bishop Overall's Convocation-Book bears Date only from 1606. But it was written partly by a Secretary, as he imagines, and partly by the King himself; by some Scotch Secretary, I suppose; but King James's hand is too well known, to trust the Learned World (in his Cant) with a sight of it, for fear of some Discovery.

*In this Letter King James blames the Convocation for asserting that all Kings, if they be but in Possession, are invested with Gods Authority; and then he says, But you know all of you, as I think, that the Reason of calling you together was to give your Judgment, how far a Christian and a Protestant King may concur to assist his Neighbours to shake off their Obedience to their own Sovereign, upon the account of Oppression, Tyranny, or what else you like to name it. In the late Queens time this Kingdom was very free in assisting the *Hollanders* both with Arms and Advice; and none of your Coat ever told me that any scrupled about it in her Reign. Upon my coming to *England* you may know, that it came from some of your selves to raise Scruples about this matter. And albeit I have often told my mind concerning *Jus Regium in subditos*, as in *May* last in the Star-Chamber upon the occasion of *Hale's* Pamphlet; yet I never took any notice of these Scruples, till the Affairs of *Spain*; *Holland* forced me to it; all my Neighbours call on me to concur in the Treaty between *Holland* and*

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and Spain ; and the Honour of the Nation will not suffer the Hollanders to be abandoned, especially after so much Money and Men spent in their Quarrel. Therefore I was of the mind to call my Clergy together, to satisfy not so much me, as the World about us, of the Justness of my owning the *Hollanders* at this time : This I needed not have done, and you have forced me to say, I wish I had not.

Here we are told that the Clergy at the beginning of King James I. his Reign 1603. were possessed with strange Scruples, which they had never had before, concerning the Dutch Affairs; tho the same scrupulous Clergy at the same time maintained, that bare Possession gives a Title to Usurpers in any Government: and from the year 1581. the united Provinces by virtue of expresse Privileges and Provisions in that behalf had renounced all Obedience to the King of Spain, and had been treated with as free Estates by the neighbouring Princes. Now tho Scruples are sometimes very unaccountable things, yet these are such Scruples as I think have been seldom heard of, that Possession should give a Right, and yet not give the Dutch a Right, who had so many other Pleas besides from expresse Laws in their favour. But only some of the Clergy were scrupulous: Some! Who were these Some? They must be of the most considerable and eminent, and their Number must be considerable too; or else the King had taken no notice of it, at least, he had never called a Convocation to decide the Controversie. But the Convocation was called to satisfy not so much the King nor the Clergy, as the World about us of the Justness of his owning the Hollanders at this time, that is, about Two or Three and Twenty years after the World had owned them, and when all the King's Neighbours called on him to concur in the Treaty between Holland and Spain; the Convocation is assembled to determine that for the Satisfaction of the World, which the World had been satisfied in so long before, and now called upon the King for his Concurrence in that very thing, about which all this Scruple was raised.

But because all men are fallible, and may change their minds, we know, sometimes on the sudden; let us examin how this Letter agrees with the History of that time. How did King James help

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help the Hollanders to shake off the Spanish Toak? Or what Occasion could there be of Scruple in the Clergy at the beginning of his Reign, tho they had neither held that Possession gives a Right, nor that the Dutch had any better Claim? The King at his coming to the Crown refused to concern himself in the War between Holland and Spain, and would by no means be persuaded to send

(a) *Scotorum quoque nova cohors, Baclavio Tribuno, & Anglorum Supplementa, Permissu Regis, non ut ante, imperio. Grot. Hist. lib. 13. An. 1604.*

the States any assistance of Forces, (a) but all that went into those Wars, went only by his Permission and Connivance, not by his Command; and all the Supply of Money that I can find he furnished them with, was only thus; that after the earnest Sollicitation and Importunity not only of the States themselves, but of the King of France in their behalf, he consented that a third part of the Money, which the French lent them, should be upon the King of England's account, so as to discharge a Debt, which was then owing to England from France; and soon after he gave instructions concerning what Money was due to England from the United Provinces.

(b) *Ad Batavos hæc pertinebant, Hostes, Rebellesq; alterius alter ne juvaret, neu juvari à suis pateretur. ib. lib. 1604.*

(c) *Quippe federe Britannum tanti Belli otiosum spectatorem. ib. lib. 16. An. 1607.*

(d) *Satis hic (Jacobus) intelligebat Batavorum Armis suam quietem ac maximè Hiberniam defendi. Sed haud minus videbat, quàm non idoneus esset Belli suasor, qui pecuniam, cujus id Bellum maximè egebat, nec contulerat antehac, nec habebat undè conferret. ib. An. 1607.*

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In the year 1607. the United Provinces were treated with as Free Estates both by the Arch-Dukes, Albertus and Isabella, and by the King of Spain himself. The Arch-Dukes declare, that they are content to

• Grimestone's Hist. of the Netherlands. l. 16. An. 1607.

treat with the General Estates of the United Provinces in quality, and holding them for free Countries, Provinces and States, whereunto they pretend not any Title. And the King of Spain in his Ratification says, that he upon due deliberation and advice of his own certain knowledge, and absolute Kingly Power and Authority—— had made unto the said Estates, and by these presents did make the like Declaration, which the Arch-Dukes had formerly made, as much as in him lay, and that he declared himself to be content, that in his name and in his behalf, the said Estates should be treated withal in quality, and as holding them at this present for free Countries, Provinces and Estates, to whom he pretended no Title at all.

This was at the first entrance upon a Treaty in Order either to a Peace or a Truce, and afterwards I think, there could be no cause of Scruple, tho the King had never so openly and vigorously espoused their Interest at the Treaty; as he did indeed the year following appear with more Zeal and Resolution in their behalf, than before he had done. But what happened not till 1608. could not occasion the Scruples mentioned in the Letter to have been in the beginning of his Reign, and the last Book of the Convocation had passed the Lower House April 16. 1606. as it bears date.

What Scruple then could the Clergy raise to themselves in this Case? Did K. James by his standing Neuter, or by his League with Spain engage himself in the War with the Dutch against Spain? or could the most Scrupulous men think it unlawful for him to promote the Peace as a Friend and Allie to both Nations? or rather must we not contradict all the Histories of that time, if we will believe this to be a true Letter?

We know by our Ecclesiastical Constitutions and Canons, that the Convocation had other Business before them, than the Consideration of the Dutch affairs; and few men are so little acquainted with the State of Affairs in England at the beginning of King
James

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James the first's Reign, but they know that there was 'too great occasion (and I doubt there will always be) for the Clergy to declare and explain the Doctrin of the Church concerning the Authority of Kings, and the Allegiance of Subjects.

The Books of Parsons, and Buchanan and several others had fill'd mens minds with such Principles, as the Orthodox Clergy neither of that, nor of succeeding Reigns have been yet able to dispel. The Kings Prerogative both in Spiritual and Temporal Affairs was the subject of the most and the Principal Books written at that time, as well as of the Convocation; and we always have had too great cause at home, to need to go so far as the Low-Countries for an occasion to treat of Allegiance. But then more especially when there was such an attempt by Gunpowder, and fire from Hell to blow up and destroy their Sovereign, and the whole State of the Country &c. as they mention. lib. 2. can. 1.

But indeed if there were nothing else to prove this Letter forg'd, what it contains about the Convocation would be a sufficient Proof of it; for I think nothing can be more plain to an unprejudiced Reader, than that, in the Sense of the Convocation, an Usurper is then only Thoroughly Settled, when the People have submitted to him, and when there is no other Prince, who has a better Claim.

E R R A T A.

P Ag. 4. Col. 1. lin. 18. dele *the*. lb. dele *of*. p. 6. c. 1. l. 13. r. *be*. p. 7. c. 2. l. 18. (from the bottom) r. *aberrations*. p. 10. c. 2. l. 16. (from the bottom) r. *Jehoiachin*. p. 13. c. 2. l. 20. del. *of*. lb. l. 13. from the bott.) r. *hæc*. p. 17. c. 1. l. 12. r. *depose*. lb. l. 20. r. *over*. p. 21. c. 1. l. 19. (from the bott.) r. *the Dr. can say*. p. 45. c. 1. l. 16. (from the bott.) r. *ἡγεμον*. p. 63. c. 2. l. 16. for *a r. as*. lb. 29. for *that* r. *the*. p. 62. c. 2. l. 1. for *the* r. *that*. lb. in Marg. r. *Hadrianus*. for *Judea* r. *Judeo*.

Appendix, p. 2. col. 2. l. 2. del. *if*. p. 4. c. 2. l. 13. r. *bound*. p. 5. c. 2. l. 8. r. *where*. p. 7. c. 2. l. 5. for *the* r. *this*. lb. l. 9. (from the bottom) for *were* r. *are*. p. 8. c. 2. l. 8. r. *Regal Power*. p. 9. l. 7. (from the bott.) for *by* r. *to*. lb. c. 1. l. 1. for *when* r. *where*.

The **TITLE** of a *Thorough Settlement*
examined, in Answer to Dr. **SHER-**
LOCK's Case of the Allegiance due to
Sovereign Powers, &c.

TO avoid all Ambiguity
and Dispute about Words,
and to bring the Mat-
ter in debate to as nar-
row a Compass as I
can; I shall reduce it to this Ques-
tion:

Whether the thorough Settlement
of an Usurper doth entitle him to the
Allegiance of the Subjects, over
whom his Usurpation is thoroughly
settled, though the rightful King who
is out of Possession be still living, and
demand their Allegiance?

The Resolution of this Question
in our present Case depends first,
upon the Authority of Bishop *Overall's*
Convocation-Book; secondly, upon
the Reason of the thing it self.

First, the Convocation expressly
determines, that there is some kind
of *Thorough Settlement*, which is suffi-
cient to give a Title, and whether
it be the Thorough Settlement now
described, is the Thing to be exa-
mined. And for the better under-
standing the Sense of the Convoca-
tion, it will be convenient to give a
brief Account of the first Book, so
as to collect all together that con-
cerns this matter; that at one view a
more clear and distinct Notion may
be had of it.

They declare their *Chief Purpose* to
be to imitate the Scriptures in setting

out, and describing the Dethy and Dig-
nity of our Saviour Christ, by his Al-
mighty Power and Universal Govern-
ment of all the World, as Heir of all things
and Head of his Church. And therefore
they first affirm, that he created the
World, and gave the supreme Au-
thority to Adam for his time, and to
the rest of the Patriarchs and Chief Fa-
thers successively, before the Flood; or-
daining, by the very Law of Nature, that
their Children and Off-Spring should
fear, reverence, honour and obey them.
After the Flood it was committed to
Noah; who, by virtue of this Autho-
rity given unto him by Almighty God,
and also warranted by the Laws of Na-
ture and Reason, distributed the whole
World among his three Sons, and
they again divided it among their
Sons. But Nimrod descended of Cham,
not contenting himself with the Patriar-
chal or Regal mild Government, ordain-
ed of God by the Laws of Reason and
Nature, became a Tyrant and Lord of
Confusion. And within few Ages af-
ter the Death of Noah's Sons, their
Posterity becoming dissolute, barba-
rous and ungovernable, cast off that
Government which God had ordain-
ed, and set up new Forms of divers
kinds, after their own Humours and
Inventions. Whereupon, it is deter-
mined by the Convocation; If any
one shall affirm, that the said Posterity

Ch. 2.
Can. 2.

Ch. 6.
Can. 6.

Ch. 8.
Can. 8.

Ch. 1.
Can. 1.

of Noah's Children did well, in altering either the Manner or Form of Civil Government which God had appointed; by bringing in of Tyranny or factious Popularity—or that it was lawful for such as then served God, upon any Presence to have imitated their examples: He doth greatly err.

Ch. 8, 9,
10.
Can. 10.

Abraham with his Family being by God called out from among the wicked and idolatrous People of Chaldea, that Supremacy of Power, which he had over his own Family, was continued down to Jacob: And though afterwards this Authority was much weakened and diminished, during the abode of the Children of Israel in Egypt; yet in Process of time according to Jacob's Prophecy, the Scepter was bestowed on Judah. In the mean time, they were first governed by Moses, and then by Joshua after a mild and temperate manner. After the Death of Joshua, they had no constant Succession of Princes, but God raised up Judges from time to time, as Occasion required, to deliver and to govern them: But upon the Peoples impatience and importunity, God appointed Saul for their King; and lastly the Scepter came to the Tribe of Judah by David's advancement to the Throne, to which

Ch. 11.
Can. 11.

Ch. 14.
Can. 14.

he was as truly called by God himself as Aaron was to the Priesthood: And David's Posterity had by God's Ordinance as Rightful an Interest to succeed him in his said Kingdom, as either Aaron's Sons had to succeed him in the Priesthood; or Moses, Joshua and the rest of the Judges; notwithstanding that God himself did chuse and named them particularly, had in their Governments.

Ch. 15.
Can. 15.

But after the Kingdom was thus become Hereditary, the Kings were as much obliged, as ever, to the Observation of those Laws, which God had prescribed for them to govern by; and that they might do this the better, they had their Judges and

Inferiour Magistrates; which was no diminution of their Power, but they thereby ordered their Kingdoms with such a temperate and soberly Moderation; as was most agreeable for the Government of God's People.

Then the Convocation shews by a brief recapitulation of the Particulars from the beginning of the World, that Kings by Gods Institution have a Paternal Authority, and that Subjects owe them the Obedience of Children to their Parents. And whether the Kings or supreme Governours were nominated and appointed immediately by God himself, or succeeded by an Hereditary Right, as in the Kingdom of Judah, neither the Priests nor People had any share in conferring upon them their Legal Authority, but this was immediately and solely from God. The following Chapters and Canons to the 23d. are spent in shewing and explaining the Authority of the Kings and supreme Governours among the Jews in Ecclesiastical Affairs and the Subjection and Duty of the Priests to them, by which they were bound not to depose or rise up against them upon any account whatsoever. And then by way of Objection against this Doctrine is brought the Example of Jehoiada's deposing Athaliah; in answer to which it is said, that the Right of Succession according to Gods own Appointment was in Joash and that therefore Athaliah, though she had sat six years on the Throne, might lawfully be deposed, as being still but an Usurper, but that this ought not to be drawn into Example against a lawful King.

Ch. 16.
Can. 16.

Ch. 17,
18, 19.
Can. 17,
18, 19.

To obviate another Objection they observe, that the Prophets under the Old Testament did often severely rebuke their Kings, and sometimes anointed one King before the decease of another. Thus David was anointed by Samuel, in Saul's life-time, to succeed him; and Jehu was put into actual Possession of the Kingdom of

Ch. 25.
Can. 25.

Israel.

Israel by *Elihu*; and as God had commanded by the said Prophet, he killed Joram before that time his Sovereign, but then his Subject. But these things were done by a direct and express Message from God; and therefore were to be no Precedent to the Jews themselves, (much less to others) unless God sent a Prophet with the same Order and Commission.

Another Objection is wont to be made against the Authority of Kings from *Jer. 1. 10.* which is likewise answered.

A fourth Objection might be raised from the Example of *Othoniel*, and more especially from the Example of *Abud*, who slew *Eglon* King of the *Moabites*, to whom the *Israelites* had been Eighteen years in Subjection. But these are shown to be extraordinary Cases as that of *Jehoiada*.

But still another Difficulty arises; for the Monarchical Government spoken of hitherto among God's own People, was mild and temperate; but in other parts of the World, the temperate and *fatherly* Government which *Noah* had prescribed unto his Offspring, and which God himself established afterwards amongst his own People, was soon degenerated into Tyranny, as we see by what the Scripture relates of *Nimrod*; or into Republicks, as amongst the *Romans*, who rebel'd against their Kings; and quite cast off Kingly Government; and in like manner several Forms of Government were introduced in several other Nations. In this Case the Convocation determines; that tho' it be sinful in them, who by Invasion or Rebellion invert the Order of the World, and set up degenerate Forms of Government instead of that temperate and fatherly Government, which God has ordained; yet when these Forms are thoroughly settled, as that Tyrannical Government of *Nimrod* and the Republick of the *Romans* in Process of time were; they must then be

submitted to: For tho' they were at first introduced by very wicked Practices, yet God, having vouchsafed to establish them, and to invest them with his own Authority, they must be obeyed as his Ordinance.

These things thus stated and cleared, the Convocation proceeds to the remaining course of the Jewish History, and shews that the Jews owed Allegiance to the Kings of Persia after their return from Babylon, who still continued by God's Appointment in supreme Authority over them: and accordingly *Jaddus* the High Priest; when *Alexander* required him to assist him in his Wars and become Tributary to him, returned this Answer; that he had taken an Oath for his strict Allegiance to *Darius*, which he might not lawfully violate: which *Darius* he said was when *Alexander's* Authority was first set amongst them; and when this Case was altered, and they then owed him the same Subjection; that before they had owed *Darius*.

After *Alexander's* Death the Jews became again a free People, still leaving behind him no Successors; but they were miserably oppressed by the bordering Kings of Egypt and Syria, especially by *Antiochus Epiphanes*, whose Invasion and Government was most unjust and Tyrannical; until *Maccabees* with the most strenuous and valiant Resistance, the Government of that Tyrant being not then either generally received by Submission, nor settled by Continuance. The great disorders amongst the Priests brought many and grievous afflictions upon the Jews, both under the Government of the *Seleucians*, and of the *Maccabees*; till at last *Pompey* took Jerusalem by the Assistance of *Hircanus*, who had been displaced from the High Priesthood, his younger Brother *Aristobolus* having fled into the town: and the *Hircanians* did very wickedly in taking this occasion to revenge himself of

Ch. 29.
Can. 29.

Ch. 26.
Can. 26.

Ch. 27.
Can. 27.

Ch. 30.
Can. 30.

Ch. 28.
Can. 28.

Ch. 31.
Can. 31.

Ch. 32.

Ch. 32, 33,
34.
Can. 32,
33, 34.

Ch. 35.
Can. 35.

his Brother, by enslaving his Country; yet when the *Jews* had submitted to the *Romans*, and had yielded themselves up to their Government, they were utterly inexcusable in those Rebellions which they afterwards raised, and which ended in their own Destruction. Having thus far spoken of that mild and moderate Form of Civil Government which God at first establish'd throughout the World, and afterwards preserved (in some measure) amongst the *Jews*, till they by their perverseness and Rebellions brought utter ruin upon themselves; they say lastly, that Christ is the universal Lord and Governor of the whole Earth, and the Orders of the several particular Kingdoms and Governments, as it may best conduce to the design of his Will and Conduct in the Government of the whole World; which is but one universal Kingdom under him.

The Substance then of what the Convocation sayeth this. First, Christ as Creator and Governor of the World establish'd the first and temperate and fatherly Government, which was to continue throughout all Ages in all Parts of the World, but the wickedness of men soon introduced other degenerate Forms either Tyrannical or Popular, and these of several Sorts and Denominations; *Democracies, Aristocracies, &c.* and God calling *Abraham* out of *Chaldea* into *Canaan*, and choosing his Posterity for his peculiar People, continu'd this mild and Paternal Government amongst them, and upon all Occasions did himself appoint their chief Governors; until at last he ordain'd that this Government should be Hereditary, and entailed it upon *David's* Posterity; so that the *Jews* were govern'd all along after that original Form of Paternal Government, until God visit'd upon the last Generation of Mankind, and then again confirm'd after the Flood; though this Form of Government was much defaced and diminished

among the *Jews* in succeeding times, by the great Abuses that crept in among them. And in this Government, First, the Power was solely from God, not depending upon the consent, neither of the *Princes* or People, nor deriving any Authority from any Act of theirs. Secondly, that *Moses* had supreme Authority over all Persons and in all Causes as well Ecclesiastical as Civil. Thirdly, their Power was irresistible, and they were accountable to God only for it. But against this several things might be objected from Examples among the *Jews*, which they answer by shewing that in those Instances, God's particular Warrant and Commission had been revealed, as in the Case of *Moses* and *Jehoiada*; or that his Will and Command was fulfilled in their maintaining that Hereditary Succession which he had appointed; by deposing an Usurper, and setting up the Rightful Heir; and this was what *Jehoiada* did.

3. As for other degenerate Sorts of Government, though they ought not to have been introduced, yet when by never so sinful Arts and Practices, by Usurpations from abroad, or by Factions and Rebellions at home, they had in any where been thoroughly settled, as the Governments of *Babylon* and *Egypt* and *Rome* were, they must be submitted to; because where the Original, Paternal Government was extirpated, the Authority thereby devolved upon the Possessors of the supreme Power in these degenerate Forms, whether they were Tyrannical or Republican; because the supreme Government of the World would not suffer so great a Part of Mankind to be without any rightful Government for so long a time, and yet so they must be, unless he either authorize these degenerate Forms upon the Extinction of the Paternal Original Government, or restore it by an overruling Providence.

4. When

4. When the Jews themselves were, by God's Judgment upon them for their Sins, placed under such degenerate kinds of Government, they were to pay the same Submission to those Governors; that they did to their own Kings; they might not depart out of Egypt without Pharaoh's leave first obtained; unless God would have warranted them to do it by his express Direction and Command; they must not submit to Alexander, whilst Darius lived; and no Oppression of the Romans was a sufficient excuse for their rebelling against them.

This being the Sense of the Convocation, it will not be difficult to understand, what they mean by a *thorough Settlement*.

Their Words are these:

Ch. 28.

"And when, having attained their ungodly Desires, (whether ambitious Kings by bringing any Country into their Subjection, or disloyal Subjects by their Rebellious rising against their natural Sovereigns) they have established any of the said degenerate Forms of Government amongst their People; the Authority either so unjustly gotten, or wrung by Force from the True and Lawful Possessor, being always God's Authority, (and therefore receiving no Impairment by the Wickedness of those that have it) is ever (when any such Alterations are thoroughly settled) to be revered and obeyed, &c.

These Words being an Inference from the Particulars before related in this Chapter, we must judge of them from the occasion and design of the whole Chapter, and from the particular Instances alledged in it. First, the design of the Chapter is to shew what Obedience is due to Kings or other supreme Magistrates,

where that mild and temperate Government, which had been the Subject of the foregoing Chapters, was not retained, but other Forms set up in its room. For, as the rebellious Humours of the People, declining from their Obedience, did in many Countries alter that temperate and fatherly Government which Noah had prescribed unto his Offspring, and which God himself established afterwards among his own People: So did the ambitious and insatiable Dispositions of sundry no less elsewhere impeach the same, as by the Beginning and Progress of the Four Monarchies it is most apparent. And therefore they now declare, what is to be thought of all these Aberrations from the said mild and temperate Government before specified: And they determine, That Almighty God, (who for the good of any Nation or Country altereth those Governments and Governors, translateth, setteth up, and bestoweth Kingdoms as it seemeth best to his Heavenly Wisdom) having in his Wisdom suffered wicked men to introduce and establish these new Forms, we are to look upon them as his Ordinance; and therefore to pay them all that Obedience which is due to the Paternal Government of his own Institution. Secondly, we may learn what is meant by a *Thorough Settlement* from the particular Instances here mentioned; and these are the Assyrian Monarchy, the Roman Commonwealth, the Kingdom of Egypt, and all the Four Monarchies: When therefore any degenerate Forms of Government, or Aberrations from the mild and temperate Government before specified, are so settled as these were, we must in Conscience yield all Obedience to them, and not think that they have no sufficient Authority, because they deviate from the first Pattern of Government prescribed by God himself, and preserved amongst his own People.

It is indeed said, that the Authority unjustly gotten, or wrong by force from the true and lawful Possessor, is God's Authority and therefore receives no Impairment from the wickedness of those that have it. Which seems to suppose, that the true and Lawful Possessor may be still living, and may still claim the Allegiance of his Subjects, and that the Invader or Usurper keeps Possession as wickedly, that is, as much against all Human Law and Right as the first got into it. But if we observe the instances immediately added, it will appear that no such thing can be concluded from this Passage. For they instance in the Kings of Egypt, who oppressed the Israelites after Joseph's Death, and in the Kings of Babylon, when they had brought the Jews into Subjection, and had carried away the whole Nation into Captivity. But the Kings of Egypt after Joseph's Death had undoubtedly as good a Right as they had before it, and the Kings of Babylon had such a Right to the Allegiance of the Jews as no other Princes could pretend to, when the whole Jewish Nation were brought under Subjection to them, and their Kings themselves had made a Covenant with them, and taken an Oath to them, *Exek. 17. 16.* and were strictly commanded by God himself to let the King of Babylon, *Jer. 27.* Yet these are the only Instances brought to shew that God's Authority receiveth no Impairment by the wickedness of those that have it, that is, as no wicked means in the acquiring of Power can hinder, but that after a long and uninterrupted continuance (as in the Four Monarchies) these Forms of Government are confirmed by God's Authority, so neither can the abuse of this Authority, by Oppression and Tyranny, when any such Alterations are thoroughly settled, invalidate the Authority itself, but it is always God's

Authority, and is still to be revered, and obeyed as such. And therefore all the Severities and intolerable Burdens which the Jews endured in Egypt and in Babylon, could not warrant their taking up Arms against those Kings; so that the Jews themselves, when brought under these new Forms of Government were obliged to submit to them, and not by any Insurrections or Violence endeavour to restore themselves to that Primary Institution of Government, which God had appointed, these having his Authority as much as that itself, when they are thoroughly settled, and when there is no other objection to be made to them, but that they are irregular and corrupt in their Constitution, or had an ill beginning, or are oppressive and Tyrannical in their Management and Administration. If all who had any Right or Interest in the former Government have submitted to the new one, and are under the Obligation of Engagements and Oaths to it, (which was the Case of the Jews) they must be obedient to it, however different from the former, or how much worse soever it may be.

But the Convocation acknowledge no other settlement, tho never so full to have been sufficient to debar the Jews from casting into Arms against an Usurper. For they justify Mattathias and his Sons in their open Resistance, they made against Antiochus Epiphanes, because his Government was neither generally received by Submission, nor settled by continuance. Now Antiochus was called in by a prevalent Faction, and had two years penitible Possession of Jerusalem; for so long it was, before Mattathias took up Arms against him, that Antiochus had entered into Jerusalem by the Treachery of that Faction, without any opposition; and it was three years longer, before it was recovered out of his Hands by Judas Maccabeus, so that he held

1. Mac. c.
1, 2, 3.
Joseph. Antiqu. l. 12.
c. 7, 8, 9.
11.

held it in all five years; yet because that Faction only that invited him in had submitted to him, and the contrary Party, who had the Right on their side, were not subdued nor brought to a Compliance by this continuance of his Government, it was not such a Continuance as is required to that thorough Settlement, which the Convocation mention: But tho he had for so long time been in full Possession of Jerusalem, and of their whole Country, and had, as the Convocation observe, spoiled the Temple, and profaned it with his Idols, and exercised all the cruel and wicked Acts of the most absolute and tyrannical Conqueror, he had notwithstanding no better Right still, than at his first Usurpation. So that the Convocation cannot mean a bare Possession, though it be never so full, by a Thorough Settlement, but such a Settlement only, as both supposes Submission or Continuance, and no Claim of Right in any other Person.

And that the meaning of the Convocation could not be, that an Usurper, by being gone into full Possession, may have any Right or just Title against the true Heir, appears from what they determine about the Deposing of Athaliah after six years Possession: For the Reason they give to justify the Proceedings of Jehoiada therein is, that Joash their late King's Son was then their only Natural Lord and Sovereign, although Athaliah kept him for six years from the Possession of his Kingdom. It may here be objected that this is a peculiar case, and that this Reason would hold good only in the Kingdom of Judah, where God himself had appointed and settled the Succession of their Kings in the line of David, and that therefore Jehoiada said to the Congregation, Behold, the King's Son shall Reign, as the Lord hath said of the Sons of David, 2. Chr. 23. 2. and the Convocation observes that he acquainted them, that it

was the Lord's will that he should reign over them, and that God himself had required all that they did at their Hands. For when God has given his Promise, we must interpret no occurrences of Providence, in contradiction to it, and therefore we see that when the Kingdom was taken from David's Posterity, it was not done without an express Revelation: But where God has made no Promise to a King and his Successors that they shall enjoy the Kingdom, he may by his Providence take it away from them.

To this I answer, That the whole design of the Convocation is, as I have shewn, to explain the Duty of Subjects by the example of God's own People, and therefore if in this place they suppose, something so peculiar in the Constitution of their Government, that it could be no precedent to other Kingdoms this must be a manifest contradiction to their whole design: They tell us that Government in its Original, and by its first Institution was immediately from God, and was the same throughout the World, and tho it were corrupted in other Nations, God preserved it amongst his own People; and yet still the same Obedience was due under those alterations from the said mild and temperate Government, at first instituted, that was to be paid under this itself, and by consequence there must be the same obligation to the Right Heir in all other Hereditary Monarchies; and therefore they call Joash here the true and natural apparent Heir to the Crown and their only natural Lord and Sovereign, which would be very unfit expressions, if they did not think, that he had an unalterable Right by the Law of Nature as well as by God's Promise. It was enough indeed that Jehoiada should remind the People of God's own choice of Davids Posterity to rule over them, and nothing more needed

to be said by him; and it was very fit, that this should not be omitted by the Convocation: But if this were the only Title which *Joash* had, it would have been improper to call him a Natural Heir, a Natural Lord and Sovereign, and it would have overthrown all their Arguments from the Practice of the Jews, if they had said that *Joash* ought to be plac'd upon the Throne of his Ancestors, after that six years Interval, only by virtue of a Divine Promise: For a Divine command concerning any of their Kings or Judges for the time of their Lives, is equivalent to a Divine Promise concerning *David* and his Posterity, and so it might be said by parity of Reason, that the Duty which they owed their Kings was due by virtue of a revealed command from God, and could not be the same in other Nations, where there is no such revealed Command. Thus *David* would not stretch forth his Hand against *Saul*, for this Reason, because he was *the Lords anointed*, that is, he was so chosen and appointed by God himself, so a King now can pretend to be: And so in all other instances, if we must argue from no example, where Gods command or promise intervenes, in vain does the Convocation explain the Duty of Subjects from the sacred History; and if we must argue from no such examples, if Gods revealed will alters the case, and makes it different from Cases of the same Nature, which fall out in other Governments concerning which God has not revealed any thing.

It is true indeed when God so interposes as to invert the ordinary course of Government, as in the case of *Abud* and *Jehu*, this can be no Precedent for any to imitate, without the same command to authorize them, that they had, but then it was no more a Precedent to the Jews themselves, than to any other Nation. But when God only regulates the

Jewish Government according to the first Institution at the Creation, and settles it upon the Right of Succession, which is common to that with all other Hereditary Monarchies, and makes choice of the Person, to whom and to his Posterity he grants a Donation of the Kingdom; or when he reforms abuses, and puts things into their due course and order again, and enjoins nothing but what without a Divine warrant, is of itself lawful to be done, we may conclude that all these things are written for our instruction, and must be a Rule to all other Nations in the like Cases.

The Convocation therefore proceeds all along upon this Principle, that from the first Institution of Government there is both a Natural and a Divine Right in all Sovereigns; which is Natural as it is founded on the Laws of Nature, and Divine because Government is Gods Ordinance, and owes its Original Form and Constitution to Gods own immediate appointment, and therefore that when God by his express direction and command afterwards settled that sort of Government, which he at first instituted to all the World, among his own People, he did not thereby make any alteration in the Duty of Subjects, or Rights of Kings, but did only oblige both to perform their several Duties in that way and manner which he had enjoy'd them. The Children of *Israel* asked a King to judge them like all the Nations, 1 Sam. 8. 5. 20. And God chose *Saul* to be their King, but what ever variations there might be in some circumstances of Government, they owed just the same Duty and Subjection to him, which was due to *Adam* and *Noah*, &c. And according to the Convocation, every other Sovereign Prince has the very same Right that he has neither, they in asking, nor God in giving them a King made any distinction between the Authority

Ch. 2. 6.
Can. 2. 6.

of their King and the Kings of other Nations; but the manner or Royal Power of their King is described to be just the same with that of the Kings round about them. God entailed the Kingdom of *Judah* upon *David* and his Seed, but the Right of Succession was still the same in that, which it is in all other Hereditary Kingdoms, only they had a Secondary Obligation to the performance of their Duty from an immediate and positive Command, whereas others are oblig'd to the same Duties, but by Virtue only of the Law of Nature, and of the first Institution of Government. The *Jews* then were bound to set up *Joash* in that Kingdom upon two accounts, that is, both as he was their Natural Sovereign, and as he descended from *David*, to whom God had made a peculiar Promise, and had given the Kingdom to him and to his Posterity: but the first obligation had been of itself sufficient, and those Kings who hold by no Divine Promise, but only by Right of Inheritance, have the same Right which he had, who held by a Twofold Title, because either of them had been alone sufficient: For a single Title is enough to convey a Right, and an Additional one can only confirm and strengthen it. Indeed when there are two Titles, one may sometimes hold good, when the other fails: But then this must be, when the Titles are wholly distinct and independent one upon another, as they are not in the present Case. For God bestowed the Kingdom upon *David* for him and his Heirs after him to hold by Succession, that is, to hold by the same Right that other Hereditary Monarchs hold by; so that if he by his Providence had disposed of the Hereditary Right, and caused it to fail, his Promise which was grounded upon this Hereditary Right, or rather did suppose it, as its Object, or the

Thing Promised, could now no longer give him a Title to the Kingdom: For God by his Promise did not bar himself from disposing of the Kingdom of *Judah* in the same manner, as he disposeth of all other Hereditary Kingdoms, but he promised *David*, that he should Rule that Kingdom by an Hereditary Right, just in the same manner and by the same Tenure from himself, that other Hereditary Kings hold by. God had promised to protect the Kings of *Judah*, and to continue the Kingdom to them; and that a peculiar Providence should watch over them, but never that his Providence should not have the same Power over them, that it had over all other Kings; and therefore we find that the Kingdom of *Judah* did not always continue without Interruption even in *David's* Line, which yet it must have done, if God's Promise had been so to be understood, as that it was not to be subject to the Contingencies that other Hereditary Kingdoms are liable to. And upon this Account the Convocation proposes the Kingdom of *Judah* as a Pattern to other Kingdoms, because the Jews had God's Warrant and Direction in such Cases as happen in other Kingdoms, whereas if their Proceedings were to be no example to others, the Convocation had argued from a wrong Principle, and their whole Act Book had been to very little purpose.

But granting that the Kingdom of *Judah* was by the Entail upon *David's* Line exempted from the ordinary Laws of Providence, yet I shall shew, First, that it was not so exempted in the time of *Joash*. Secondly, that when God by his revealed Will deposed the Kings of *Judah*, he so ordered it, that the Allegiance of the Subjects would have been transferred by human Laws and Justice, without a Revelation.

First, Tho the Kingdom of *Judah*

had been at first exempted from the common Laws of Providence, yet it could not be so exempted in the time of *Joash*. For the Promise to *Dauid*'s House was conditional, and upon supposition, that his Children kept Gods Covenant and Testimony *Ps. 132. 12.* And when the Kings of *Judah* had by their Transgressions forfeited all that Right, which God had made over to them by Promise, they could no longer have any pretence to that exemption; but there is no Reason to think, but that his Posterity might have fall'n from their Right by any way, which other Kings may. For the promise being conditional, if God by his Providence conveys away the Right to other Kingdoms, and invests all those with his Authority, who are possessed of the Sovereign Power in other Nations, the Jews must have concluded in the Case of *Joash* and *Abathiah*, that since the House of *Dauid* had not performed the Conditions expressly annexed to the Promise, God had taken the forfeiture of the Kingdom of *Judah*, and had by his Providence disposed of it so as to set up another in the Room of the Right Heir. For a conditional Promise can oblige no longer, than the Conditions are performed by them, to whom it is made, and therefore there could be no need of a new Revelation to take away the Kingdom from *Dauid*'s Line; since the Conditions upon which the Kingdom was granted, were notoriously violated by so many of the Kings of *Judah*, particularly by *Solomon*, the last Successor, who the God had repeated to him the conditions of his Promise made to his Father *Dauid*, provoked God to that Degree, that Ten Tribes were taken away from his Son, and Separated from the Kingdom of *Judah*; and by *Ahab* the Father of *Jezebel*, who had added to the Ways of his House, *Ahab*. The Kings of *Judah* therefore not

observing the Terms, which were enjoyed them at the making the entail, but transgressing that Covenant which God made with *Dauid*, upon which the Throne of his Kingdom was established, *2 Chron. 7. 17, 18.* God could be no longer bound to continue the entail in Performance of his Promise or Covenant, but that Kingdom must be afterwards in the same State, with all other Kingdoms, and there could be no Reason why God should not dispose of it, in the same manner, that he disposes of any other.

Secondly, When God by his revealed Will deposed the Kings of *Judah* he so ordered it, that the Allegiance of the Subjects would have been transferred by Human Law and Justice without any Revelation. For at last when the Scepter departed from *Dauid*, tho' not from *Judah*, tho' the Kingdom was not taken from the House of *Dauid* but by Revelation, yet it was taken away in such a manner, as to make no breach upon the Rights of Kings over their Subjects, but to require their Allegiance according to the ways of Right and Justice amongst men, for God had commanded the Kings of *Judah* to submit themselves to *Nebuchadnezzar*, and accordingly *Jehoiakim* became his Servant three years, and afterwards when he came against the City, *Jerusalem* went out to him, and *Benhadad*, and his Servants and his Princes, and his Officers, *2 Kings. 24. 20.* submitted to him in the most solemn manner imaginable, and therefore the Subjects Case was just, and manifest, that it is when there is no Revelation, but only the Providence of God to transfer Allegiance: For if a King become Servant to the Conqueror, if he and his Servants, and his Princes, and his Officers, all that have Right of Authority in the Government are carried away Captive, and submit and bind themselves by Oath

1 Kings. 9.
4, 5.

2 Kings. 8.
27.

to the Conquerour, as the Kings of Judah did *Ezek. 17. 16.* there is no doubt but the Subjects may follow their Kings Example, and become Subjects to the Conquerour, as well as he, and cannot be obliged to reserve their Allegiance to him, by virtue of that Right, which he has now resigned: For when a King has resigned his Crown, whether it be by God's Appointment, or upon some other Account, he has resigned his Right to the Subjects Allegiance, and they are then at liberty to submit to another Prince. And it is a good Evidence, that the Allegiance of Subjects is not transferr'd by Providence without the Resignation or Death of the Rightful King, because it was not otherwise transferred by *Revelation.*

Obj. The Israelites had been 18 years in Subjection to the Moabites, as they had been a little before 8 years to the Aramites, and they knew that it was not lawful for them of themselves to take Arms against the Kings whose Subjects they were, the under they were Tyrants: And therefore they cryed unto the Lord for Succour. Yet both these Nations could have no other Authority over them, but what was obtained by Conquest and a thorough Settlement.

I answer first, the Scripture says, *the Anger of the Lord was hot against Israel, and he sold them into the hand of Chushan-rishathaim. Judg. 3. 8. and v. 12. The children of Israel did evil again in the sight of the Lord: and the Lord strengthened Eglon the King of Moab against Israel.* From whence it is probable, that God who governed the Israelites by a more than ordinary Providence, and made frequent Declarations of his Will to them, especially in denouncing his Judgments, before any remarkable Punishment was inflicted upon the whole Nation, so give them time for Repentance; did now discover to

them, that the Aramites and Moabites were sent by him to subdue them. *For the Anger of the Lord was hot against Israel, and he sold them into the hand of Chushan-rishathaim, and he strengthened Eglon the King of Moab against Israel.* But if this Judgment were not particularly foretold and denounced; yet this they knew in general, that these Nations the Lord left to prove Israel by them, to know whether they would hearken to the Commandments of the Lord, which he commanded their Fathers by the hand of Moses v. 1. and 4. And therefore when they were vanquished and were forced to seek their Preservation by subjecting themselves to their Enemies, they well knew that they had no Power nor Authority to oppose such Kings, whom God for their sins, as he had before threatened, had set over them, but they cryed unto the Lord, and he raised up a Deliverer for them. Secondly, the whole Nation was in Subjection 18 years to the Moabites and 8 years to the Aramites, and when they had once yielded themselves up, and were become their Subjects, no Right which any other Person had over them being prejudiced thereby, they were obliged to keep their Oaths or other Engagements of Obedience to them, and were bound to pay all Duties of Allegiance to these Kings, after they had owned them for their Kings, tho they were Tyrants; that is, tho they governed them in a rigorous and tyrannical manner. For the consent of a Nation may be the means of conveying a Right to a Prince in such a Case, where no other has any precedent Right to their Allegiance, tho there be no express Warrant from God for their so doing: so that there being at this time no King in Israel, there was no injury done to any man, if the whole Nation submitted to the Conqueror.

Can. 31. *Obj.* " But the Jews generally " both Priests and People were the " Subjects of *Alexander* after his Au- " thority was settled amongst them, as " they had been before the Subjects " of the Kings of *Babylon* and *Persia*: Tho it appears from History, that *Darius* was alive when *Jaddus* made a surrender of *Jerusalem* to *Alexander*, or, if he had been dead, yet he left Heirs behind him.

Ans. First, the Convocation ob- serves, that when *Alexander* sent to *Jaddus* to require him to submit to him; and send him Assistance in his Wars; *Jaddus* answered, that he might not yield therunto, be- cause he had taken an Oath for his true Allegiance to *Darius*; which he might not lawfully violate whilst *Darius* li- ved. And when *Jaddus* afterwards submitted to him, it was by reason of a Command, which he had receiv- ed by Revelation from God: For as *Josephus* relates, in the place refer- red to by the Convocation, *Jaddus* had appointed Publick Prayers and Sacrifices upon this account, and it was revealed to him in a Dream, That the People, in white, and the Priests and *Jaddus* himself, in their Holy Garments, should go out to meet *Alexander*, and make their Sub- mission to him; who no sooner saw *Jaddus*, but he fell down and wor- shipped God; whose name he saw written on his Mitre; and when his Followers were all amazed at it, and *Permenis* asked him the Reason of that strange Action; he answered, that before his Expedition he saw in a Vision one attired as *Jaddus* was, who encouraged him to undertake it; and promised him success in it; and that it was not the Priest, but that God whom he served, that he worshipped. Secondly In Chap. 30. the Answer of *Jaddus* to *Alexander*, that he was bound by his Oath of Allegiance to *Darius* during his Life is mentioned and approved of by the

Convocation; but neither in the fol- lowing Chapter nor Canon is any mention made of *Jaddus*, only it is said in the Canon, that both Priests and People were the Subjects of *Alexander* after his Authority was settled among them, &c. Which might be true, tho *Jaddus* had been faulty in submitting to *Alexander*, whilst *Darius* was alive. Thirdly, *Jaddus* went out to meet *Alexander*, and made his Submission to him at his first Approach to *Jerusalem*; so that if his Example be to be followed, a City ought to surrender before it be besieged, or so much as a Sword be drawn against it: And the first sight and appearance of an Enemy is a different thing from that thorough Settlement which the Convocation re- quires, whatsoever be understood by it. The Convocation therefore could not propose the Example of *Jaddus* in all Circumstances for our Imitation: for either he had a Di- vine Warrant for what he did, or according to their Principle he must be highly blameable, because he did not stay till there was a thorough Settlement, nor indeed till there was any Settlement at all, before he submitted to *Alexander*. But after the Death of *Darius*, his Authority was thoroughly settled; for *Darius* just before he expired sent such a Mes- sage to him, with his thanks for his great Courtesie and Civility to his Mother and to his Wife and Children, as can amount to no less than a bequeathing to him his King- dom, and *Alexander* taking one of his Daughters in Marriage, no Pre- tensions were made afterwards a- gainst his Right to the Kingdom of *Persia*.

Obj. " But God Is the universal " Lord and Ruler over all the World, " and the whole World is his univer- " sal Kingdom; in the Government " whereof he ever used the Ministry " of Civil Magistrates, as well in " other

Joseph.
Antiqu.
l. 11. c. 9.

- "other Countries as amongst his
 "own peculiar People of Israel, with-
 "out any defect of them, but as in
 "his heavenly Providence he thought
 "it most convenient. I have made
 (saith he) the Earth, the Man and
 Jer. 27. 5. "the Beasts that are upon the Ground,
 "and have given it to whom it pleaseth
 "me: And again, the Prophet Daniel
 Dan. 4. 14. "tellet us that God changeth the times
 12. 17. 32. "and seasons, that he hath Power and
 "beareth Rule over the Kingdoms of
 "men; that he taketh away Kings and
 "settleth up Kings; and that it was
 "the God of Heaven, who gave unto
 Dan. 2. 37. "Nebuchadnezzar so great a King-
 5. 8. "dom, Power, Strength and Glory, as
 "then he had to rule, with Majesty
 "and Honour a very great Empire.

First, The Design of the Convocation here is to set forth Christ's Universal Empire over all the World, and to shew that, for all their Dignity and Greatness, he did not leave Kings at liberty to do what they list, but held himself the Helm of every Government, and used their Services in such sort, as, were they good or bad and their Disposition holy or wicked, he ever made them the Executioners of his own just Judgments, Will and good Pleasure; according as he was minded either to bless or punish any Kingdom, People or Country. All which will be never the less true, tho God should not dispose of Kingdoms merely by the events and Success of things, without any regard had to Humane Law and Right.

Secondly, The Chapters here quoted by them are all concerning Nebuchadnezzar. In the first, Jeremiah prophesieth of his Victories over the Neighbour-Kings, and commands them in Gods Name to submit to him. And the two latter Chapters contain Nebuchadnezzar's Dreams and Daniel's Interpretation of them. In his second Chapter Daniel tells him, *Thou, O King, art a King of Kings, for the God of Heaven hath given thee*

a Kingdom, Power, and Strength, and Glory, v. 37. and then proceeds to declare, that by his Dream was signified the State of the four Monarchies. In the fourth Chapter of Daniel is related that Judgment which from God befel Nebuchadnezzar; and his Dream whereby it was foretold to him; The intent of which was, that the living might know that the most high ruleth in the Kingdom of Men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the basest of men.

First then, as to the four Monarchies; we have here no intimation that God did raise up the first Founders of them, or did approve of the Settlement they made: The Assyrian Monarchy, the Convocation takes notice of, began in Nimrod, contrary to Gods express Institution, he having no Authority from God, as afterwards Nebuchadnezzar had, to enlarge his Dominions and make War against the bordering Princes. Cyrus we know indeed was Gods Anointed, and was Prophecied of by name long before his Birth; and alleadg'd his Commission and Charge from God in the Proclamation which he put forth in the first year of his Reign, 2. Chron. 36. 22. 23. Ezr. 1. 1, 2. God had declared of him, *I have raised him up in Righteousness, and I will direct all his ways, Isai. 45. 13.* or as our Translators have noted in the Margin, *I will make straight all his ways*, and the Septuagint renders it, *Εγὼ ἐμεγαλυνῶ αὐτὸν ὡς δικαιοσύνης βασιλέα, καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ὁδοὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδραίας.* And Alexander, if we believe Josephus, was encouraged by Revelation to undertake his Expedition: But the Roman Empire had only Gods Permission as far as we know, and at its rise had no further Authority than the Justice of their Arms could give them: So that this Prediction is no Evidence, whether the first Erection and Settlement of these Monarchies were approved of by God or not; if

If they were erected by his Command and Appointment, or by a just Title, they were approved of by him; if by Injustice and Violence they were only made use of by him, as all other Wickedness is, to bring about by an over-ruling Providence his own just and righteous Decrees.

Secondly, as to what concerns *Nebuchadnezzar* himself; First, all those Expressions have an immediate relation to an extraordinary Case, wherein God had revealed his positive Will, commanding the several Kings mentioned by the Prophet *Jeremiah* to serve *Nebuchadnezzar*, and to put their Necks under his Yoke, and threatening them with the severest Punishments, if they would not do it, with the Sword, and with the Pestilence, and with the Famine, until he had consumed them; *Nebuchadnezzar's* Hand, *Jer. 27. v. 8.* and afterwards in the Book of *Daniel*, God takes away all his Power and Greatness to bring him to a sense of his perpetual dependence upon God, and to an awe and reverence of the Divine Majesty. Secondly, God had declared by his Prophet that he had given all the Neighbouring Kingdoms into the hand of *Nebuchadnezzar* the King of *Babylon* his servant, and his Commands were in a publick and solemn manner given out, and sent to all the Kings round about to charge 'em that they should without any Resistance or Opposition resign up themselves and their Kingdoms in subjection to him. And this being some years beforehand with such Zeal and Earnestness publicly and solemnly declared by *Jeremiah*, and so notoriously known in all the adjacent Countries, *Nebuchadnezzar* himself could not be ignorant of it; for which reason he gave such strict Charge concerning *Jeremiah*, that he should be used with all manner of kindness and respect, *Jer. 39. 11.* Afterwards *Daniel* in expounding his first Dream had plainly told him, that the God of

Heaven had made him a King of Kings, and had given him a Kingdom, Power, and Strength, and Glory. Yet *Nebuchadnezzar* ascribes all to himself, and therefore this Judgment was inflicted on him to make him sensible that all his boasted Greatness was owing to God alone, who has absolute Authority over the greatest of Kings, and can advance to the height of Empire the basest of Men; and those that walk in Pride he is able to abase.

Besides what relates personally to *Nebuchadnezzar*, there is a further intention in the words, which respects all Princes in all Ages of the World. For *Nebuchadnezzar* is set as an Example of Gods Almighty Power, and of the frailty of all Human Greatness, to let the mighty Potentates of the Earth know, that all their Power is from God, and that he can deprive them of it, whenever he pleases.

But Thirdly, This does not prove that God will give or take away the Power of other Princes, in the same extraordinary manner, that he both raised and debased *Nebuchadnezzar*. For as in ancient times there were Prophets and Workers of Miracles, so these Prophets were sometimes sent by God himself to declare, in his name, that he had bestowed Kingdoms or Empires upon certain persons, as upon *Nebuchadnezzar*, *Cyrus*, &c. And then these were no Usurpers, because they acted by Gods Appointment, and had a right precedent to any Conquest or *Thorough Settlement*. But there were in all Ages many Usurpers too, and they had no Authority from God, nor were the People obliged to obey them, having no Command from him to do it. And as an Usurper can have no Authority for his Usurpations (for if he had they would be no Usurpations nor he an Usurper; so the continuance of his Usurpations cannot make him the less an Usurper, but the greater and the more injurious Usurper.

Usurper. *Nebuchadnezzar* was no Usurper from the beginning, because he acted by Authority from God, and if concerning any Prince can be shewn such a Commission now, he is not an Usurper but a Rightful King, and we must forthwith acknowledge his Authority, without staying for a thorough settlement, but if he be at first an Usurper, he must always be so, unless he acquires a Right by some other means, than a settled and habitual Injustice. The Scripture nowhere informs us that God authorises Usurpers, after a thorough Settlement, but on the contrary that those are no Usurpers concerning whom God by his Prophets has given assurance to the People, that himself had raised them up to the Throne.

Fourthly, All are now to be lookt upon as Usurpers, who invade the Rights of their Neighbour Princes, for the same Reason that we esteem all pretenders to Miracles and Prophecys no better than Cheats and Impostors. For *Nebuchadnezzar* had Prophecys delivered concerning him which entitled him to the Kingdoms he possessed: For tho he find in invading the Dominions of other Princes, if he did not believe the Prophet or knew not of his own Title granted him by God himself to them, yet he did them no injury, because their Right was already transferred to him and therefore his Sin was only that of a Man, who robs another of that which is his own not knowing it to be so. But now Prophecys are ceased, as well as Miracles, and God acts by the ordinary course of his Providence as well as by the ordinary course of Nature. Miracles were necessary to awaken Mens attention, and put them upon a serious consideration of Religion, and bring them to an acknowledgment of the Truth of it: and so were such Revelations needful to manifest Gods infinite Power and Majesty, and to make the greatest

Princes stand in awe of him; but when once these ends are served, we are left to the Moral and Divine Laws of Reason and of Scripture for our Direction in the performance of our Duty, as we are to the Physical Laws of Nature in the Provisions of Health and Life: and to conclude that every Conqueror has the same Right to our Obedience that *Nebuchadnezzar* had to be obeyed by the Nations, whom he had subdued, is as groundless as to think that any man, who comes with lying Wonders and confident Stories, has a Power of Miracles and a Gift of Prophecys. God many times by a wonderful Providence casts down Usurpers, when they are most settled and secure in their unjust Possessions, and it is the Glory of his infinite Wisdom that when he suffers the World to go on in one constant Tenour, and does not interrupt wicked men in their enterprises and practices, yet he still holds the Helm of Government, and the most lasting and settled Usurpations cannot in the least prejudice the execution and accomplishment of his just and Holy Decrees: And in this he exercises his Dominion over Mankind, as he shews his Dominion over Nature by a steady and constant concurrence with natural Agents, notwithstanding the many seeming Irregularities that appear in the World: and we ought no more to imagine his Authority in any Usurpers from whom we promise our selves Protection, then we may suppose a Miraculous Power in those Charms, which sometimes cure Diseases.

The Earth is the Lords and all that dwell in it, and it cannot be denied, but God might if he had pleased, frequently raise up Princes as he did *Nebuchadnezzar*, but then he would send his Prophets to give notice of it: For we must conclude in this case, as the Convocation does in the case of *Jehu*, that it is unlawful to follow such extraordinary examples, *except*

first

Can. 25.

first that it might plainly appear that there are now any such Prophets sent extraordinarily from God himself, with sufficient and special Authority in that behalf; and that we might be assured of every such Prince as is by Usurpation settled in anothers Dominions, that God himself had in express words required and commanded us to submit to him by Name; as he commanded the Nations whom Nebuchadnezzar conquered, to serve him, declaring that he had given all those Lands into the Hand of Nebuchadnezzar the King of Babylon his Servant. Jer. 27, 6. But we may observe that as Nebuchadnezzar was raised up by God himself, so the Kings of those Nations were commanded to submit to him as well as their People, and did submit, or were subdued by him, so that the Peoples part in that Revolution was no more than what Subjects may do now, if such a thing should be brought about by Providence; for when the King has submitted himself, there is no Question to be made, but that the Subjects may do so too.

II. Having considered the Arguments from the Authority of the Convocation, I now proceed to the Arguments from the Reason of the Thing itself.

By an Usurper in this Question is plainly meant one who is in Possession of the Kingdom contrary to the Laws and Constitution of the Realm, and without any Title but that of Possession; and an Usurper in Possession is opposed to a Rightful King out of Possession, whether he be either first, actually dispossessed and driven out of his Kingdom; or secondly, have an undoubted Right to it, but has been always kept out of Possession and could never come to the enjoyment of it. But it's granted that

First, If the Title be doubtful, the Subjects are at liberty to submit to the Possessor, and ought not to em-

broider the Nation with Wars, and sacrifice the Peace and Happiness of it for an Uncertainty: And in this case the Subjects are oblig'd to stand by him, to whom they have sworn Allegiance, till a clear Title be made out against him, upon defect whereof the Oath was taken, upon supposition that there was no precedent Obligation to another Prince, and therefore must oblige till it appears that his Competitor claims by an Hereditary or other antecedent Right.

Secondly, If in an Hereditary Monarchy, after the thorough Settlement of an Usurper, it should so happen that the Royal Line had failed, and the Right of Succession were extinct, the People might be oblig'd for their own, and for their Country's sake to submit to the Usurper and after their Submission he would become their lawful King. For tho he could have deriv'd no Authority from his Thorough Settlement, (notwithstanding there were none surviving of the Royal Line,) and the Subjects might have yielded themselves up to the Obedience of any other Person, if they had had a convenient opportunity, so as to have done it without bringing damage and mischief to the Publick by it, yet they might be oblig'd to submit to him, to prevent that Slaughter and confusion, which else would ensue, and if they should have refused to do it, they would have sinned against God, in neglecting the safety of themselves and of their Country, supposing nevertheless that no Injustice would have been done to the Usurper thereby, and that he could have had no Right before their Submission.

The Question therefore is, Whether an Usurper who has no claim to the Crown but that of Possession, tho he be never so long and thoroughly settled in the Throne, can have a Right to the Allegiance of the Subjects, whilst their Rightful King, who has

has an Hereditary, or whatsoever other undoubted Title by the Constitution of the Kingdom is alive, and requires them to bear Faith and Allegiance to him?

The Sum of what can be said in the Affirmative seems to be this; That as it is shewn at large in the Convocation Book, Christ has reserved the Government of the World and the disposal of Kingdoms entirely to himself and can make or dispose Kings, as he pleaseth, notwithstanding any Claim, Right, Title or Interest, which they can challenge to their Kingdoms, and as he first ruled the world by frequent Revelations and Prophecies, so since these are ceased he doth it by his Providence only for he always retains the same immediate Inspection with human affairs, but now manifests his Pleasure and gives out his Commands as Governor of the World by the Declarations of his Providence, that is, by the Success and Event of things; for he could not govern the world as supreme Lord and King of it, or which is all one, he could not require our Obedience in Compliance to his disposal of Kingdoms if his will were not some way or other discovered to us, and this being now the only way whereby he discovers it, we must acquiesce in the Events of his Providence, so as to obey Christ the Supreme Governor of the world in the Person of him, whosoever he be, whom he has set over us, making no enquiry into the Justice of the Cause, or into the means by which the Person now fully possessed of another Princes Power and Dominions, came so possessed of them. For God can take away and transfer any Right or Title as he pleaseth, and the Conduct of his Providence in a Thorough Settlement of the Government, is a sufficient evidence that he has transferred it, because it is the only evidence we now can have. And therefore we ought to look upon the Person thus settled, as invested with God's Authority, and to pay him a full and entire Allegiance, as his Viceroy with the same Submission, and upon the same

Reasons, as if he had commanded us to do it by an express and immediate Revelation, since his Providence is now the only Revelation, or Manifestation of his will, that we can expect, and it must be instead of all other Revelations to us.

This seems to be the full of what can be fairly offered in the Affirmative, and it is liable to the following Difficulties.

I. By Gods Providence must be understood either his Permission in concurring with Natural Causes to produce their Effects; or, his Appointment.

First, If he only suffer or permit a thing to be done, without denying his Concourse, or interposing his Almighty Power to prevent it, this by no means proves his Approbation of the Event or Success of it. For he permits all the Wickedness, that is committed in the World, and suffers the worst men to prosper many times in their evil Courses.

Secondly, If by Gods Providence be meant his Appointment, this may signify, First, that he from all Eternity decreed to permit the Event, and designed and ordained it to advance his own Glory, and to bring about some good to Mankind by it: And so the Treachery of Judas was appointed (Act. 1. 23.) that is, God had decreed to suffer it to come to pass, and had ordained it, when come to pass, for the Salvation of Mankind: And there can be no doubt, but the final Issue, and ultimate event of all the worst Actions is ordained of God, and approved of by him; but the Case before us is of an intermediate and subordinate End, which must be judged of, whether it be good or bad, by the Nature of the thing, and not by any success or event. That all will at last conclude in some good End in the long Series and Chain of Causes and Events, which are ordained by God's Decree is most certain, but then this doth

not prove that the intermediate Causes and Events are approved of by him, but we must enquire into the Justice of the Cause, whereby we can only know, whether the Event be pleasing to him or not. Secondly, By Gods Providence as it signifies his Appointment may be meant his Will or Command: And this Will or Command is either for the doing of a thing, or for our Submission and acquiescence in it, after it is done. His command for the doing of a thing, cannot be known before the Event, but by the Justice of the Action, or by Revelation; to neither of which the Doctor pretends. And the Event cannot discover to us God's command to do a thing, which is already done and past, and I have in part shewn and shall more fully shew afterwards, that it can as little discover to us his Approbation of the thing done, or that it is his Will that we should acquiesce and submit to it.

II. Whereas it is said, that, since God now governs the World only by his Providence, we must of Necessity acquiesce in the Event of things, or else we should disobey him in not submitting to his disposal of the Governments of the World. First, God governs the World so as to require no Duty or Act of Obedience now of us, but what the Laws of Nature or of Scripture enjoin: And because Revelations are ceased, it seems requisite, that he should have revealed it in the Scriptures, if he had required us to acquiesce in the Events of things, and to look upon the most unjust Usurper as invested with his own Authority, when he is once gotten into Possession of the Throne: I say this seems necessary to have been revealed, since Natural Reason cannot dictate it to us for in Gods permission of all other sort of Injustice in the World, we never imagine that any Right can accrue to the injuring Person by it. Secondly, God by his Power and Wisdom so

orders things, as to make the most unjust actions subservient to the Ends of Justice and Righteousness, but not to reward Usurpation with the Investiture of his own Authority, or to turn wrong into right. And all that we learn from Scripture concerning God's Providence is, that we must rely upon it for Protection in the performance of our known Duty, and by consequence that we are to regard the Justice only of a Cause, not the Success of it.

III. This would make it unlawful for any Prince who is dispossessed, or excluded from the Throne, to wage War against the Usurper in defence of his own Right. For he is supposed to have no longer any Right, after the Usurper is in full Possession; because that Right which God gives to the Usurper, the Lawful King must be divested of, unless there can be two opposite Sovereign Authorities at the same time, and both from God, who severally retain the whole and entire Right at once to the same Kingdom. But we read that David waged War against *Ish-bosheth* who was possessed of the Kingdom of all *Israel* for two years, and against the *Jebusites*, who were in possession of *Jerusalem*, and he was in continual Wars, before he was fully possessed of his Kingdom, for above seven years together. And there never was any dispossessed Prince, but he endeavoured to regain his Throne if he could, and never any Prince was blamed for it.

IV. This Argument would hold as well in private as in publick Affairs, since both are alike in God's disposal, and it would be as unjust for a man injuriously dispossessed of his Estate, to endeavour the recovery of it by due course of Law, as it would be for a King by waging War to endeavour the Recovery of his Kingdoms. For in both Cases it may with equal Reason be said, that the Title is lost.

lost, and the Right transferred by God himself. And the Example of God's commanding the Children of Israel to spoil the Egyptians may seem as well to justify the one Case, as his bestowing Kingdoms in the Old Testament, to justify the other.

If it be said that there is a more peculiar and extraordinary Providence, which rules and disposes of Publick States and Kingdoms. First, if by a peculiar and extraordinary Providence be meant, that God is wont more immediately so to interpose, as to change the ordinary course of Justice, and to transfer Rights, and displace, and dispossess Rightful Kings more than he does Rightful Owners of private Estates, this seems to be groundless and disagreeable to the Methods of his Justice and to those Rules which the Scripture prescribes to us, which are the same in our Duties towards Kings, as in those towards other men; and it besides lays upon us greater Obligations to observe them: We must render to all their Dues, and particularly Tribute to whom Tribute is due, &c. Rom. 13. 7. But we have no where the least intimation, that the Rights of Kings cease any other way than other Mens do, viz. by Death, Resignation, &c. not by a foreign Invasion, or the Rebellion of Subjects, or by the Interposition of Providence in a concurrence of unfortunate Accidents. And those Texts which seem most to favour this supposition have been already considered, and if they prove any thing to this purpose, they must conclude as well concerning the Properties of Subjects, as concerning the Prerogatives of Princes, for it is as easie a thing with the Lord, to make a poor man rich, as it can be to set up over Kingdoms the basest of Men, and the Providence of God is alike concerned in both Cases; for as he leadeth Princes away spoiled, and overthroweth the mighty; so the Taberna-

cles of Robbers prosper, and they that provoke God are secure, into whose hand God bringeth abundantly, Job. 12. 6. 19. And thus we find Job ascribes all his Losses and Calamities to Gods afflicting hand upon him; for God having all things in his Power and at his Command, is often said to do what he does not hinder. Secondly, if by a peculiar and extraordinary Providence be meant such a Care as is answerable to the great Importance of Publick Affairs and the Government of Kingdoms, this will imply no more than that Gods Care is more concerned and more employed about things of greater Importance, than in things of less moment, that is, it manifests itself in a greater number and variety of Exigencies, and is applyed to more Circumstances of Affairs: Yet, his Providence extends itself to the Hairs of our Heads, and to the falling of a Sparrow to the Ground, and is as watchful over the most inconsiderable and minute things in proportion to their Nature, as over the greatest matters. His Providence, his Justice, and Goodness is over all his Works, and he may as well be supposed to convey Private Estates to the unjust Possessors of them, as to dispose of Kingdoms to Usurpers; his Providence, which permits both, gives one no better Title than the other.

Kings, 'tis true, receive their Power from God and are his Vicegerents, and therefore are accountable to none but him, and can be deposed by none else; but God invests them with his Authority, by the intervention of subordinate means, and by the Observation of the same Laws of Justice, which ought to be observed in the Rights and Possessions of Subjects. Thus in the Elective Monarchies, there is the same Justice to be observed in the Election of the King, that there is to be observed in the Election of inferior Magistrates,

tho, after Election, the King is accountable to none but God, and the inferiour Magistrates are accountable to the King: And in an Hereditary Kingdom there is the same Right of Inheritance, (in respect of the Nature of Right or Justice) that there is in Private Estates, tho the Inheritance of Kingdoms be forfeitable to God only. For as God now makes no Kings by his express Command and immediate Designation, but according to the Methods of Law and Right amongst men, so he deposes and devests them of their Power in such a manner as does not interfere with the ordinary course of justice; *The Lord shall smite them, or their day shall come to die, or they shall descend into Battel and perish*, 1. Sam. 26. 10.

V. Tho by the Law of Nations Foreign Princes may transact with any Conquerour as Rightful King: Yet by the Law of Nature Conquest can give no just Title, unless the Claim before Conquest were just; that is, indeed it gives no Title at all, but only recovers what before there was a just Title to. For even a just cause of War will not justify a Conquest, unless there be a precedent Right to the Dominions of the conquered Prince; as a Debt of 5 l. tho it will justify a Suit at Law yet gives no Title to a mans whole Estate. And if a *Thorough Settlement* can give the Conquerour any Right, which he had not at first, it can be no less than such a Settlement as the Laws and Customs of Nations allow, which is an undisturbed and uncontested Possession for a term of years exceeding the Memory of man. *Jephtha* alledged against the King of the *Ammonites* the Prescription of 300 years, *Judg.* 11. 26. and the time for Prescription to Kingdoms is generally set at 100 years: *Duck de test. & Auctorit. Jur. Civil.* l. 1. c. 1. §. 19. and yet the Civilians generally maintain that the longest Prescription can give a right to none, but

to those who are *Possessores bonæ fidei*, not to those who came in by Fraud or Violence; but who thought they had a just Title, or knew of no better Claim. And if it should be granted necessary for the Peace of the World, that some certain time be fixt, when, after a quiet and unmolested Possession, all Pretensions should expire: Yet men must not be allowed to judg every thing settled that is uppermost, or that can brave it for a while, for this would in reality let nothing be settled, but would open a Gap to perpetual Disturbances and Confusions. For every thing that can be called a Government is settled or may appear to be so to Private Men, till it is overpowered. Thus, *David* fled from *Jerusalem*, and went *whither he might*, uncertain *whither* to go, and almost despairing of his Return; *Absalom* possessed himself of the City and *David* was so forlorn and despicable, that *Shimei* cursed him to his face, and threw stones at him, and told him withal, that Gods just Judgment was fall upon him in revenge of the Blood which he had shed of the House of *Saul*, and that *the Lord* had delivered the Kingdom into the hand of *Absalom* his Son, 2. Sam. 16. 8. And this seems to have been the general Opinion of all that followed *Absalom* in his Rebellion; and therefore *Hushai* chose it as the fairest Pretence to recommend himself to him, and make him believe that he was firm to his Interest; *nay but whom the Lord and this People and all the men of Israel chuse his will I be, and to him will I belong*, v. 28. So that the Man after Gods own heart, and of his own designation to the Kingdom, could not be secure against this Principle; and it can hardly prove of better consequence to other Kings, if they must be looked upon as abandoned and dethroned by God himself, whenever they are forced to withdraw, and by a strong hand are kept out of their Dominions

And

And it ought to be considered, how King Charles II. could retain any Right to his Kingdoms upon this supposition; and yet he had an indisputable Right, during his long Absence, in the Judgment not only of all the Loyal Nobility and Clergy and Gentry of that time, but of our Parliaments and of the whole Nation ever since his Return.

Dan. 4. 26.
2. Chron.
33. 13.

VI. We find in Scripture that when God himself does dispossess Kings of their Kingdoms, he doth not always devert them of their Right but reserves it for them, and restores them to the Possession of it again upon their Repentance. Thus it was in the Case of *Nebuchadnezzar* and *Manasses*, and it is very reasonable to believe that God doth often punish Kings and Subjects too, by successful Rebellions, and by Usurpations upon the Regal Rights and Prerogatives, without any Intention to release them from the mutual Obligations of their respective Duties to one another. And if this has been the Case as the Scripture informs us it has; if Reason tells us, that such Cases may be again, since they are very agreeable to Gods Justice, and Wisdom, and Goodness in governing the World; then all that hath said for transferring the Allegiance of Subjects, from the deposed King by Law to the Possessor of his Throne by Providence, is to the ground.

And yet we ought to be very sure before we venture to act upon such a Principle. For it would be a mighty Temptation and Encouragement to ambitious men, to be always making dangerous Attempts upon the Rights and Dominions of Princes, if they could be assured, that if once their Usurpation proved so prosperous as to put them into a full Possession, they should then be secured in it by a Divine Right, and would be so far from any Obligations to make Restitution, that they would

be bound to stand by it, and all the Subjects would be obliged to maintain and defend them with their Lives and Fortunes against the dispossessed Prince. It is not to be imagined what confusion it would breed in the World, if no restitution were to be made of what is gotten by Fraud and Rapine out of Private Estates; but all were a Mans own that he could but get and keep. Men would easily flatter themselves, that they might sin first, and then repent at their leisure; if this mortifying part of Repentance were but remitted; but when they must restore all again or be damned, they may perhaps think fit to sit down contented at first. And this Doctrine would be so much the more dangerous to Kingdoms, as they are greater Baits, and the Injustice is greater; and the Mischiefs more grievous.

But it may be said, that tho this Argument from success and a Thorough Settlement should not hold good in all Cases, yet such peculiar Circumstances may sometimes fall out, as plainly shew it to be Gods doing, and command our Submission and Obedience. Suppose a Prince by a Series of fatal Miscarriages, and by a strong Infatuation as it were from God upon all his Counsels, undermines his own Throne, and in a short Reign loses the Hearts of a Nation at first wholly devoted to his service; suppose he alienates the affections of his greatest Dependents and Favorites, and that the Body of his People revolt from him, and that all Orders and Degrees of men conspire to renounce him, and without War or Bloodshed set up another in his room, in whom all their remaining hopes are placed, and whose Arms are attended by a favourable and wonderful Providence; suppose that there is no Human Prospect of the former Kings return at all, and that if he do return it must be to the ruin of the Kingdom and the

the overthrow of the true Religion; is not this a Settlement so thoroughly established that we must needs be obliged to stand up in defence of it, and have we not in this case all the Assurance that can possibly be, without an express Revelation that our Allegiance is transferred?

This, I think, is the highest that the Case can be put. In answer to which, First, It must be granted that all this cannot prove more effectually, that our Allegiance is transferred now it is brought about by his Providence, than if it had come to pass by an express Revelation; or than if God had denounced this as a Judgment upon the Prince whom it is supposed to have befallen. For the utmost that can be supposed is, that Gods Providence is now the same Evidence of his Pleasure to us, that his Revelation was to those of former Ages; and therefore, if when God had declared that he did send such Calamities as Judgments upon a Prince, this was no Argument to the People that they were released from their Duty of Allegiance, it can be no Argument to us now, tho the Providence be never so signal and extraordinary. Secondly, We see in the Examples before mentioned, that what befel those Princes was from God, and that he had dispossessed them of their Kingdoms, and yet their Right still remained. King David was forced to fly in great haste from his own Palace, he left his Capital City and the Ark of God itself in the Enemies Power, and when Shimei cursed him, he made this Reflection upon it, that God had bid him to do it, and to make the Judgment still more signal, Absalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of all Israel, which was directly the fulfilling of that Judgment, which Nathan had prophesied, should come upon him: yet his Subjects all the while could be excused from no Duty of Allegiance to him, but

were as much obliged to all instances of it, as if he had been still at Jerusalem and upon the Throne: tho Absalom's Followers interpreted it otherwise, as has been before observed, and as for the Promise made to David, they imagined that it might have been as punctually fulfilled to his seed, tho himself had been set aside, as if he had been actually dead, and probably they supposed that this was the Evil that God had threatened; viz. to dethrone him, and set up his Son in his room; when he told him by his Prophet; Behold, I will raise up Evil against thee out of thine own House, 2. Sam. 12. 11. Manasses and Nebuchadnezzar were as great Tyrants to their Subjects, as great Enemies to the true Religion, and as great Offenders in all respects against God as any Christian King can be supposed to be: Yet when God caused Manasses to be carried away captive to Babylon, and Nebuchadnezzar to be driven from amongst men to eat Grass with the Beasts of the Field; he brought these Afflictions upon them, not to deprive either of them of their Kingdoms, but only to humble them, and then to restore them to their Thrones. And his dealing with Nebuchadnezzar is full of all considerable in this matter, because the Judgment upon him was purposely designed to the intent, that the living may know that the most high ruleth in the Kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the basest of men, Dan. 4. 17. and yet v. 26. it is told him, thy Kingdom shall be sure unto thee, after that thou shalt have known that the Heavens do rule: and in the 31. verse. There fell a Voice from Heaven saying, O King Nebuchadnezzar, to thee it is spoken the Kingdom is departed from thee, which was taken from him for the space of seven years, until he should know that the most highest ruleth in the Kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, v. 32. This then being

ing an Example purposely set for the Admonition of Kings, and to acquaint the World that God raises them up, and deposes them as he pleases; we may from hence conclude that tho they be dispossessed by his Appointment whether secret or express, yet we can have no certainty that he has utterly rejected them; but rather that upon their Repentance, he will again restore them to the Enjoyment of their Dominions, which they have still a Right to, against any Usurper or Possessor of them. Thirdly, What Danger soever Religion may seem to be in, yet it is manifest that throughout all Ages of the Church, Religion never flourished more than in times of Persecution; and Religion itself forbidding us to defend it by any Disloyalty, if by any such unreasonable and unwarrantable means Subjects undertake the Preservation of Religion, they may expect for their Reward no better than *Abraham's* Fate, who put forth his hand to support the Ark of God, when he saw it shaking, and like to fall. God can preserve it without our help against all the Power and Stratagems of the greatest Kings, or he can turn the hearts of Kings, and of Enemies make them become its Defenders. So he turned the hearts of *Nebuchadnezzar* and *Manasses*, and there is no Reason to suspect, that God will not grant Princes space for Repentance, now he rules the World by his Providence, as he did in those Ages of Prophecy and Revelation.

It may be alledged that where there is an express Revelation, men must follow the directions God is pleased to give, and proceed no further than he appoints: But when we have only his Providence to guide us, we must not neglect to make use of the present occasion, but must take all the opportunities, which Providence puts into our hands, as so many indications of what God expects and requires of us.

I answer, this is a plain Argument that we ought not to make God's Providence the Rule of our Actions, but his Law: Because this principle would have misled those of ancient times, contrary to Gods design and purpose in an immediate Revelation, as well as it may now make us transgress his revealed Will recorded in Scripture, and his Laws engraved in our Nature, I mean the Laws of Justice, and of Obedience to Governors. For from hence it appears that his Providence is not a sufficient Interpreter of his Will, in what he requires of us; if it were they might have rely'd upon it then, and since it is not, we must not depend upon it now. Because the Scripture is our Guide as much as an immediate Revelation was theirs, and we have as little warrant to follow Providence, without a Revelation in Scripture for it, as they could have to follow it, without an immediate Revelation. For as Prophecys and Revelations are long since ceased, so we are nowhere told that God's Providence shall be instead of them to us, but the Scriptures are to us instead of all other Revelations, and we are to interpret God's Will by his Providence no further than they direct us to do. And from the Scriptures we may be assured, that God by his Providence often offers men opportunities of doing things only for their Trial, and when he gives them no license to do them. If ever any circumstances of Providence could justify an Action otherwise sinful, they must have been those, which *David* was in, when *Saul* was twice at his mercy: He was before by Gods appointment anointed to succeed in the Throne, and *Saul* the first time came unexpectedly into his Power, the second time a deep sleep from the Lord was laid upon *Saul* and his whole Army; God had promised *David* to deliver his Enemy into his Hand, and *David's* Followers both times.

times did not fail to put him in mind of it: So that if Providence could be at any time a sufficient warrant, *David* must have had as full a Commission to have slain *Saul*, as *Abud* had to kill *Eglon*, or *Jehu* to kill *Joram*, and *David* must have concluded, that God who had before rejected *Saul* from being King, had now actually devested him of all his Authority, and according to his Promise, had delivered *Saul* to him, to execute the divine Vengeance upon him: But because this would have been to act against a known Duty, he still owns *Saul* for his Master, and the Lords anointed, and repented of the cutting off but the Skirt of his Garment. All this probably was designed as a Tryal to *David*, as well as to propose him for an example of Fidelity to all Ages: and perhaps nothing can be more reasonably concluded from our late Revolution, than that we are now call'd to the practice of that Loyalty, which we have made such high professions of.

I shall add no more, but only transcribe some Passages out of Dr *Sherlock's Case of Resistance* to shew that the Authority of that very great Man can signify little in this Controversie, whatever his Arguments may do.

p. 29.

"We know what use some men have made of this Argument of Providence to justify all the Villanies they had a mind to act: But *David* it seems, did not think that an Opportunity of doing evil, gave him license and Authority to do it: Opportunity we say, makes a Thief, and it makes a Rebel, and it makes a Murderer: No man can do any Wickedness which he has no opportunity of doing, and if the Providence of God which puts such opportunities into mens hands, justifies the wickedness they commit, no man can be chargeable with any guilt whatever he does; and certainly opportunity will as soon justify any other sin, as Rebellion and the Murder of Princes. We are to learn our Duty from the Law of

"God, not from his Providence; at least this must be a settled Principle, that the Providence of God will never justify any Action which his Law forbids.

"There is another Objection a. p. 127.

"against what the Apostle affirms, that there is no Power but of God, the Powers that be are ordained of God. For is the Power of Victorious Rebels and Usurpers from God? Did *Oliver Cromwel* receive his Power from God? then it seems it was unlawful to resist him too, or to conspire against him: Then all those Loyal Subjects, who refused to submit, when he had got the Power in his hands were Rebels and Traitors.

"To this I answer that the most prosperous Rebel is not the Higher Powers while our Natural Prince to whom we owe Obedience and Subjection, is in being. And therefore though such men may get the Power into their hands by God's Permission, yet not by God's Ordinance; and he who resists them does not resist the Ordinance of God, but the Usurpations of men. In Hereditary Kingdoms the King never dies, but the same Minute that the Natural Person of one King dies, the Crown descends upon the next of Blood; and therefore he, who rebelleth against the Father and murders him, continues a Rebel in the Reign of the Son, which commences with his Fathers Death.

"It is otherwise indeed where none can pretend a greater Right to the Crown than the Usurper; for there possession of Power seems to give a right. Thus many of the Roman Emperors came to the Crown by very ill means, but when they were possess of it they were the Higher Powers; for the Crown did not descend by Inheritance, for the possession of Supreme and Sovereign Power is Title enough where there is no better Title to oppose against it, &c.

But

" But it was otherwise in the Kingdom of Judah, which God himself had intailed on David's Family, as appears from the Example of *Joash*, who was concealed by his Aunt *Jehoshaba*, and hid in the House of the Lord for six years. During this time *Athaliah* Reigned, and had the whole power of Government in her hands; but yet this did not make her a Sovereign and irresistible Prince, because *Joash*, the Son of *Ahaziah*, the right Heir of the Crown, was yet alive. And therefore in the Seventh Year *Jehoiada* the Priest, set *Joash* upon the Throne, and slew *Athaliah*, and was guilty of no Treason or Rebellion in doing so, 2 Kings 11. Which shews, That no Usurpations can extinguish the Right and Title of a Natural Prince. Such Usurpers, though they have the possession of the Supreme Power, yet they have no Right to it; and though God, for wise Reasons, may sometimes permit such Usurpations, yet while his Providence secures the Persons of such deposed and banished Princes from Violence, he secures their Title too. As it was in *Nebuchadnezzar's* Vision, *The Tree is cut down, but the stump of the Roots is left in the Earth. The Kingdom shall be sure to them, after that they shall know that the Heavens do rule.* Dan. 4. 26.

Hitherto I had written before Dr. *Sherlock's* Book was published, and upon the most impartial consideration of it, can now find no cause to change my Opinion; but having proceeded thus far, I shall, as exactly as I can, examine all that relates to this matter in his Book, which I could not foresee, and have not already given an account of.

His Two first Sections, I cannot think my self much concerned about, having already given both the full State of the Case, and the plain meaning of

the Convocation. One thing indeed I omitted, which he remarks in the Second Section: He observes, That whereas in the 30th Chapter, it is said, That *Jaddus* returned Answer to *Alexander*, That he might not lawfully violate his Oath of true Allegiance to *Darius*, whilst *Darius* lived, the Convocation in the Canon following it, takes no notice that he owed Allegiance to *Darius*, during the Life of that King; And it is plain, says he, that *Jaddus* himself could mean no more by it, than that he could not make a voluntary Dedition to *Alexander*; nor that he never could submit to him till *Darius* was dead; for when he was in *Alexander's* power, he made no scruple to submit to him. But I think it is not much material, whether they mention this in the Canon or no, since they set it down in the foregoing Chapter, and then approve of the Behaviour and Conduct of *Jaddus* in the Canon. For if this part of *Jaddus's* Answer, which was the most considerable thing in it, had been disliked by them, it must have been excepted; but when they give a general Approbation of what *Jaddus* did, and except against no Particulars, they must be supposed to approve of it in all its Circumstances before set down in the Chapter; at least they must approve of that, which was the principal thing in *Jaddus's* Answer: for when the thing that *Alexander* required of him was to bear Arms himself against *Darius*, or to sollicite others thereunto; and *Jaddus* answered, That he might not do it, because he had taken an Oath for his true Allegiance to *Darius*, which he might not lawfully violate whilst *Darius* lived: and the Convocation in their Canon determine, That if any man affirm, that having so sworn he might have done it, he doth greatly err; they can mean no less in the Canon than they expressed in the Chapter, That he might not lawfully violate his Oath of true Allegiance to *Darius*, whilst *Darius* lived. And

the Doctor doth not deny, that they approved of these words in the sense in which *Jaddus* meant them; and that *Jaddus* meant them in the strictest sense, is evident; for the words will admit of no Latitude: and what *Jaddus* afterwards did, was by an immediate Direction from Heaven; and therefore it can be no Argument, that *Jaddus* had any thoughts of submitting to *Alexander*, whilst *Darius* lived, when he sent that Message; but on the contrary, That he was resolved not to have submitted, and ought not to have done it, unless a Revelation had warranted him to do it, and thereby absolved him from his Oath to *Darius*.

In his Third Section, the Doctor lays down some Propositions, upon which his whole Discourse depends; and indeed to grant him these Propositions, is to give up the Cause to him; for they plainly imply, and suppose the whole Question, without any more to do.

P. 10.

His First Proposition is, *That all Civil Power and Authority is from God*: This he rightly observes, no man will deny him, but an *Atheist*. But then it ought to be proved, That it is so from God, as to exclude all Humane Rights and Titles; or that God now bestows and conveys this Authority, contrary to the Rules of Law and Justice amongst Men, and in opposition to the Constitutions of particular Governments, and the Agreement and Consent of the several Nations of the World. That God by his Providence doth set aside all Humane Law and Right, and doth give an extraordinary and immediate Right and Title to every Usurper, who is got into full Possession of any Kingdom, because no Man can have any Authority but from God, is no Consequence, unless there be no other way for God to rule the World but in this manner: for if God may

govern the World agreeably to the Methods of Right and Justice, which Reason obliges men to observe towards their Sovereign, and which by an Authority derived from God himself, and settled and chasted in particular Countreys, then it cannot be known, but by Revelation, that God does ever interpose to the Prejudice of Legal Right, or absolve Subjects from their Allegiance to their Natural Sovereign, by transferring his Authority to an Usurper.

Prop. 2. That Civil Power and Authority is no otherwise from God, than as he gives his Power and Authority to some particular Person or Persons to govern others. Civil Power and Authority is from God in its Original Institution, as well as in its Application and Donation to particular Persons. But not to insist upon that: The Person or Persons, who are invested with it, are either qualified for the Reception of this Authority from God, by a just Accession to the Throne, according to the particular Form or Constitution of the Government; or they must be appointed by Divine Revelation, which may discharge the Subjects from adhering to the Legal Constitution, in performance of their Allegiance sworn to any other Person. But the Exercise of Power may be in him, who has properly no Authority, but only a Nominal one; that is, Men are forced to call it so, though it be really nothing less, for meer Force, and External Power, gives no Right; nor is any otherwise from God, than are the Natural Powers and Force of Wild Beasts, who devour Men, and other Creatures, nor without the Permission and Concurrence of God's Providence; and to use the Doctor's Expression, they cannot devour a Man, whether God will or no.

But

But if he Governs without receiving his Personal Authority from God, he Governs without God's Authority. No doubt, of it, he Governs, when he has no Right, and ought not to Govern: for the Exercise of Authority may be usurped, as well as the Ensigns of Authority, or the Jewels of the Crown; but the Right to Govern, which is bestowed by God, is not always in him, who actually Governs, but in him, who ought to Govern, tho' perhaps he does not.

Prop. 3. There are but three ways, whereby God gives this Power and Authority to any Persons; either by Nature, or by an express Nomination, or by the Disposals of Providence. This may be granted, and yet the Disposals of Providence may be such, as are agreeable to the Rules of humane Laws and Justice, and it remains to be proved, that there are any disposals of Kingdoms by God's Providence contrary to these Rules. And whereas the Doctor says, that by what bounds the Paternal and Patriarchal Authority was limited, we cannot tell: I can see no Reason to make any scruple or enquiry concerning that matter, according to his Principles; for Men always had just as much Authority, as they could by any means attain to the exercise of; if they could enlarge their Dominions, all they got by fraud, or violence, or by any way whatsoever of Injustice, was the gift of Providence; and if their Patriarchal Authority would not bear them out in it, yet the Divine Authority, which upon a full Possession, they became invested with, would never fail to give them an undoubted Right and Title. If they could by any means deprive their Subjects of all the Privileges they enjoyed, and take from them all their Liberty and Property, and reduce them to the vilest Slavery, they were by God himself settled in an Absolute and Arbitrary Government. And by

the same Argument the King of France has a Divine Right not only to the Principality of Orange, but to all the Despotick Power, which ~~he~~ he exercises over his own Subjects; since he is thoroughly settled in the Possession of both.

is said

That God made Kings only in Jewry Pag. 11. by a particular Nomination is a mistake.

For he nominated Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus particularly, as he nominated David himself. Nor is it true, that God entailed no other Kingdom, but that of Judah; as the Doctor seems here to say. For as he entailed the Kingdom of Judah upon David's Posterity indefinitely, so he entailed the same Kingdom with many others upon Nebuchadnezzar, and his Son, and his Sons Son, Jer. 27. 7. And God entailed the Kingdom of Israel first upon Jeroboam and his Posterity, promising him, that if he would keep his Statutes and Commandments, as David did, he would be with him, and build him a sure house, as he built for David, and would give Israel unto him, 1 Kings 11. 38. And afterwards he entailed it upon Jehu, and his Children of the fourth Generation, 2 Kings 10. 30.

There can be no doubt, but that God ruled in all the other Kingdoms of the World, as well as in Jewry, and all other Kings ruled by Gods Authority, as well as the Kings of Judah and Israel, who were advanced by his command. And therefore God sometimes interposed his immediate Command, in the advancement of Kings in other Kingdoms as well as in those of Judah and Israel; and he entailed other Kingdoms, and might do so now, if he pleased: but this is no argument, that he will do it, nor that we are now to expect it, since we are left to the guidance and protection of his Providence in the ordinary course of things, and in our obedi-

dience to the Laws of that Constitution of Government under which we live, which are to determin when the ~~Authority~~ Sovereigns ceases; and the Allegiance of Subjects; ~~are~~ are not to think their Power and Authority transferred, unless it be transferred legally. For God now Rules the World by no exprest Commands, or extraordinary Declarations of his Will; but Governs every People, by the just Laws and Constitutions of their Country: and whatever happens contrary to these, he permits for good and wise Reasons, known only to himself. But Subjects are not to look upon themselves, as discharged from their Duty and Oaths of Allegiance, unless the Laws themselves, and the Nature of the Constitution discharge them: for we are not at liberty to have recourse to Providence for a Dispensation or Release from the most Solemn Obligations, that Nature and the Laws of the Land, and our own Oaths, and God himself by his Authority in his Vicegerents, by whom these Laws are enacted, lies upon us.

Page 12.

But it is said, That it makes no difference in this case to distinguish between what God permits, and what he does; for this distinction does not relate to the events of things, but to the wickedness of Men; which is the only reason for this Distinction; for the Scripture never speaks of God's bare permission of any events, but makes him the Author of all the good or evil, which happens either to private Persons or publick Societies. The events of all things are in his Hands, and are ordered and disposed by his Will and Counsel, as they must be, if God governs the World: but God cannot be the Author of any wickedness, cannot inspire Men with any wicked Counsels or Designs, nor incline their Wills to the commission of it; and therefore this we say, God only permits; but when it comes to

Action, he over-rules their wicked Designs to accomplish his own Counsels and Decrees; and either disappoints what they intended, or gives success to them, when he can serve the ends of his Providence by their wickedness: and herein consists the unsearchable Wisdom of Providence, that God brings about his own Counsels by the free Ministries of Men: He permits Men to do wickedly, but all events, which are for the good or evil of private Men, or publick Societies, are ordered by him, as the Prophet declares, Amos 3. 6. Shall there be evil in a City and the Lord hath not done it?

1. I answer, There is no Reason, why we should distinguish in this case between the Counsels and Designs of wicked Men; and their Actions in the execution of them; for God concurs, as much to the Physical Operations of the Mind in purposing and contriving Evil; as he does to the corporal acts in the bringing it to effect: for the Mind is as little capable of thinking as the Body is of moving without God's continual concurrence, both having a necessary dependance upon him in the exercise of their proper Faculties. And the Resolution and Contrivance to do Evil, is the event or result of Thought and Consideration, as the success in the performance and accomplishment of the Evil designed and resolved upon is the event of the several outward Actions, which are done in order to it: so that God concerns himself no more in the events, which proceed from the exercise of the bodily Powers in bringing about ill Designs, than in those, which proceed from the Operations of the Mind in the projects and contrivances of Evil: he permits both, and concurs with both, as they are the acts of Natural Causes, in the production of their effects, but as they have a tendency to Evil, he concurs with neither. He leaves Men a Liberty of Acting

Acting and Thinking, and concurs with them accordingly; he suffers them to sin, and does not take from them the use of their Natural Faculties of Body or Mind, though they employ them to ill Purposes, and about wrong Objects.

2. *Evil*, whether considered Physically, or Morally, that is, as it signifies Affliction, or as it signifies Sin; is in the *Action* as well as in the *Event*, and therefore the words of the Prophet *Amos* are applicable to both alike. For not only the *Events* of all things, but the *Actions* of all Creatures are in *Gods* hands, and are ordained and disposed by his Will and Counsel; and by the Doctors arguing, in all Actions, as well as in all Events, there is no distinction between what God permits, and what he does, which, he says, relates only to the wickedness of Men, and therefore it does not relate to the Actions of Men, but only to the wickedness of humane Actions. For God gives success, he says, to wicked Designs; when they come to Action he sets up Kings, he advances them to the Throne, he gives them the Throne; that is, he goes along with them, and assists them in the attainment of the Supreme Power, and at last puts it into their hands. So that they have his concurrence, and assistance, as much before the settlement, as after it, and he that at last gives them the Plenitude of Power, gave them all along the opportunity and the means of attaining it. For God makes no immediate Donation of it, but bestows it upon them by his Providence, that is, by affording them ways and means to come by it. The plain consequence of which must be, that God not only suffers Men by wicked means to get into Power, and then bestows his Authority upon them, but he conducts them in every step they take, and at last when they arrive at the

Throne, he places them in it. For what God gives by Providence, he does not give all at once, but by the several degrees of success, by which it is attained; and the success of every particular action must be his Gift as much as the event it self. And if every Event be of Gods doing, every Action must be so too, because Events proceed from Actions, and are no otherwise done or brought about, than by the performance of those Actions, which are requisite to produce them; and to say that God is the Author of the Event, but not of the Action, is to say, that he is the Author of the Effect but not of the Causes Acting, whereas he cannot appoint the Effect without appointing the Cause to Act, unless the Effect could be produced without its Cause.

3. *End* and *Event* are both but relative Terms, the end of one sort or series of Actions may be but the beginning of another, and the Event or Effect of one Enterprize the Cause of another. For that which is an Effect in respect of its Cause, is a Cause in respect of its Effect; and that, which in respect of the means is the Event, is the means in respect of another Event. If then the Event of all things is from God, and therefore gives a Right; a Rebel or Usurper would have a Right to every Fort or Castle he gets into his Possession in order to his *Thorough Settlement* in the whole Kingdom, for that in its kind is as truly an Event as a *Thorough Settlement* it self is in a different kind: for he that possesses himself of a Castle has gained his end as much for that time, and in that particular design, as he that is possessed of a Kingdom has gained his end, in the full accomplishment of his desires and designs. And when he has his wishes in this, perhaps he stops not here, but makes this End and Event only a step

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to another Enterprize upon a Neighbour Kingdom, and then the obtaining the first Kingdom is but a means to gain the latter, as the several degrees of success were the means of obtaining the first.

But all other Events whatsoever are as means in Gods Hands, and are made use of by him, for the bringing about the final Events of things. God therefore does not approve of every Event so as to command us to acquiesce in it, any more than of every Means, but he approves, or disallows of them, as they are either just, or unjust, good, or evil; and because the last Events of things will be perfectly good, therefore they are approved of by him; and in the meantime he orders and disposes all lesser and precedent Events, whether they be good or evil, to the attainment of these. The evil Events God neither approves in themselves, nor gives any Right or Authority to the Persons, whom he suffers to bring them about, but whilst the Authors of them are disliked and disowned by him, he permits the Events for the sake of that good, which he has decreed to produce out of them, and for that relation and subserviency, which they have to the last Events of things, which he has determined and ordained from Eternity.

4. If there be no difference between what God permits, and what he does, as to the Events of things, this will justify all Events whatsoever, as being of God's doing; and therefore Robberies, and all the Wickedness in the World besides, that is successful, and ends in the desired issue, must be ascribed to him: for these are as properly Events as any besides can be; and the success of things respect not their Nature, but their End; and Actions attain their End, not as they are of less,

or greater moment, of publick or private Concernment, but because they answer the Designs of the men that perform them.

And this will make it impossible, as the Doctor says expressly, *That there should be any King, who is not Rightful with respect to God*: which overthrows the Distinction he makes between the Kingdom of Judah, and other Kingdoms. For *Athaliah* must have been as Rightful Queen as *Joash* was Rightful King, and both must have had God's Authority alike; and so the Subjects must have been obliged to Contradictions; that is, to assist *Athaliah* against *Joash*, and *Joash* against *Athaliah*, at the same time; because she had God's Authority by Providence, and he by Promise; and therefore both must have been obeyed, and yet both resisted; and the Subjects must have owed Allegiance to both, and yet they must have owed Allegiance to neither of them. Thus it would have been likewise in the Case of *David* himself, to whom God first assigned the Kingdom of Judah; and *Ishbosheth*, who was possessor of the greatest part of it for Two Years. For either *Ishbosheth* and *Athaliah*, had God's Authority, or they had not; if they had not, then it is possible there may be a King who has not God's Authority, and that there may be some Events which are only by his permission: If they had, then God must bestow Two Opposite Sovereign Authorities and Rights, at once, to Two several Princes over the same People, and to the same Kingdom; and both must be equally valid and obligatory upon the Subjects Consciences. For by what way soever God conveys the Authority, it is his Authority; and God's Authority is always the same, to whomsoever, and
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in what manner soever it be conveyed.

5. Since therefore God concurs with the Thoughts and Actions of Men, in the Means and Causes, as well as in the Ends and Events of Things; and disposes all alike, it follows, that he can be no more the Author of Evil Events, than of Evil Means, or Actions, or Thoughts. But God may be said to do all that is done in the world, because nothing can be done without him; for his Providence concurs with Men in the performance of the worst Actions, though not in the Wickedness of them. Men contrive, and practice Evil, and God concurs with them in their Actions, but only permits the Evil of them: for every Action being a positive thing, necessarily requires God's Concurrence, and could not be done without it; and every Action, as such, is Good: But Evil is an Accident, it is a Defect, or a privation of Good; and therefore this proceeds from the Imperfection and Wickedness of Man only, and needs no Cause to produce it, since it has no other Being, but the want of Rectitude and Goodness in the depraved minds of men. Thus to think is always the same Action of the mind, whatever it be that we think about; And Evil Thoughts differ from Good ones, not in the Nature of the Act, but only in the Object, which employs the Thoughts; and therefore, though God never suggests Evil Thoughts, yet he leaves the Will free to determine it self in the choice of the Evil Object, and sustains the Mind in the Exercise of its Faculty of Thinking, whatever the Object be about which it is conversant. And so in all other Actions of the Body or Mind, God concurs to the Action, not as it has such or such an Object, but as it is produced by its

proper Faculty; that is, he concurs to it, as it is a Natural, not as it is a Moral Action.

6. As God permits Wickedness to come to pass, so he orders it for the Good or Evil, that is, for the Reward or Punishment of private Men, or publick Societies; yet still he does not approve of the Event, but of the Consequences and Effects, which his Infinite Wisdom and Power produces out of it. And the Event gives no Right to the Persons who are permitted to bring it about. For then a Thief would have a Right to stol'n Goods, because it may be a just Punishment from God upon the Person from whom they are stol'n, to suffer him to have the possession of them.

I shall not venture to say, That though God permits Wickedness in the Counsels or Designs of Men, yet *when it comes to Action, he either disapproves what they intended, or gives Success to them, when he can serve the Ends of his Providence by their Wickedness.* For I believe there is no wickedness either in Thought or Action, but God's Infinite Power and Wisdom can over-rule it to accomplish his own Counsels and Decrees.

And the difference between Evil in the Action, and in the Design, seems to be this, That whilst it is designed and contrived in the minds of Men, it can have no such Influence towards the Production of that Good, which God causes to proceed from Evil, as it certainly shall have one way or other, when it is reduced to practice. For though Evil Thoughts are overruled by God, as well as Evil Actions, and either suffered to proceed to Action, or hindered; and if suffered, then upon this or that Occasion,

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at this or that Time, with respect to certain Persons and Accidents; yet Thoughts, as such, have no Effect, but upon the Mind it self; whereas Actions have a further Effect upon divers Objects, for the tryal of Good Men; for their Admonition or Amendment, or for the prevention of that Sin, which they would otherwise run into; or else perhaps for the Punishment and Correction of wicked men.

And therefore *there can be no Evil in a City, and the Lord hath not done it.* He concurs with wicked men by his Providence, but concurs with them, as if they were Natural, not as they are Moral Agents, by sustaining and enabling their Natural Faculties to produce their Effects; he never inclines their Minds, nor influences their Wills to Evil, but oftentimes over-rules their first Intentions, and diverts their Will, already determined and resolved upon Mischiefs, to certain Objects, that the Evil may most tend to his Glory, and the good of Mankind, in the Punishment of Sinners, or in the Exercise of the Patience, and other Vertues of Good Men.

P. 12.

As to the distinction of Events, *That some God only permits, and some he orders and appoints,* it is grounded upon this, That he orders and appoints all that are good and just, and permits the contrary. But then this appointment is known to us, not by God's Providence, but by his Law. For Providence appoints us to do nothing, but only concurs with Men, and assists them in the performance of what God's Laws appoint or command: The most that can be said, is, That Providence may sometimes be an Indication to us, of God's Will and Command; but that can be only

in Events that are miraculous and supernatural, when there is nothing repugnant in them to his Will already known and declared: For even Miracles wrought to carry on wicked Designs, are to be looked upon as false, and the Impositions and Delusions only of the Devil.

2. Of that particular Providence which watches over Kingdoms, and orders the Government of them, and the difference of it from that Providence, which guides and influences private Affairs, I have said enough already, and have shewn, That God, *with his own Hand, immediately directs the Motions of the great Wheels of Providence,* but permits none to move as they please themselves. For I take it to be a very wrong Notion of the Permission of God's Providence, that he leaves things to move, as they please themselves; No, he rules, and restrains, and limits what he only permits; and puts a check and stop to it, when he pleases: And by God's more immediate direction, I understand, not that God ever acts at a distance, or leaves any thing in the world to it self, but that he sometimes acts in a way to us more visible and remarkable; though the steady and unobserved Influence of Providence has as much of God's immediate Presence in it, as have the most extraordinary and miraculous Events.

The other Propositions are but Consequences of these Three, and therefore need not to be particularly examined; and if these Three only were but well proved, and not laid down, as if they were *so very plain to his purpose, as to carry their own Evidence with them,* I should readily agree to all the rest, and indeed to the whole Book, as far as it concerns this matter, except some few Par-

P. 16.

Particulars less material to the merits of the Cause. But I despair of seeing these Propositions so effectually proved, as to induce me to think, that by what way soever that can be thought of, a Prince is advanced to the Throne, he is as truly placed in it by God, as if he had been expressly nominated and anointed by a Prophet, at God's Command, as Saul and David were : Or that it is impossible there should be a wrong King, unless a Man could make himself King, whether God will or no. I believe the Self-Evidence of these Propositions, can work in few men so much assurance as this amounts to.

The Fundamental Mistake, is, That the Doctor confounds the Exercise of Power or Authority with the Right of it; and supposes, that every one, who has the Administration of Power, has a Right to the Administration of it; which are plainly Two very different things: For the Administration or Exercise of Power, is a Natural Act, and may be without that Moral Qualification, which is implied in the Right of Power or Authority. Thus in his first Proposition, *That all Civil Power and Authority is from God*: If he mean the Exercise of all Civil Power, I deny it, because it may be exercised by him who ought not to exercise it: If he mean the Right to exercise Civil Power and Authority, the Proposition is true, but nothing to the purpose. So that either his Proposition supposes the thing in Dispute, and is false; or if it be true, it is to no purpose. And the same Mistake runs through the rest of these Propositions: For if by *Civil Power and Authority*, he understand only the Exercise and Administration of it, he supposes that which ought to be proved: if he under-

stand the Right it self, though these Propositions were true, yet still they would prove nothing,

But the Doctor makes an Objection P. 13. to himself, which has great weight in it; *If this be so (that no Obedience is due to the Rightful King, when another is settled in the Throne) what does a Legal Right signifie, if it do not command the Allegiance of Subjects?*

He answers: *It bars all other Humane Claims: No other Prince can challenge the Throne of Right: and Subjects are bound to maintain the Rights of such a Prince, as far as they can; That is, against all Mankind; but not against God's disposal of Crowns: and therefore when God transfers the Kingdom, he transfers our Allegiance, which is due and annexed to his Authority, whether this Authority be conveyed by a Legal Succession, or by any other means.*

But notwithstanding all this, the Legal Right can signifie nothing, unless it be in that Interval of Time between the Dispossession of one Prince, and the Settlement of another. For if the Legal Possessor be in the Throne, his Legal Title can be of no advantage to him, because his Divine Authority would secure him, while he is in Possession, as well without it; and when an Usurper is once settled, it can then no longer be of any account to him; for though it be good against all Mankind, yet not against God in his disposal of Crowns; but when God has given away his Kingdom to another, the Rightful King must submit, unless he may plead his *Humane Claim* against God's Donation. Before a Settlement, indeed, he that has the Legal Right, has the Odds

on his side. But Men are so partial in their Judgments, in all things wherein their own Interest is so nearly concerned, that every one, who were exposed to any great Danger from the Usurper, would easily perswade himself, that he might become his Subject, and that the Legal King had no longer any Right to his Allegiance, the Usurper being, in his Opinion, settled enough to become invested with God's Authority: So that a Legal Title would upon these Grounds, be little more than an empty Word or Notion, and would either be of no use at all, or of little benefit, when there should be most need of it.

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I shall not much trouble my self about the several *Degrees of Settlement*, and of the Proportionable Submission, which they require; since I am not yet satisfied, that any Settlement of an Usurper, though it be in the *highest Degree*, can confer any Authority upon him, or cause any Obedience of the Subjects to become due to him merely upon that account. But if any Man can prove, That a *thorough Settlement* of an Usurper, does of it self, and upon its own Account, before the Decease or Cession of the Rightful King, and his Heirs, entitle him to the Crown, I will give him no Trouble to dispute with me about the *Degrees of Settlement*. But since the Doctor supposes, That the *Generality of the Nation have submitted to such a Prince*, and have placed him on the Throne, and put the whole Power of the Kingdom into his hands; and says expressly, That he is indeed King, while he administers the Regal Power; And since he has told us before, That it is impossible there should be a wrong King, I cannot see, why he should be so solicitous to define the Degrees

P. 17.

of Submission, and not think him thoroughly enough settled to have Right to an intire Allegiance, while the dispossess'd Prince has such a formidable Power, as makes the Event very doubtful. For if God have once made him King, as by the Doctor's Supposition he has, then by the same Supposition, the Subjects owe him an intire Allegiance to day, though they were sure that the dispossess'd Prince would recover his Kingdom of him to morrow. For he that has once God's Authority, has a Right to our Allegiance from the first to the last hours he has it; why therefore may not Subjects obey him as their King now, who perhaps may not be their King a while hence? Nay, though they were certain that his Royal Authority were to be taken from him in never so short a time, yet this could make him have never the less Right to their Obedience, while his Authority lasts. If he be indeed King, he must be Rightful King with respect to God; for all Kings are equally right-ful with respect to him; and it is impossible there should be a wrong King, unless a Man could make himself King, whether God will or no. So that if he be King, as the Doctor supposes, he is Rightful King, and may challenge the Allegiance of the Subjects by Vertue of God's Authority, whatever Forces the dispossess'd Prince may yet have: and therefore either he is now thoroughly settled, or a thorough Settlement is not necessary to the obtaining God's Authority; and when he is once King, there can be no Reason, why the Allegiance of the Subjects should in any measure be abated for any Apprehensions of Danger he may be in from the late Legal Possessors Arms.

P. 8.

P. 14.

In the Fourth Section, the Doctor proceeds to confirm his Doctrine

Strine by Arguments, and to answer Objections.

His Arguments are, 1. From Scripture. 2. From Reason.

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1. From Scripture. His first Argument is from Rom. 13. 1, 2. *Let every Soul be subject to the higher Powers, for all Power is of God: The Powers that be, are ordained of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.* He observes, that the word *ἑξουσία*, Power, or Authority, which is opposed to *δυναμὶς*, as it signifies Force, is sometimes used in the same sense with it, and that these two words are sometimes used promiscuously in Scripture, and that therefore unless there were some distinction set down by the Apostle in express words, whereby we might know that by it in this place are to be understood only Rightful Powers, we are to understand the word in its full Latitude, so as to comprehend Usurpers likewise. For the Scripture neither in this nor any other place distinguishing between Lawful Kings and Unlawful, we are not to limit the signification of the words, so as to exclude Usurpers from a Right to the Duties enjoined in the Text; or to say, that they are not ordained of God.

1. But if the various signification of words necessarily require, that there be some express limitation added, to determine them to one particular sense; or if every word must be taken in the utmost Latitude of its signification, unless it be so limited, we shall be at a great loss to know how to make sense of most Authors, or to make them consistent with themselves. For the same words often have opposite and quite contrary significations, as they are differently used and applied by the same

Authors, and yet they seldom give notice, when they use them in one sense and when in another, but think it sufficient, that the sense be limited and determined by the subject to which they are applied, or by the coherence and connexion, which they have with the rest of the discourse. And if the Acceptation of a word be still doubtful, the most likely way to find it out, is to examine in what sense the Author most commonly uses the same word. But unless there be an evident Reason to the contrary, every word is to be taken in its proper, or in its usual sense; for there needs no Reason to be given, why a word should be understood properly, or, as it uses to be understood, but he that will understand a word in an improper, or unusual signification, is obliged to produce his Reason for it: because every word is supposed to retain its first and most genuine sense, unless it be most frequently used Metaphorically, and then it must be taken in its most usual signification, unless it can be shewn, that it is applied to another meaning, than is commonly intended by it. When we read in Scripture,

* of the Powers of darkness, of the God of this World, † and of the Power and Seat, or Throne, and great Authority, which the Dragon gave the Beast in the Revelations; the words are in-

telligible, though taken very improperly, without any express limitation. And when St. Paul says, *Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, &c.* We are to understand only Rightful Powers, unless it can be shewn, that any other are ordained of God. For in its primary and natural signification, and in its common use, *ἑξουσία* must be acknowledged to mean

† *Ἡ ἑξουσία τῶ σκότους, Luk. 22. 53.*

† *Καὶ ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ ὁ δράκων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ θρόνον αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μεγάλην, Rev. 13. 2.*

only Just and Lawful Authority, and this every Man must understand by it, unless the context determin the contrary, which it cannot do here; for here is no mention of any Powers, but those, which are *ordained of God*. In some other places of Scripture, it plainly appears from the Text it self, that the word is used improperly, and contrary to its ordinary signification; but here the Doctor seems not to pretend any such thing, but only argues, that because it is used in an uncommon sense in some other places of Scripture, it must be taken so in this, because *St. Paul makes no exception against Kings who exercise Civil Government without a Legal Title to it*. Whereas we ought to conclude on the other side, that since the Apostle gives no intimation, that he uses the word in an improper and unusual sense, therefore we are to understand it only of those who have legal Titles, and the rest are *excepted against* plainly enough, because they are not mentioned, nor is the least intimation given of them; when in the other places of Scripture it is manifest at first sight, that the word is applied to a different sense than that which it commonly has in Scripture, or in any other Book.

2. If the Scriptures make no distinction between Kings, who have a Right Title, and those that are Usurpers, who have only the Name and Title of Kings, it is because there needs no other distinction, than the Reason of the thing, which sufficiently declares the difference. The Scripture had never declared any distinction of Husbands, yet the Woman of *Samaria* well enough understood, that there must be one, and therefore replied, that she had no Husband, though she had one, who

was called so; and our Saviour answers her, *Thou hast well said, I have no husband; for thou hast had five husbands, and he, whom thou now hast, is not thy husband: in that thou saidst truly*, John 4. 17, 18. And if it should now be asked any Man, who is not prepossessed with the Notion of a *thorough Settlement*, whether *St. Paul* by the *higher Powers*, or *ordained of God*, meant Rightful Kings only, or Usurpers likewise, he would scarce be able for some time to imagine what reason there could be to doubt, whether Rightful Kings only, were meant by those expressions, or to conceive what interest Usurpers could have in that Text. And this *Dr. Sherlock* seems to own, when he says, *That the Apprehensions of novelty and singularity had cramped his freedom and liberty of thinking, and that his Scheme of Government may startle some Men at first, before they have well consider'd it*. So that it is evident, that this Interpretation is a Novelty and Singularity, which will startle most Men, and that this Text in its most plain and obvious sense is to be understood of Rightful Kings, and if others are to be comprehended in it, this must be proved not from the words themselves but from other Reasons; for the words do not naturally include them; the utmost that can be said is, that they may possibly comprehend them, because they are not always used in a strict sense; but that they are not so used here is the thing to be proved: if *usurped Powers are ordained of God*, the Text plainly commands subjection to them, but if they be not ordained of him, it as plainly commands subjection to Rightful Kings in opposition to them, And it cannot be concluded from the different sense of the word *Usurper* upon different occasions, that Usurpers are ordained of God, but it must be

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be first proved, that they are ordained of him, and then and not before, it must be allowed, that the signification of that word is to be so extended in the Text, as to be understood of them as well as of other Kings.

3. Besides, if this Argument from the Scriptures making no distinction between Kings, who have a Legal Title, and those who have none, prove any thing, it must prove too much, to make at all to this purpose. For the Scripture makes no distinction between Kings, who have both a Legal and a Divine Right, and those who have neither, but are Usurpers both against God and Man. Thus *Abimelech* is stiled King, *Judg. 9.* without any manner distinction, or explication, though he was set up not only by the most wicked and bloody means, but in opposition to the Authority of God himself, who then governed the People of *Israel*, by raising them up Judges to Deliver and to Rule over them; and for this Reason, when they would have made *Gideon* King, he rejected it as a thing, which would be a great offence against God, and a notorious contempt of him. *Then the men of Israel said unto Gideon, rule thou over us, both thou, and thy son, and thy sons son also: for thou hast delivered us from the hand of Midian. And Gideon said unto them, I will not rule over you: the Lord shall rule over you, Judg. 8. 22, 23.* And since that God was afterwards so displeased with the Children of *Israel* for desiring a King, and said that in asking a King they had rejected him, that he should not reign over them, *1 Sam. 8. 7.* The People of *Shechem* in setting up a King of their own chusing, without leave from God, or asking counsel of him, must be guilty of a much

greater affront against God: for they rejected him in a more insolent and provoking manner; not contenting themselves with those whom God used to raise up for them; and not regarding his choice, or expecting his pleasure in it, they presumed to chuse them a Prince of their own. *Abimelech* therefore could be King by no Authority from God, but by his Permission only; and yet the Scripture gives the Title of King to him as well as to *Saul* and *David*, because he was in full Power, and exercised all outward Acts of Supreme Authority, though he had really no Authority, but by Force only, and success in his wickedness assumed to himself the name of King. *Ishbosheth* likewise was set up by *Abner* against *David*, whom God had nominated, and caused to be anointed King, to reign over all *Sauls* Dominions, after his death: yet the Scripture says in the same words, in which it speaks of all other Kings, that *Ishbosheth* was made King over all *Israel*, and that he reigned two years, *2 Sam. 2. 9, 10.* And *Athaliah* is said to have reigned over the Land six years, *2 Kings 11. 1.* tho' she had no manner of Right either from God or Man, as the Doctor himself confesses and maintains, because *Joash* was alive, on whom God had entailed the Crown, as being descended from *David*. She is notwithstanding said to have reigned over the Land, in the same terms that are used in Scripture, concerning the most Rightful Kings, nominated and appointed by God himself. The examples then of *Abimelech*, *Ishbosheth*, and *Athaliah* abundantly shew, that Usurpers, tho' they exercise the Supreme Authority, and are in full Possession of it, are not therefore the ordinance of God, and that it is not impossible there should be a wrong King, unless a Man could make

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make himself King, whether God will, or no: for Abimelech, and Ishbosheth were Kings, and Athaliah was Queen without any Authority at all, and yet not whether God would or no, but by his Permission. And from hence it is evident that the word *King* or *Queen* doth not always signifie in Scripture a Person invested with God's Authority, though it be used without distinction; and that the sense of the same words in particular places of Scripture must be known, not always from any distinction annexed to them, but from the Circumstances and Reasons of things; and that if this distinction between Usurpers and Rightful Kings be unknown to Scripture, yet if it be not unknown to Reason, that is sufficient to interpret this Text of St. Paul, to be meant only of lawful Powers; for the Scriptures always suppose and require that Men should bring their Reason along with them, when they read and explain them, or else they will make no more difference between Kings authorised by God, and those not authorised by him, than between Legal Kings and Illegal.

4. But I cannot think that the distinction between Rightful Kings and Kings by Usurpation is unknown to Scripture; but rather that St. Peter has expressly declared, that it is to Rightful Kings obedience is due; when he says, *submit your selves to every ordinance of Man for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the King, as supreme*, 1 Pet. 2. 13. *κατατάγητε ὑποὔμῳ κυρίου ὡς κυρίου*. He commands them to submit themselves to every humane Ordinance, or Constitution of Government under which they lived. Or, as the Convocation quote this Text, according to the old Translation, to submit themselves unto all

Page 144. manner of ordinance of Man. I know

there are different Interpretations of this Text, but this seems the most probable: for the King is here called the Ordinance of Man, not because he is made King by Men; but because the Constitution, according to which he becomes King, is an humane Constitution or Ordinance, and not Divine, as was that of the *Jews*. St. Peter admonishes the Christians, that they ought not to overvalue themselves upon the account of their Christian Liberty, so as to imagine themselves exempted from those Duties which are incumbent upon the rest of mankind, as Subjects to their Sovereigns, or as Servants to their Masters; but to behave themselves, as free and not using their Liberty for a cloak of maliciousness, verse 16. He had told them, verse 9. that they were a chosen Generation, a Royal Priesthood, a holy Nation, a peculiar People: which was the Character given of the *Jews*, and now applied by the Apostle to the *Jewish* converts, and left they should have too high a conceit of themselves, and vainly think, as the *Jews* did, that because they were Gods peculiar People, they were bound to submit to no Government, but what was of God's own immediate appointment, (and this was the Opinion the *Gentiles* had of them, they spoke against them as *evil-doers*, v. 12. and accused them of disobedience to *Cesar*, and of Preaching another King, one *Jesus*, Act. 17. 7.) St. Peter therefore acquaints the Christians, that so was the will of God, that by subjection to all in Authority they should with well-doing put to silence the ignorance of foolish men, verse 15. in as much as tho' the Frame of all Governments is not of God's appointment, yet the Authority in every Government is from him, and therefore whoever is King according to the Legal Constitution of each Government,

Exod. 19. 5, 6.

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Obedience becomes due to him for the Lord's sake, because God makes him King, and concurs with the Humane Act, in ratifying what is done according to the Ordinance or Constitution of Man. So that St. Peter calls particular Governments Man's Ordinance, because they are of Humane Contrivance and Institution; and he says, they are to be submitted to for the Lord's sake, because whoever is empowered to administer the Government according to the Constitution of it, has God's Authority, and in St. Paul's words, is God's Ordinance. St. Peter therefore speaking of Legal Powers, and St. Paul only mentioning the higher Powers in general terms, and both saying, Obedience is due to them for the Lord's sake, both must be understood of Legal Powers; and St. Paul writing his Epistle to the Romans, after this of St. Peter, his words could need no distinction, to be understood with that limitation, which St. Peter here uses, of every Ordinance of Man, or of those Powers which are Just and Right by the Laws of Men.

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Serm. 1. p.
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For as Bishop Sanderson has accurately expressed it, the truth is, the Substance of the Power of every Magistracy, is the Ordinance of God; and that is St. Paul's Meaning: but the Specification of the Circumstances there-to belonging, as in regard of Places, Persons, Titles, Continuance, Jurisdiction, Sub-ordination, and the rest, is (as St. Peter termeth it) an Humane Ordinance, introduced by Custom, or Positive Law.

5. But further, we find this Distinction in express words in the Old Testament: for according to the Doctor's Interpretation, it is impossible there should be any King, who is not Ordained of God; for he explains

it of all the Powers, that at any time be, of all that are possessed of Supreme Power, however they came by it: Whereas, besides what has been said of Abimelech, and Ishbosheth, and Athaliah, God says expressly of the People of Israel, *They have set up Kings, but not by me; they have made Princes, and I knew it not; that is, did not approve of it, Hof. 8. 4.* To this the Doctor answers Three things, which I shall consider.

1. This is not true, as to all the Kings of Israel, after their Separation from the Tribe of Judah: for some of the Kings were set up by God's own appointment, as Jeroboam and Jehu, and their Posterity: So that this can be true only of those Kings who reigned over Israel between the Posterity of Jeroboam and Jehu, and after the Kingdom was taken from the Line of Jehu. P. 35.

2. One of these Kings was Baasha, 1 King. 15. 27. 16. 2. who slew Nadab the Son of Jeroboam, and made himself King without God's express Nomination and Appointment; and yet God tells him, *I exalted thee out of the dust, and made thee Prince over my People Israel; and all the other Kings, who were not nominated by God, nor anointed by any Prophet, no more than Baasha was, were yet set up by God, as he was.*

3. The true Answer then is this: Israel was originally a Theocracy, as well as Judah, and though God allowed them at their request to have Kings, yet he reserved the appointment of them to himself; and therefore as in the Kingdom of Judah he entailed the Crown on David's Posterity; so he appointed Jeroboam to be the first King in Israel; and they ought, when that Line was cut off, to have consulted God, and received his Nomination by his

his Prophets of a New King; but instead of that — they submitted to any who could set themselves over them; which was a great Fault in a People, who were under the immediate Government of God: For hereby they fell out of the State of Theocracy, into the common condition of the rest of the World, where Kings are set up by the Providence of God, &c.

1. To this I reply, 1. It is not pretended that the words of the Prophet can be meant of all the Kings of Israel; nor of all neither who reigned either from Nadab, the Son of Jeroboam to Jehu; or after the Posterity of Jehu.

2. For Baasha, who slew Nabab, was set up by God himself, according as God had threatened Jeroboam by the Prophet Ahijah: Moreover the Lord shall raise him up a King over Israel, who shall cut off the House of Jeroboam that day, 1 Kings 14. 14. The Lord shall raise up to himself a King, *ἀναστήσει ὡς ἐαυτῷ βασιλέα*, thereby entitling him in a more especial manner to his Authority, and styling him his King, the King whom he would raise up to himself to vindicate his Honour, and to execute his Judgments upon Jeroboam: which Prophecy is expressly said to be fulfilled in Baasha, when he killed Nadab, and destroyed all the House of Jeroboam, 1 Kings 15. 29. So that though Baasha were not directly nominated, yet he was immediately appointed by God himself; and the beginning of his Reign, in the destruction of Jeroboam's Family, was exactly foretold; and therefore God's exalting him out of the dust, and making him Prince over his People Israel, 1 Kings 16. 1. cannot be understood of his Providence, but of his Appointment.

It may be objected, That God did not authorize Baasha to slay Nadab, because this is alledged against him as the Cause of his own Destruction, 1 Kings 16. 7. And also by the hand of the Prophet Jehu, the Son of Hanani, came the word of the Lord against Baasha, and against his house, even for all the evil that he did in the sight of the Lord, in provoking him to anger with the work of his hands, in being like the house of Jeroboam, and because he killed him.

To which I answer, That by him in this Verse, cannot probably be meant Nadab, of whom there is no mention after the 31st Verse of the foregoing Chapter: Nor can it be meant of Jeroboam, who was not killed by Baasha, unless Jeroboam be said to be slain by him, not in his own Person, but because he had destroyed all the Family of Jeroboam: Which kind of Interpretation seems never to be admitted, where there is no evident Necessity for it, or not however when there is another more easie and natural. The words then are a Repetition of what had been before related in the first and second Verses: God had raised up Baasha, and so blessed him, that he reigned Twenty Four Years; but he was guilty of great Ingratitude towards God, and did that which was evil in his sight, which is expressed twice before by his walking in the ways of Jeroboam (1 Kings 15. 34. and 16. 2.) and here by his being like the house of Jeroboam: for this God threatens, That he will take away the Posterity of Baasha, and the posterity of his house, and will make his house like the house of Jeroboam, the Son of Nebat, ver. 3. Which implies, That God designed to continue Baasha and his Posterity after him in the Throne of Israel, if he had not thus provoked

ked God with his sins. But in neither of the Two other Verses is there the least intimation, that the killing of Nadab was imputed to Baasha as a sin; and here, after the Death of Baasha, God's Message formerly sent to him by his Prophet, is again repeated, and the mention of Jeroboam is added, as it had been twice before, for the further aggravation of his Guilt: It is said, the word of the Lord came against Baasha, and against his house, even for all the evil that he did in the sight of the Lord, in provoking him to anger with the work of his hands—and because he killed him; or, as it may be translated, for which he smote him; that is, God smote Baasha for his sins: The Prophet was sent to denounce God's Judgments against him, and God at last took away his Life, and his sins were the Cause of it: So

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that the words are not to be understood with relation to Nadab, as slain by Baasha, but to Baasha himself, as killed by God's just Judgment upon him for his sins. And with this agrees the Version of the Septuagint, καὶ ἐλάλησεν κύριος — ὅτι Βαασά, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ὤκνησεν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὅτι πᾶσαν τὴν κακίαν, ἣν ἐποίησεν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς κυρίου, τὸ παροργίσαι αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις τῶν χειρῶν αὐτῷ, τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸ ὅτι οὐκ ὤκνησεν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὅτι τὸ πατάσαι αὐτὸν, and concerning the smiting him: And

Pleriq; eum, Ba-hasam, propter quod percussit eum Dominus, id est, propter sua prava opera. Malvend. in loc.

Ob hanc causam occidit eum, hoc est, filium Hanani, Prophetam.

thus Malvenda says, most understand this place of Baasha's being slain of God for his sins. The Vulgar Latin renders it, ob hanc causam occidit eum; that is, God slew Baasha for the Cause abovementioned, viz. for provoking God with his sins, as Jeroboam had done; though there is a Clause added, which ap-

plies the words to the Prophet Jehu, as if Baasha had killed him for delivering the Message; but this is omitted in some Copies, and Sixtus Se. Sixt. Senensis thinks that it was only an Annotation put by some body at first in the Margin, which afterwards got in Jehu, into the Text.

Cajetan says, the Prophet declared Ob hanc causam to Baasha the Cause for which Jeroboam's House was destroyed, that Baasha might take warning by his Example; and for which he smote him; that is, the Evil of the House of Jeroboam, for which God destroyed it. tur, & pro quo percussit eum. Pronomen eum demonstrat Jeroboam, cum domo ejus. Narratur enim quod Jehu Prophetam manifestavit Regi Bahasam, pro qua causa percussit Deus Domum Jeroboam, ut vel ab exemplo disceret recipiscere. Cajet. in loc.

But if we should grant, that this Verse is to be understood of Baasha's killing Nadab, the meaning seems then to be, not that he sinned in killing Nadab, but that his having killed him proved the aggravation of all his other sins; that when he had been raised up by God purposely to destroy the House of Jeroboam, he should notwithstanding be guilty himself of the same sins, for which it was destroyed; and therefore no mention is made of Nadab, but of Jeroboam, the Prophet having declared, That God's Anger was kindled against him, because he walked in the way of Jeroboam, which yet he knew to be so abominable before God, that he was exalted out of the Dust, and had the Kingdom given him, to reduce Israel from that sin, which Jeroboam had led them into; and therefore this is added at last, as the most aggravating Circumstance, that

he should follow the Wickedness of that very Man whom he had by God's appointment slain : And the Word of the Lord came against him, for all the Evil that he did , *in being like the house of Jeroboam, and because he killed him ;* that is, because he was the Man who had killed him for the same sins which he now became guilty of himself.

But if we should further grant, That *Baasha* was raised up by God's Permission only, and that he sinned in killing *Nadab*; yet when he had destroyed the House of *Jeroboam*, and there was none left who had a Right to the Kingdom, he then became Rightful King, and God made him Prince over his People *Israel* : So that he could not be of the Number of those whom the Prophet *Hosea* mentions, that were made Kings, but not by God ; for in those frequent Conspiracies and Murders of the Kings of *Israel*, which we read of, it might often happen, that the Right Heir was alive, and excluded, which alters the Case.

3. It is precarious to say , That God had reserved to himself the Nomination and Appointment of the Kings of *Israel*. He gave indeed the Ten Tribes to *Jeroboam*, and entailed the Crown of *Israel* upon his Posterity , in the same manner as he had entailed that of *Judah* upon the Line of *David*, on condition, That he should serve God, as *David* did, *1 Kings* 11. 38. And he settled the Kingdom upon *Jehu's* Posterity to the Fourth Generation, *2 Kings* 10. 30. But these were extraordinary Cases, and therefore can be no Evidence, That God did reserve to himself the constant designation of their Kings,

though he did sometimes nominate and appoint them. God's Promise to *David*, and his House, was ultimately and principally to be understood of the *Messiah*, who was to be the Son of *David*, and it was absolute with respect only to him; *David* and *Solomon*, &c. were Types of Christ, and the Kingdom of *Judah* was Typical of Christ's Kingdom, and the Scepter was not to depart from *Judah* till the coming of Christ : So that God had a more immediate Care and Regard to the Kingdom of *Judah* than to that of *Israel* : and yet the Entail of the Kingdom of *Judah* is scarce ever mentioned, but with such express Conditions annexed, as shew, that upon the Violation of them, it might, by the very Terms of that Promise, whenever God had pleased, have been taken away from them in the same manner that other Kingdoms are alienated and transferred : And there is no intimation, That upon the Forfeiture of their special Favour and Privilege, either *Israel* or *Judah* were to expect that God would afterwards nominate their Kings. After the sin of *Jeroboam*, wherewith he made *Israel* to sin, and at once lost God's Favour both to himself and his Posterity, and forfeited the Hereditary Right to the Crown ; God seems to have left the Succession of the Kings of *Israel* to the Care of his ordinary Providence, excepting only when he interposed upon particular occasions, to put down one King, and set up another. For if it had been sinful for any King to ascend the Throne, without God's express Order, it is incredible that the rest of the Prophets should be so silent in a matter of so high a Nature, who reproved and rebuked their Kings so freely, and so severely too upon all other occasions. A sin so notorious, and so long continued in, would probably have been taken notice of by all the other

other Prophets as well as by *Hosea*. The Kings then, whom this Prophet mentions, that were *set up, but not by God*, must be such as were set up not only without God's appointment, but without his Approbation, or Authority.

And indeed, if God had reserved to himself the Appointment of the Kings of *Israel*, his permitting them to Reign without his Appointment, and suffering them to settle themselves in the Kingdom by his Providence, could be no evidence that he had bestowed upon them any Authority; because this had been contrary to that Order of Government, which God had instituted among them, and in derogation from that Prerogative, which he had determined to exercise over them; and when God has declared his Will in any Case, we must not conclude from any Events of Providence that he allows or authorises the contrary. This we are told in the Case of *Joash* and *Athaliah*, and there is the same reason in this; for God may as well be supposed by his Providence to set aside the next Heir to the Crown of *Judah*, which was entailed by himself; as to forgo the *Theocracy*, which he had retained over the Kingdom of *Israel*: so that either we must say, that he confirmed *Athaliah* in the Throne by his Providence, or else, that the Kings of *Israel*, whom he did not appoint, could have no Authority from him, notwithstanding any success or continuance of their Reigns.

It appears therefore from the Prophet *Hosea*, that the People of *Israel* did set up Kings, who had no Authority from God, and made Princes, when God *knew it not*, or did not approve of it, and who by consequence could be none of his Ordinance. And how many or how few soever these Kings were, it cannot truly be said, that there was no distinction to be

found in Scripture between Kings, who are invested with God's Authority, and those, who are not: and therefore *St. Paul* could not be understood to mean all Kings whatsoever, under the Denomination of *the higher Powers, ordained of God*; and since all are not set up by him, there needed no distinction in express words, to inform us, that he meant only Lawful Kings; for if he had intended by this Precept subjection to unlawful Kings too, there would have needed a further distinction to know, what unlawful Kings we were to obey, since the Scripture speaks of some unlawful Kings, whom we are not to obey, unless we must obey such as are not set up by God, or those Kings can be God's Ordinance, whom he does not set up: wherefore it would have been necessary for him to have distinguished between Usurpers, that are set up by God, and those, who are not, if he had not spoken only of Rightful Kings.

But it is urged that this sense of the Text would involve Mens Consciences in great perplexities; for the Titles to Crowns being oftentimes very uncertain, great skill in History and Law is required to find out the Right Title; and after all their search the most learned Men cannot agree about it, and it is not to be imagined that all Mens Consciences should be concerned in such niceties, which wise and learned Men are not able to decide: especially the Titles of the *Roman Emperours* at that time, and afterwards for many Ages together, being either *stark nought*, or the very best of them very doubtful, the Apostle cannot be imagined to oblige every Christian of that and of succeeding Ages to examine the Titles of Princes: and this the Doctor takes to be little less than a demonstration, that this Precept of *St. Paul*

cannot be understood only of Subjection to Powers, that had a Legal Right.

I answer, 1. I have proved that there may be Kings, who are not God's Ordinance, and the only way we have now to distinguish Kings, that are set up by him, from those, who are not, is to enquire into the Justice of their Cause, and the Legality of their Titles. And St. Peter speaks of the Ordinance of Man, or of human Establishment, according to which Kings are advanced to the Throne.

2. If the Title be doubtful, yet the Consciences of Subjects will not be so ensnared and perplexed with niceties and difficulties, as it is objected: for in such cases the Subjects may lawfully swear to the Possessor; and are obliged to pay all Allegiance to him, unless his Competitor can make it appear, that the Right is his, and not the Possessor's; and then, the Subjects not knowing this before, are guilty of no breach of Allegiance to him, but are bound, as soon as his Right becomes known to them, to yield him their Allegiance, having taken an Oath, or given any other assurance or proof of Obedience to the Possessor, only out of ignorance, that any other Person could make out a clear and certain Title.

3. But granting that St. Paul had meant Usurpers as well as Lawful Powers in this Text; yet the perplexities of Conscience would not have been much less, than it is said they must necessarily be according to the contrary exposition. For so learned a Man as Dr. Sherlock could not find out the true sense of the Text, it seems, till now, upon this occasion, and very few perhaps besides have been able to discover it, since the Epistle was written. * The Doctor acknowledges, that St. Chry-

ostom is against him, and produces no Father, nor any other Author ancient or modern for his Opinion, except the Convocation, which I have shewn, says nothing to his purpose:

And St. Basil says expressly, that the higher Powers mentioned by St. Paul, are such as attain to the Government, according to Humane Laws: and this appears to have been the sense of the Church in his time; for he sets it down as a thing certain, That the Civil Powers

must receive their Authority in a Legal way; and from thence proves, that if they, that resist those, who receive their Power according to humane Laws, resist the Ordinance of God, then much rather must those resist his Ordinance, who resist the Ecclesiastical Powers, which are, by Gods own more immediate Institution, invested with his Authority, according to the Divine Laws. So that if Dr. Sherlock's Interpretation were true, yet it would not much have eased Mens Consciences, since it has been so little known and so lately discovered, and by his own Confession was by himself so lately suspected of Novelty and Singularity.

4. The Titles of the Roman Emperours were then neither stark nought, nor very doubtful. The Titles of Claudius, and of Nero were not at all doubtful, and under one of them this Epistle was written: Claudius was saluted Emperour by the Soldiery, and approved of by the Senate; and Nero was adopted by Claudius, and chosen by the Army, and the choice confirmed by the Senate, and they were both owned, and submitted to by the whole Empire; which is all that could be requisite to make them

Ἐν τίνων τοῖς τῷ
κρίμα τέτε ἀρχαῖς,
τοῖς καὶ νόμον ἀνθρώ-
πων ἢ ἀρχῇ ἐλη-
φείσι πομπῇ τῷ ἰσο-
παλῶ ὡς δὲ ἔνυσ-
βάντων ὁ δὲ ὁ νό-
μος ἀπένειμε, &c. Ba-
sil. Tom. 2. Constitut.
Monast. c. 22. p. 715.

* Case of
Resistance,
p. 122.

Jordan. c. 1. Lawful Emperours: for it is evident beyond all dispute, that the Roman Empire was not Hereditary. And, when at any time the Title was doubtful, they might have submitted with a safe Conscience to the Possessor, as I before observed. And thus much may serve in answer to his first Argument from Scripture, out of *Rom. 13.*

P. 21. 2. He urges, That we have no example in Scripture, that any People were ever blamed for submitting to the present Powers, whatever the Usurpation were, tho' we have examples of their being condemned for refusing to submit to them. This he proves from the Prophecies of *Jeremiah*, and from our Saviour's Argument in his discourse with the Scribes, and Pharisees, which relies wholly on the Possession of Power; *Whose Image and Superscription hath it?*

I answer, that the silence of Scripture is no Argument, unless it can be shewn that the Prophets at the same time that they reprov'd the People for their other Crimes, did not blame them for submitting to an Usurper, while the Lawful King himself had not submitted, nor was commanded by God to submit, but had a Right to their Allegiance. For in matters of History the Scriptures often give a bare Narrative, without any remark or censure at all upon it. We read of *Lot's Incest*, and that both *Noah* and he were drunken: but no Man, I suppose, will conclude that either Incest or Drunkenness is Lawful, because the Scripture relates only the matter of Fact, and says nothing more of it: for they are Vices notorious enough in themselves, and it was not the design of the Sacred History to inveigh against Vices, but only to declare by whom, and with what circumstances they were committed: in like manner if there be any instance in Scripture, where the Subjects abandoned their natural Sovereign, and betook themselves to the Usurper, and fought

against him; a bare Narrative of this can no more prove that it is lawful, than that it is unlawful: for an Historical Relation can prove nothing, but that such a thing was done, and in such a manner; but the nature of the action it self, with the circumstances of it; or some command in Scripture must discover the goodness or the wickedness of it.

But in the present case the Scriptures are not silent, but plainly enough declare, that Allegiance is only due to the lawful King, tho' an Usurper be never so well settled. For *St. Peter* and *St. Paul* both declare this, as it has been just now shewn, unless we can serve two Masters; for they teach subjection to the Rightful King, which implies that it cannot be due to his mortal Enemy. And when *Jehoiada* charged the People by their duty to God and to the King, to submit to *Joash*, and to depose *Athaliah*; this was a sufficient Declaration against Allegiance to an Usurper in prejudice to the Lawful King's Right.

But the case of the Jews under the Kings of *Babylon* was such, as made their Obedience to them a necessary Duty according to those Principles, which are most contrary to the Doctor's Opinion. For, 1. God had commanded both King and People to submit to these Kings. 2. They did submit, and take Oaths to them accordingly. 3. Therefore, the Kings submitting, as well as the People, there was none who could claim their Allegiance in competition with the Kings of *Babylon*. And under these Circumstances, either of a Divine command, or of a joint consent and submission both of King and People, no Man, who maintains the Right of an Hereditary Succession and a Legal Title, can with any Reason scruple to submit to a Foreign Conqueror. But I shall speak more particularly

ticularly to the Texts, which the Doctor has produced.

P. 21.

1. He acknowledges that the Prophet *Jeremy's* Argument is Prophecy, or an express command from God to submit to the King of Babylon, which he says, because of the Entail, that God himself had made of the Kingdom of Judah upon David's Posterity, was necessary, though other Kingdoms which are governed only by God's Providence, ought to submit to any Conquerour, or Invader in the same manner, as the Jews did to *Nebuchadnezzar*, without any Revelation to require it of them, or to warrant them in so doing. I shall not repeat what has been already said in Answer to this; but shall consider here only what he further urges, viz. That this Prophecy was, at the beginning of the four Monarchies, and that the Prophecy of the four Monarchies is not yet at an end; for under the fourth Monarchy the Kingdom of Christ was to be set up, and Antichrist was to appear, and the increase and destruction of the Kingdom of Antichrist is to be accomplished by great Changes and Revolutions in humane Governments; and when God has declared, that he will change Times and Seasons, remove Kings, and set up Kings, to accomplish his own wise Counsels, it justifies our necessary, and therefore innocent, compliances with such Revolutions, as much as if we were expressly commanded to do so, as the Jews were by the Prophet *Jeremiah*.

To say that the Prophecy of *Jeremiah* was at the beginning of the four Monarchies, is a thing I confess, that I can reconcile to no account of Chronology; it had been a much less mistake to have said, that it was at the end of the first Monarchy, or at the beginning of the second: for there were but two Kings that succeeded *Nebuchadnezzar*, in the *Assyrian* Monarchy, as God had declared by the same Prophet, that all Nations

should serve him, and his Son, and his Son's Son, until the very time of his Land came, and then many Nations should serve themselves of him, *Jer. 27. 7.*

And the Prophecy of *Daniel* is only a Prediction of what should come to pass, and therefore implies no Authority from God, as has been shewn before: for if all Kingdoms, that are foretold of in Scripture, have Authority from God, then the Kingdom of Antichrist himself (as that signifies either Temporal or Spiritual Power) must be founded by God's Authority. For if either Prophecy, in declaring what shall come to pass, or Providence, in ordering and appointing all Events, as the Doctor argues, or only in permitting those that are Evil, as the general Opinion is, does imply, That all things prophesied of, and accomplished accordingly, are of God, the Kingdom of Antichrist must be of God's Erection, as much as any other Kingdom whatsoever. For Antichrist is in Scripture stiled King, and he could not make himself

P. 14.

King whether God will or no; and therefore he must be constituted King by God himself, because all Events are in his hands, and the distinction between what God permits, and what he does, does not relate to the Events of things. So that the Power of Antichrist must be the Ordinance of God, if the Four Monarchies were so merely for this Reason, because they were prophesied of in Scripture, and set up by God's Providence in the World, especially since it is said, That Power was given unto the Beast to continue Forty and Two Months, *Rev. 13. 5.* and that Power was given him over all Kindreds, and Tongues, and Nations, v. 7. which is as much as is said of the Four Monarchies; and yet it was the Dragon that gave him his Power, and his Seat, and great Authority, v. 2.

P. 12.

In short, if a Prediction in Scripture, and Providence in the disposal of the event, necessarily implies, that God authorises and approves of the thing foretold,

told and brought to pass, then every thing that is prophesied of, and comes to pass, must be approved of by God; or, which is at least the same thing, it must be authorised by him; for whatever God gives Authority to, so far he certainly approves of it: But as God foresees all things, so the most wicked Actions that have been in the World, have been foretold by him; and therefore his Prediction of Events can no more imply his Authority, or Approbation, than his Fore-knowledge does, and by consequence, the Four Monarchies could derive no Authority from the Prophecies of *Daniel*, and could be no further authorised by God, than they were just, and were erected upon the same Foundations of Righteousness, that other lawful Governments are settled upon.

P. 20.

The Doctor says, That the Four Monarchies were all as manifest Usurpations as ever were in the World. From whence I perceive that he is not of the Opinion of some Learned Men, who think, that *Cyrus*, the Founder of the Second Monarchy, was well acquainted with the Prophecy of *Isaiah*, in which he is expressly named, and that *Daniel* had explained it to him. However, I do not see how consistent this is with the Account, which, as has been observed, the Scripture gives of him.

Chron. Ca-
vion.

But the Doctor seems to have particular Exceptions against the Roman Empire; for he says, That if we must obey such Powers as the Roman Power was, he knows very few Powers that we may not obey; for whatever Legal Right the Roman Emperors had, who by Fear, or Flattery, or other Arts, extorted some kind of Consent from the Senate, it is plain the Romans themselves were great usurpers, and had no other Right to the greatest part of their Empire, but Conquest and Usurpation.

P. 21.

This is soon said; and it does not concern the matter in hand, in the

least, to justify the Romans in their Wars, though very great things have been said by some Authors in their Praise upon that Account. But whatever their Conquests, or their Usurpations were, their Usurpations could give them no Right, but were only an accidental means, whereby, after the Submission, or Decease of those in whom the Right was, they became invested with it. And if this be not enough to give a Legal Right and Claim, there can be no such thing now in the world: which takes away the Subject of the Question; and when we are enquiring whether the Legal Right, and the Divine, may be in different Persons, the Doctor must deny, that there is any such thing as a Legal Right. For if there be any such thing, let any Man shew that the Romans had not such a Right, and to what Provinces they had no Legal Title, or that they had none to any Province at all.

What Power the Roman Emperors had, and how it was conveyed to them, appears from the *Lex Regia*, and from an Inscription in *Gruter*, where we find the Power describ'd that was renewed to *Vespasian*, and had belonged to the Emperors his Predecessors. And by the way we may observe, that

Sed & quod Principi placuit, Legis habet vigorem: quum Lege Regia, quae de ejus imperio lata est, populus ei & in eum omne imperium suum, & potestatem concedat. Justin. Instit. lib 1. Tit. 2. Jani Gruteri Inscrip. Antiq. p. 242.

the Romans had given up the Sovereign Power to *Augustus*, he made a Division of the whole Empire, reserving one part of it to himself, to be governed by Deputies sent by him; and giving the other to the People, who sent either Prætors or Consuls into the several Provinces assigned them: but all the Kingdoms and Principalties were reserved to the Emperors share; and thus they continued, *Strabo* says, at the time of his

Strabo lib. ult. in fin.

this Writing, which was in the Reign of *Tiberius*.

2. As to the Objection of the *Pharisees* against Submission to the Roman Powers, it did not respect the Title of the Emperor, but their own Privileges and Immunities. For they pretended, That because they might not voluntarily make choice of a Stranger to set over them, Deut. 17. 15. for that Reason they might not submit to Strangers who had conquered them, and to whom they had been in subjection near an hundred years; which was a most unreasonable and absurd way of arguing, and fit only for *Scribes* and *Pharisees* to use; for what could be more ridiculous than to conclude, That because they might not chuse a Stranger their King, therefore so many years after the whole Nation had submitted and sworn to Strangers, they might not pay Tribute to them? Our Saviour then, when they proposed that ensnaring Question to him, whether they might pay Tribute or no, gives them such an Answer as determines nothing indeed concerning the Title of *Tiberius* to the Empire, which was not the thing in Question, but was owned by all as good and lawful; but he shews them, they ought to pay Tribute to the lawful Emperors, for such *Tiberius* was acknowledged to be; and this he did by requiring them to shew him a peice of that Money, in which the Tribute was wont to be paid; and seeing that that had *Cesar's* Image and Supercription upon it, he tells them, they ought to render to *Cesar* the things which are *Cesar's*, and unto God the things which are God's, Mat. 22. 21. Whereby he assures them, that they were forbid by no Law of God to pay Tribute, or perform any other Instances of Obedience to the Princes, under whom they lived; but were in this left under the common Obligations of all other Subjects; and that which they were bound to above others, concerned not things of this Nature, but

their Obedience to God, and the Observation of his Laws, so as to keep themselves from the false Worship and Idolatry of the Heathens, whilst they obeyed their Edicts, and submitted to their Government: They were obliged both to render unto *Cesar* the things that are *Cesar's*, and unto God the things that are God's; to submit to *Cesar* in Civil Affairs, and to reserve for God his own Honour and Worship. The Title of the Emperor was not the Question, but supposing him to have a Rightful Title, the *Pharisees* denied that Tribute ought to be paid him by the *Jews*, who they pretended were to be Subjects to no Strangers whatsoever, but were exempt from his Jurisdiction, how just and lawful soever it might be over all the rest of his Subjects: Our Saviour answers, That the Privilege and Duty which was peculiar to the Jewish Nation, was not such, as to require them to submit to no Foreign Power; but it consisted in the Worship of the True and Only God; and that all other Subjection to *Cesar* was lawful, but that which was repugnant to their Duty to God: They might not pollute themselves with Idolatry, nor worship the Heathen Gods, nor pay Divine Honours to the Emperors themselves, nor do any other sinful thing at their command: This was not *Cesar's* due, and therefore he could not require it of them; nor must they obey him, if he should; They must not render to *Cesar* that which is due only to God, nor deny him that which is his own; but must render unto *Cesar* that which is *Cesar's*, and unto God that which is God's. Our Saviour speaks not of the Legal Authority of the Emperor's, but supposes it, as the *Pharisees* themselves did, who put that insidious Question to him; he only determines what was the Duty of the *Jews* under a Prince who was not of their own Nation.

II. The Doctor now comes to produce his Arguments from Reason; by which he endeavours to shew, that hereby is given the only true Account of the Original of Government, and that upon any other Principles there can be no such thing as a Divine Right of Kings, nor can they be irresistible, but their Authority will be precarious and uncertain, so that upon his Principles only the Doctrine of Passive Obedience can be maintained. I shall first shew, That Kings are irresistible, according to the Principles contrary to his, and then consider his Objections.

1. Kings are irresistible upon the contrary Principles. That Government was originally in the Fathers of Families; who by Nature and by God's Institution had supreme Authority over their own Children and Servants, is evident from Scripture; and how this Paternal and Patriarchal Authority was preserved among God's own People, but degenerated into other Forms, among the rest of the World, has been sufficiently explained from the Convocation; which determines, That when these other Forms are so sett'd, as that there is none who can claim any Right to the Paternal or Patriarchal Authority; then, however Irregular or Degenerate they may be, they are thoroughly settled, and require our Submission; it being evident that God has ratified them, when there must be either such kinds of Government or none at all over us; because it cannot be imagined, that he will place Societies of Men in such a condition, as to have no Lawful Government, or that none should have a Right to Rule over them: So that it is not the Consent of the People, nor Length of Time, or Prescription and Continuance of Usurpation, that gives a Right; but these are either only accidental Means of attaining to a rightful Title, as in continued Usurpations, upon the Failure of the Royal Blood; or Conditions and Qualifications, which prepare and capacitate Men for it, as in other Cases. For when the Throne becomes vacant either by Death or Cession

in an Elective Monarchy, or by the Extinction of the whole Royal Line, in an Hereditary Kingdom, the People may, and, in most Cases, are obliged to submit to the present Possessor, by what means soever he got into Possession; and then it is not the Submission or Consent of the People, that gives the Right, but God himself, who concurs with their Act, and ratifies it. As in Matrimony, it is not the Consent of the Parties, which joyns them together, but God himself, upon their Consent, and the Contract is irrevocable, because *whom God hath joyned together, no Man may put asunder*. A mutual Consent cannot separate them, much less can either Party revoke their Consent, when they please; but *whosoever shall put away his Wife, except it be for Fornication, and shall marry another, committeth Adultery*, Matth. 19. 9. And if the Consent of the Parties in Matrimony be so firmly ratified by God, there is no reason to doubt but that God may so confirm the Agreement or Compact between a King and People, as that nothing but a mutual Relaxation shall be able to disengage them from the Terms of it; And he may invest the King with his own Authority, and make him as irresistible, as if he had himself nominated him, and not conferred upon him his Authority by any Intervention of Subordinate Means. I need not mention that in Ordination, and in the Sacraments, and in all the Dispensations of God's Grace and Authority under the Gospel, Human Acts intervene; from whence it is obvious to conclude, That since in things of the highest and most Spiritual Nature God requires Human Acts, and does by them confer his Grace and Power, the irresistible Authority of Kings, can be never the more doubtful or questionable, because the People's Consent and Submission is ordinarily required to the conveyance of it in the first Erections of Kingdoms; for God acts as powerfully and effectually by the Ministries of Men, as by an immediate Command or Designation.

2. The Absurdities then which he would prove to arise from the asserting a Necessity of a Legal Right in them who are now invested with God's Authority, are all upon a false Supposition.

1. He argues, *If the Authority be wholly derived from the People, who shall hinder them from the taking it away, when they see fit? Upon these Principles there can be no Hereditary Monarchy; one Generation can only choose for themselves, their Posterity having as much Right to choose, as they had. And what Right had my Ancestors, three or four hundred Years ago, to choose a King for me? These are the Absurdities he would bring all Men to, who are not of his Opinion: And upon the same wrong Supposition would afterwards prove that Passive Obedience is altogether inconsistent with any but his present Principles, though he has effectually proved it upon other Principles in his Case of Resistance. And if he will now suppose that by his former Principles nothing more can go to the making of a King, whether he comes in by Conquest, or Usurpation, upon Defect of a better Claim by any other, or by Compact, or an Hereditary Right, than the bare Choice and Consent of the People, this is a little too much to be granted; and yet if this be denied, all his Inferences fall of themselves to the Ground. The thing to be proved is, That Kings have not their Authority from God, unless they be set up only by the Divine Providence, without any respect to Human Law and Right; which can never be proved, unless it be shewn, That God cannot or will not set up Kings in a way consistent with the Laws of Kingdoms, and with the Consent and voluntary Submission of Subjects. The Bond of Matrimony is never the sooner dissolved, because Marriages are not made in Heaven, as they say, but Men and Women are at their Liberty, and have a Power of choosing, whether they will marry this or that Person, or will not marry at all.*

God may appoint the Persons, and prevent or over-rule the Consent of the Parties, and he has sometimes done it: Gen. 24. He can appoint Kings, and set aside the ordinary Forms and Laws of Government; but this doth not prove, That he will always do it, nor that we are ever to expect it now; much less may we conclude, That he cannot or will not concur with Human Acts intervening, and give them his own Sanction. God certainly can, and ordinarily does convey Power and Authority as effectually by concurring with Men, and ratifying what they do, as if he did it immediately himself; unless we will say, That God does nothing but Miracles, and that subordinate Causes do every thing else without him.

But to use the Doctor's own Words, *God not only places a single Person in the Throne, but entails it on his Family by Human Laws, and makes the Throne a Legal Inheritance.* And after all, the only difference between the Doctor and his Adversaries is, That he says, God's Providence makes Kings by Conquest, or by Submission, and long successive Continuance of Power, or by Human Laws, or against Human Laws; because if Providence did not make Kings he could not prove that it unmakes them. But those of the contrary Opinion deny neither the absolute Power of God, nor the Effects of his Providence in setting up and putting down Kings: but they suppose, that unless it be, when God declares that it is his Will to act by an Absolute Power, without any regard to the Laws of Men, he does not raise up and depose Kings in a way that is contrary to the Constitution of their Kingdoms, so as to absolve Subjects from the Allegiance, which the Laws of their Country require; but so orders and disposes things, that Kings shall as long remain invested with his Authority, as they have a Legal Right.

2. The Notion of a Legal Right, he says, *must ultimately resolve it self into the Authority of the People to make Kings, which it is unjust for God himself to over-rule* P. 25.

rule and alter : For a legal Enail is nothing more than the Authority of the People ; and if the People have such an uncontrollable Authority in making Kings, be doubts they will challeng as much Authority to unmake them too : That is, as we were told before, no Man is bound by his Ancestors Act, and every Man too may undo what he has done himself, when he thinks fit.

It has been already shewn, that tho' the Prerogatives of Kings, and the Constitutions of Kingdoms may be contrived and agreed upon by Men ; yet God gives Kings a Right to govern according to them, and supreme and irresistible Authority to enable and secure them in the Administration of their Kingdoms, and entails the Thrones on their Families by Human Laws. And though God may over-rule and alter the Rights of Princes, yet his Providence is no sufficient Evidence that he intends to do it : If we once knew, it were his Will, all Human Laws must forthwith give Place to it ; but since his Providence is not a Declaration of his Will in this Matter, we must keep to the Observation of Human Laws, and of our Oaths grounded upon them.

But to suppose the most and the worst that can be said : If the People did set up Kings by Consent and Compact, this is no Argument that they may depose them. For a People, who consent to the setting a King over them, must consent to set one over them with Supreme Authority ; and the Supreme Authority is that, which hath no Superiour, and therefore cannot be resisted : For if the Supreme Authority may be resisted, then to be sure all Inferiour Authority may be resisted too, and so all Government must be dissolved, for want of any sufficient Authority to manage it. It follows then, That there must be a Supreme Authority somewhere in all Governments ; and in a Kingdom this Supreme Authority must be in the King ; and a

People, who upon this Supposition, should make a King, must choose one, in whom they place the Supreme Authority, that is, who is irresistible ; at least, unless they reserve to themselves a Liberty of Resistance in certain Cases, by express Agreement, which has been the Custom in Kingdoms where Resistance is allowed. Or however let us suppose, That the People declare their King irresistible upon their Choice of him, and establish that as the Fundamental Law of their Government ; suppose they oblige all in any Office Military or Civil, to swear, That it is unlawful upon any Pretence whatsoever to take up Arms against him, and oblige all the Clergy solemnly and frequently to declare it, would it be lawful for the People to recal this Power, because they gave it ? Or is it not rather of the very Essence of this Power that it can never be recalled, because never resisted ? Are other Contracts revocable by either of the Parties at pleasure, because they are entered into by Consent ? Might Marriage be dissolved, when either Party pleased, if no more were required to it than the Consent of both Parties ? Or is there any greater Reason, why he that has consented to be governed by an irresistible power, may recal his own Act, and resist when he thinks fit ?

I do not dispute whether it be possible for the People to convey a Power of Life and Death, and to establish a Sovereign Power among them ; nay, I grant it is impossible for any Rightful Government to be erected by mere Consent and Compact without God's Establishment and Confirmation of it ; I only shew, That though this were true, yet the Conclusion would be false, and though the People might make Kings by mutual Agreement and Contract, yet they could not unmake them.

But tho' the same Persons might not play fast and loose, as they please ; yet what obligation could their Children

children ly under to obey that Race of Kings which they had set up? For *what Rights*, says the Dr. *had my Ancestors three or four hundred years ago, to choose a King for me?* I answer, they had a Paternal Right, in vertue of which Children are obliged by all the lawful Acts of their Fathers in their behalf, or by the Acts of others, which are for their advantage, when they act as Parents for them. Thus Children promise by their Godfathers and Godmothers in Baptism, and when they come to Age, would be guilty of Apostacy, and of the breach of the most solemn Vow and Promise made in their name, if they should renounce their Baptism. In the Covenants which God has made with mankind, the Children were always obliged by their Fathers Act; thus it was in his Covenant with *Adam*, with *Noah*, with *Abraham*, and with *Moses* and the Children of *Israel*. There is nothing more plain in Scripture, than that the Children had an Interest in the Covenant made with their Fathers, and were obliged to perform the Conditions of it. And there is no difference between a Covenant made with God, and one made with Man in this respect; for it is essential to a Covenant that there should be the Consent of the Parties, that enter into it; and tho' God has a Right over his Creatures to require what Acts of Duty and Obedience he pleases from them, yet when he is pleased to deal with them by way of Covenant, it is necessary, they should consent to the Terms of it either by themselves, or by others that represent them, and have Power to act for them, otherwise, what were breach of a voluntary Covenant, as well as of natural Duty in the Parents, would be only breach of Duty in the Children.

And no distance of time can make any alteration in this obligation, which Parents lay upon their Children, as it appears by those Covenants, which God has entered into with Mankind. But if this could make any

difference, every Father renews his obligation to the Government for himself and his Children: For if the Person immediately consenting to the setting up a King oblige his Sons to pay Allegiance to him, then for the same reason, they by their Consent and Submission in living under his Government, oblige their Children, and so on for four hundred Years, or as long as the Government continues.

There is no need further to mention the Obligation all men are under to their Country for their Protection and Education from their Infancy, and for the many Benefits they receive from the Government; it is manifest that the Act of their Parents is obligation enough, if there were no other, and they must be obliged by their Parents Choice, as well as by their own, and are not left at liberty to deny their own Consent, if they think their Ancestors have made an ill Bargain. But when we add to this God's Authority, which is conferred upon all, that are duly advanced to Sovereignty, we have the surest grounds for the Doctrine of Passive Obedience, tho' God do not give his Authority in such a manner as to null or frustrate Legal Rights and Claims.

He next proceeds to consider the Objections, that may be made against his Assertion. The first is, that the dispossessed Prince ought not to attempt the Recovery of his Throne (nor any other Prince to assist him in it) which is to oppose God, and to challenge that, which he has no longer any Right to.

He answers; By no means: The Providence of God removes Kings, and sets up Kings, but alters no Legal Rights, nor forbids those, who are dispossessed of them, to recover their Rights when they can. While such a Prince is in the Throne it is a Declaration of God's Will, that he shall reign for some time, longer or shorter, as God pleases; and that is an obligation to Subjects to submit and obey; for Submission

mission is owing only to God's Authority: But that one Prince is at present placed in the Throne, and the other removed out of it, does not prove that it is God's Will, it should always be so; and therefore does not devest the dispossess'd Prince of his Legal Right and Claim, nor forbid him to endeavour to recover his Throne, nor forbid those, who are under no obligation to the Prince in Possession, to assist the dispossess'd Prince to recover his Legal Right.

This Answer seems to suppose, that, tho' the Prince in Possession have the Exercise of the Supreme Power, and do administer God's Authority for a time; or rather, tho' God governs by him as his Instrument, while he is in Possession; yet he has no Authority inherent in himself, but acts as wickedly, all along in withholding from the Rightful Prince his due, as he did at first in depriving him of it, and therefore may be thrust out by the Legal Prince himself, or by any others, who have made no Submission to him. But this is so directly contrary to all the rest of his Discourse, that it cannot be the Dr's meaning in this place. For he, that is set up by God, that is made King by him, that is invested with his Authority, and receives his Authority from him; he, to whom God gives the Throne, and does not only permit him to take it; he, who is as truly placed in the Throne by God, as if he had been expressly nominated and anointed by a Prophet at God's Command, as Saul and David were; he, who is rightful King with respect to God, and has the True and Rightful Authority of a King, who is God's Minister and Lieutenant, to whom God has transferred the Kingdom, and the Subjects Allegiance; this King has as full Right to his Crown as the lawful King himself could ever have; he has a Divine Right, and then the human Right, when it comes in Competition with the Divine, is nothing but a meer Formality, an empty and insignifi-

cant Word, and the want of it can never in the least weaken his Title. And the Doctor thus plainly and frequently asserting almost in every Page, that God has placed the Usurper in the Throne, I am not able to understand how it can be lawful for the dispossess'd Prince to endeavour to recover it from him, which is to endeavour to bring down whom God has exalted, and placed there with his own Right Hand. For the late Legal Possessor can have no more real Right than if he had never been King; only perhaps he may have the Honour to be called *late King* for distinction's sake, and to acquaint the World that he is now no longer so: But the Legal Right, which it is acknowledged he once had, must now be extinguished, and absorb'd in the Divine Right of the present Possessor.

To justify the King, who is supposed to retain a Legal Right in opposition to the Divine, in his waging War for the regaining of his Throne from him, who is in possession of it by a Divine Right, is plainly to maintain, that he may fight against God, and may insist upon the Validity of an human Claim, against the Divine Will and Command; it is to say, that God may dispose of Kingdoms as he pleases, but the Rights introduced by human Laws are still in force, notwithstanding his disposal. For though it be uncertain how long an Usurper shall continue in the Throne, this alters not the Case, since it is certain according to these Principles, that how long or how short a Time soever he is in Possession, for all that time, he has God's Authority. Suppose then it were certain that the Usurper were to be dispossessed at such a Time, it would nevertheless be as unjust to raise War against him, till that time, as if he were to remain in the Throne for his Life. For God may make Annual Kings, if he pleases, and yet their Authority will be as sacred

13.

P. 14.

P. 15:

sacred and inviolable, as any Kings whatsoever: It would be no excuse for a Man, that should affront my Lord Mayor, to say that his Lordship was almost out of his Office; nor any excuse to Domestick Rebels, or Foreign Invaders, to alledge that the King was sick of a Mortal Disease; and yet there is no difference in these Cases. For a King placed in the Throne by God himself, and acting by his Authority, can have no just Competitor, all the while he enjoys it, be it a longer or a shorter Time.

The rest that follows to Page 33. is a Digression, in which whatever concerns the present Question is grounded upon this Supposition, that a legal Claim is good against God's Authority, with which the King in Possession is invested, and so must either stand or fall with it. And therefore though there be several things, which granting this to be true, are unconcluding, yet I shall pass them over.

P. 33. Another Objection is, that his Opinion would give great Encouragement to daring and ambitious Men to invade their Neighbours.

He answers, that such Men need no other Encouragement, but Power to grasp at Crowns: And therefore 'tis great pity they should have any other. But he says further, that if the Kingdoms of the World be disposed of by God, and no Art or Power can place any Prince on the Throne but by God's Appointment; unless they can flatter themselves, that God has ordained them to be Kings, it will check all their ambitious Attempts, which God can so easily defeat.

But they cannot be ignorant, how easily God can defeat their Attempts, whether they know of this Doctrine, or no: They observe that Kingdoms are lost, and Kings dethroned in all Ages of the World; and when they have Power in their hands, they are apt to promise themselves Success,

without the hopes of any Authority, but what they can gain by the Sword. And when they are informed, that if they have but success, God will give them a Right, which will oblige all the Subjects in their Defence against all opposition, they will be much more forward and desirous to try their Fortunes, and see what success they can meet with; and Crowns will be looked upon by bold and aspiring Men as so many Prizes proposed for the reward of Victory. And to this there will be need of no great Dose of Enthusiasm, tho' Enthusiasm is no unusual thing in such Cases: For most of the ambitious Spirits have either flattered themselves, or at least made their Followers believe; that God would prosper their undertakings; that they were doing God's Work, and that he had ordained them Success in their Attempts: Or, if they should not be so Enthusiastick, yet this would be too great Encouragement to them, that if God would permit them to have that Success, which so many others have had before them in as wicked Designs, he would be sure to crown it with his own Authority.

But to what may be alledged of this Doctrine's being inconvenient, and dangerous to Princes, he says that the contrary Doctrine is much more dangerous to Subjects, when such Revolutions happen. But beside that a Doctrine, which is dangerous to Princes, can be no security to Subjects, this is not to the Point: For if this Doctrine promote Wars, and occasion frequent Revolutions, it will be of worse Consequence, though the other should expose Subjects to greater dangers, under the Revolutions, which would more rarely happen. For Revolutions cannot be brought about without the Expence of much Treasure, and the loss of many Lives; and it were better for Subjects to suffer more, so it were but seldom, than to be continually suffering, though
not

not altogether in so great a degree.

P. 34.

But the Objectors do not think it a sufficient Confutation of the Doctrin of Non-resistance and Passive Obedience, to say, That this puts it into the King's Power to invade the Laws and Liberties, the Lives and Fortunes of his Subjects at pleasure.

And the Reason why they think it no Confutation is, because though Passive Obedience can give no absolute Security, yet it is more for the Good and Interest of the People than the contrary Doctrin. For it is evident from all Experience, that Civil Wars spill more Blood, and waste more Treasure, and destroy more Liberty and Property, and are every way of worse Consequence to the Subject, than the Reign of the worst King can be. But the present Doctrin, which the Doctor maintains, brings Mischiefs upon both King and People, which the contrary to it would prevent, and so is worse than that in its Effects and Consequences. There is no Doctrin that can secure Kingdoms from all Dangers and Calamities; but Passive Obedience is as effectual to that end, as the State of Human Affairs will admit, and the Divine Providence takes care of all extraordinary Cases. And when it is proved that a Doctrin is delivered in the Scriptures, and has been taught by the Catholick Church from the Apostles Times, and is the best and most beneficial to Societies, that can be taught, no good Man will dispute the Truth of it, though great Inconveniences may sometimes happen, which neither that nor any other Doctrin can prevent.

But if the Doctrin of Passive Obedience should expose Subjects to never so many and great Inconveniences, the Doctor's Notion must expose Men to the same, and much greater. For Passive Obedience teaches only, That Kings may not be resisted by their Subjects: But the Doctor

goes further, and must say, That if Kings can once get fully possessed of the Properties of their Subjects, and throughly settled in their Encroachments upon their Rights and Liberties, they have from thenceforth a Divine Right to them, and their Authority over their Subjects is increased and extended with their Power and Usurpations; for all is the Gift of God by his Providence, after a thorough Settlement.

P. 34.

Again he objects; *But have not Pyrates and Robbers as good a Title to my Purse, as an Usurper has to the Crown, which he seizes by a manifest Force and Violence? Does not the Providence of God order and dispose all these Events? And are we not bound then as much to submit to Pyrates as to Usurpers? To which he answers, That the dispute is not about Human and Legal Right in either Case, but about Authority. But neither is the Objection concerning Human and Legal Right, but Divine Right; for the Conveyance of Authority by God's Providence supposes a Right to enjoy and exercise it, and that Objection is, That Pyrates and Robbers have as good a Right to their Booty, as an Usurper's Right and Title can be to his Crown; and that the Divine Providence may as well be said to dispose of the Properties of Subjects, as of the authority of Kings. For though an Indictment may be brought against Robbers in Human Courts, yet by being in full Possession, they may by the same Reason be said to have a Divine Right to the Goods they have taken, and that they are not obliged in Conscience to make Restitution; by which, Usurpers are said to have a Divine Right and Authority from God to Rule the Dominions in which they have unjustly settled themselves. And, this, I think, I have already proved; or if I had not, the Doctor himself has granted it. Has he forgot that he told us before, That the Scripture never speaks of God's bare Permission of any*

Events,

Events, but makes him the Author of all the Good or Evil, which happens, either to private Persons, or Publick Societies? What then can his Distinction between Human and Legal Rights and Authority signifie? I cannot but think, notwithstanding this Distinction, that a Purse may rather be transferred by Providence, than a Kingdom; for a Purse may be lost and found, as a Kingdom can hardly be: Yet if a Man should find a Purse of Gold, I suppose it would be no Excuse for him to say that Providence had given it him, if he should refuse to restore it to the right owner; though, in this Case, he came by it without any Fault of his, without any Expectation or Fore-sight, it was his good Luck or Fortune, or in other Words, it was the pure Act of Providence; and if Providence dispose of any Rights, it must be in such Cases where only Providence without any Human Act or Endeavour takes away from one, and gives to another. But if the Right to a thing can remain after it is lost, it must surely remain, after a Man is by Fraud or Violence deprived of it; unless it be not the Possession, but the Sin in acquiring it, which transfers the Right.

That, which he observes of *Athaliah*, that she was not killed nor deposed before *Joash* was proclaimed King, and placed in the Throne, is only a Circumstance of Time, not at all material. I shall not enquire, Whether *Joash* had the whole Power of the Kingdom in his Hands, or whether he could on the sudden be thoroughly settled in his Government, when *Athaliah* yet appeared as Queen, and cryed out *Treason*, not apprehending herself totally divested of all Power, as the Argument supposes. But if it be lawful to dispossess an Usurper, it must be lawful to pay Allegiance to the Rightful Prince, before the Dispossession of the Usurper; for it is lawful to dispossess the Usurper for the sake of the Rightful King, and the very Act

of Dispossession is the most considerable Act of Allegiance. And for this Reason the Doctor maintains, That in all other Kingdoms it is unlawful for the Subjects, who live under the Usurper, to dispossess him, in behalf of the Rightful King, because there is no Allegiance due to him, till he gets into Possession: But in the Case of *Joash* he acknowledges it was otherwise, and the Convocation justifie the whole Process of that Action: So that by the Doctor's own Principles in that *Peculiar Case*, where God himself had entailed the Kingdom, they might as well have deposed, and slain her first, and then have set up *Joash*, if it had been as convenient and easie to be done: But when the Right Heir had been six Years concealed, it could not be Safe for them, to depose the Usurper, till he had been proclaimed and shewn to the People to give them full Satisfaction, that he was yet alive; and this way was taken, as the most Safe and Easie; not that it was upon any other Account of the least Consequence, which was done first. What he says besides, in answer to this Objection, and of the Kingdoms of *Israel* and *Judah*, has been spoken to already.

There is nothing till we come to his Sixth Argument, which has not been considered in answer to the foregoing Parts of his Discourse. For if God does not confer Sovereign Authority upon Usurpers; if he does not remove Kings, and set up Kings against Human Laws; if he limits his own Providence so as not to absolve Subjects from their Allegiance, during their Rightful King's Life, then it is in vain to say, That those who refuse to comply, must renounce the only Principle, whereon Passive Obedience is reasonably grounded, and consequently renounce the Doctrine it self; That those are bold Men, who will venture to say, in plain Contradiction to Scripture, That God cannot remove or set up Kings, and that this limits the Providence of God in governing

governing Kings, and protecting Innocent and Injured Subjects. All this proves nothing, but is only the Consequence of what is supposed to be already proved.

P. 38.

His Sixth Argument is from the Necessity of Government, to preserve Human Societies: For if God will preserve Human Societies, we must conclude, *That when he removes one King out of the Throne, he gives his Authority to him, whom he places there; for without Authority Human Societies must disband.*

P. 39.

He supposes here, that every thing is just, which is necessary to the preservation of Human Societies; nay, that God empowers and requires Men to do every thing, that is necessary in order to that End. Which is true, if it be meant of Society in General, because nothing that is sinful, and derogatory from Authority, can really tend to the Peace and Preservation of Mankind. For though such Practices may give some sort of Ease and Protection to particular Societies for some Time, in a particular Case; yet this is accidental, and proceeds not from the Nature of Things; and these Practices usually end in the Destruction or great Calamity of such Societies: Or, however the Examples and the Effects are mischievous, and of pernicious Consequence to Societies in general. The Laws therefore of God and of Nature are, in General Terms, and we have no Liberty to interpret them so as to fit them to some particular Occasions, and to determine, that they do not oblige, when they seem in some particulars, not to serve the Ends, which they were designed for; because God foresaw all Inconveniences and Emergencies whatsoever, and yet he appointed them. We are not to measure our Duty from the Usefulness of the Practice of it, in particular Cases, but from its General Usefulness, and God can provide for extraordinary Exigencies.

But though God has appointed Society, and will always preserve Societies of Men and Government in the World, yet we have no Assurance that he will preserve any particular Society. How many Nations do we read of in Scripture, which God did quite root out and destroy for their Sins? and how many other Nations of the World have there been besides, whose Memories are quite lost to us? The Sins of a Nation may provoke God to destroy it; and therefore it can be no good Argument that God gives Authority to every Usurper, and commands obedience to him, lest a particular Society should be destroyed. For God may design its Destruction, and then no submission can avail to preserve it; or he may by other Means, unthought of by us, deliver it from Destruction though we do not submit.

God having instituted Society, commands, by consequence, every thing that is necessary to Society; but it is not necessary, because Man is a sociable Creature, and must live under Government, that any particular Society must always continue, and that whatever is done to maintain it, is for that reason lawful. Self-preservation is a necessary Duty, implanted in our Nature; but it does not from thence follow, that all necessary Means of Self-preservation is lawful; For a Man may be obliged not to preserve himself, but to sacrifice his Life, when the Glory of God, or the Wellfare of his Country requires it. Societies in like manner are established by God himself in the World, and we are obliged to the Preservation of them; but we must preserve particular Societies only by such Means, as are agreeable to the Laws of God, designed for the Benefit of Society in general. To endeavour to preserve any particular Society in such a way, as naturally tends to the Destruction of Society in general, is to act against the Nature and Institution of Society, and by consequence sinful, though the immediate

diate Act should be never so beneficial to a particular Government.

Now for Subjects to pay Allegiance to Kings, and for both Prince and Subjects to perform their mutual Duties to each other, as far as they are able, is the only Security of Human Society; and to say that we owe no Allegiance to an absent Prince, because God will have Human Societies preserved, is to say, That God will have particular Societies preserved by the Violation of that, which is the alone Support and Security of Society in general, when yet we cannot be sure, whether God will have this or that particular Society preserved, or no. We must distinguish between the Reason of Obedience to Governours, and the end of it; The formal Reason of Obedience is the *Ordinance of God*, or the Divine Authority in him, to whom it is due; but the End of it is the Good of Societies. If the Reason of Obedience were to be resolved into the End of it, the End would justify any means whatsoever by which it could be attained; but since God, who has proposed the End to us, has likewise directed us to the Means, we must make use only of such means, as he has appointed; and if at any Time they should fail of their End, as to any particular Society, we must conclude, That God has some further End to serve, and that is always best which he has commanded, not that which for the present may seem more beneficial or expedient. For we have an Eye only upon one Time, or Place, or Government; but he has an Universal Care and Regard for all Times, Places, Persons and Governments in the World, and sees their several Relations, and Dependences, and Effects upon one another, and has provided for all Mankind by standing Laws, and has not proposed an End only to them, and then left them to come at it as they can themselves.

The Prince's Right and the Subjects Allegiance being reciprocal and neces-

sarily supposing each other (for if the Prince have a Right to any thing, it must be to the Subjects Allegiance) it is difficult to determine, what may be done by Subjects for the Preservation of Government, in Cases of Necessity, when both King and People are reduced to these Circumstances, that they lye under an Incapacity of actually performing those mutual Obligations; and what Obedience to an Usurper may be consistent with the Allegiance due to a Rightful Prince? There is some Difficulty, I say, in determining precisely in such Cases, just how far Subjects may comply, and no further. But this is nothing to the present purpose, and so I pass by all that the Doctor has said of it. It is enough for me, that the Necessity of Human Society does not imply, That God has transferred the Allegiance of the Subjects to an Usurper. And when all lawful Compliances have been made, if the Government be ruined, the Fault must lye only upon the Usurper and his Party.

His next Argument is, that these Principles answer all the Ends of Government, both for the Security of the Prince and Subjects, because they secure the Prince in Possession by putting an end to all Disputes of Right and Title, and binding his Subjects to him by Duty and Conscience, and a Reverence of God's Authority. And they secure the Subjects by obliging them not to hazard and Ruin themselves in behalf of the Rightful King, when he is out of the Throne. P. 43.

To which it may be replied, That there are perhaps no Principles so ill, but they may at some Times, and upon some Occasions, give some Accidental Advantage and Security for a while; nor any so good as to afford a perfect and absolute Security against all Events: But those are the best and truest, which give the most constant and lasting Security. Now the Doctor's Principles seem to be fitted only for Revolutions, and then they teach men to submit

submit to the uppermost Party, as having God's Authority; but there are many Inconveniences arising from them, which more than over-balance this Advantage. For they encourage Attempts upon the Crowns of Princes, and expose Subjects to all the Miseries which usually follow from such Attempts, before a thorough Settlement, which commonly is a long Time; And after such a Settlement, they set up a Divine Authority against a Legal Right, to encounter and fight each other, and engage a Nation in a War, perhaps for many Ages; for the Rightful King may wage War for the Recovery of his Legal Right, and the Usurper, in Defence of his Possessory Right, which he holds in Donation from God; and both may do this with a good Conscience, and the War must be just on both sides, so that nothing of Law or Equity, but the Sword only can decide it. And because all that abide in their own Country, must joyn and assist the Usurper against their Lawful King, he is put upon a Necessity of relying wholly upon Foreign Forces, and upon some few Subjects perhaps, *That are out of their Wits, and will follow him into Banishment, or venture being hanged at Home;* and upon these Terms, if ever the Lawful King return, it must be by conquering his own Kingdom, for he can have no assistance from his Subjects, who must all withstand and oppose him to the utmost, till he is again settled in his Government, which cannot be but by Conquest or Miracle.

Now these Inconveniences are too great to be incurred for the sake of that little Ease and Quiet, which may happen from these Principles just upon the Settlement of an Usurper, before the Rightful King can recruit his Forces, and make a vigorous Attempt to recover his Throne; for 'tis only during that Interval, between the lawful King's Defeat, and his Reinforcement, that these

Principles can be of any use to the Subject; afterwards they expose them to all the Dangers and Miseries of a long War, of frequent Invasions, and of a foreign Conquest; and it must be remembered, that these Principles give no security to any Princes but Usurpers; for lawful Kings when they are in their Thrones, are as safe without them; and when they are dispossessed, they are not much beholding to such Principles, as will never suffer them to regain it, but upon the most unequal and most improbable Terms in the World.

Whereas, though that *immoveable and unalterable Allegiance due only to a Legal Right and Title* may expose Men to Hardships and cost some Lives, in Times of Rebellion, and Revolutions, yet this is abundantly recompensed, in that it is a constant Security at all other Times, and will, as much as it is possible, prevent Revolutions and Rebellions, and will make them less hurtful and mischievous, when they do happen. It is not pretended that this Doctrine can give a full and infallible Security against all accidental Calamities; but it gives all the Security that the State of this World is capable of, and all the Security we can have, besides that of God's Providence, to rely on. And we have no Reason to think that God by his Providence transfers the Allegiance of Subjects, but that he will protect them in the performance of it.

It is objected, 1. That if this Principle of adhering to Legal Right would prevent all Revolutions of Government, it is a Demonstration against it, that it is a bad Principle, because it is against God's Prerogative of removing Kings and setting up Kings. p. 44.

2. It is evident that this Principle was either unknown to the World before, or else that it cannot prevent the Revolutions of Government.

3. *Since then such Revolutions will happen, such Principles as must dissolve human Societies, when such Revolutions happen, or expose the most innocent and conscientious Men to the greatest Sufferings, without serving any good End, cannot be true*

1. *I answer.* Though it be God's Prerogative to set up, and to remove kings; yet we can at no time know without a Revelation that it is his Pleasure to do it, as to this or that King in particular: And therefore while the Legal Right remains, we may not conclude that he has transferred our Allegiance. And those who are of Opinion, that God is now pleased to depose and set up Kings in such a manner only, as is consistent with human Right and Justice, derogate no more from God's *Sovereign Prerogative*, than those, who believe, that he has no respect to human Laws in the disposal of Kingdoms. For the difference between them is not concerning God's Power; which both equally acknowledge, but concerning his Will only, whether he is now pleased to act according to the Absoluteness of his Power, and not rather with regard to the Laws of Men; since we have no way to know, when he has transferred any Kingdom, but by the Constitution of it, or by Revelation.

2. That this Principle was, and is still known to the World, is evident, else why should the Doctor say, *That his Scheme of Government may startle some Men at first, before they have well considered it?* His Notion could startle no Body, if the contrary to it were unknown; it is indeed so well known, that the Doctor's Principle is new to himself, and he informs us, that he could not have got over the Difficulties, that lie against it, if the Convocation had not freed him from his Prejudices, and given him a Liberty of thinking. But it does not follow that every Duty, which is known, is pra-

ctised. Nor is it pretended, That this Principle will prevent all Revolutions; it is sufficient that it will prevent them as far as it is possible for them to be prevented. And this Dilemma will do as good Execution against any other Opinion that can be named, as against this; for all pretend that their own Notions are the best Security against the Mischiefs, which they charge upon others, and therefore all may argue in the same manner against any Opinion whatsoever that is contrary to their own; *This Principle was unknown to the World before, or else this Principle cannot prevent Rebellion*; it was unknown, or it cannot prevent Heresies, or Schisms, &c. And the Consequence of this is, That either this way of arguing is to no purpose, because it will serve all Causes alike, tho' they be Contradictions to each other; or that there is no true Principle in the World. But the plain Truth is, no Man ever pretended to an Infallible Remedy to prevent all the Mischiefs of any kind; the Quack, in Physick, and of the Church of Rome itself, never pretend that their Directions will work infallible Cures, unless they be followed as well as known. This Principle would go very far towards the hindring of all Revolutions (but such as God by his Appointment and Command would have submitted to) if it were practised, and, as things are now, it is the best Remedy against them.

3. But if the bare Knowledge of this Principle will not prevent Revolutions, or if Revolutions cannot be prevented at all; it does not from thence follow, *That such an immoveable and unalterable Allegiance, as is due only to a Legal Right and Title* will dissolve Human Societies, when such Revolutions happen. present Experience teaches the contrary; for the Distinction between the Divine Authority and the Legal Right of Kings in Opposition to each other, is new
to

to almost the whole Nation, some acting upon one Principle and some upon another, but all generally supposing God's Authority, and the Legal Right to be in the same Person. Besides, the Government must be, at least in some Measure, settled, before the Doctor's Principle can take Place, or be of any use; and if the Government may be settled without it, I see no Reason, why it may not continue without it. For how comes that to be necessary to the being of Human Society, which is not necessary to the establishment of Government, but exerts itself by several Steps and Degrees in Proportion to the Degrees of its Settlement, and never is of full Force and Efficacy till a thorough Settlement?

But our Principle *exposes the most Innocent and Conscientious Men to Sufferings, without serving any good End by them.* It must be confessed, That those Men must be exposed to Sufferings, who can neither be satisfied that the Legal Right is transferred, nor be persuaded that they may subject themselves to the Possessor of the Crown, unless he had a Legal Right: But then this is not without serving any good End; for they serve the Ends of Justice and Fidelity to the Rightful King, and act upon such Principles as are the support and preservation of Human Society, tho the Practice of them may sometimes bring Accidental Inconveniences upon particular Persons and Governments, which can never fall out but in extraordinary Cases, that no Principles can effectually provide against: And God can support Men under their Sufferings, or deliver them out of them, without their Infringement of Legal Rights, or acting against the Nature and Order of Society in General, to serve some particular occasions and Exigencies.

The Doctor's Argument from the Nature of Human Society, by which he would prove, That the Safety and Preservation of a Nation is to be preferred before the King's Right, is

grounded upon the Supposition above mentioned; That any thing is lawful which is necessary for the Preservation of particular Societies; which proving a false Principle, his Argument can be of no Force. For that Allegiance is due to all Rightful Kings, is a Maxim which concerns Society in general, without which no Government can long subsist; and therefore if the Good of Society in General be to be preferred before the Good of any particular Government, tho this should be preferable to the King's Right, the Consequence would fail, because the necessary Relation and Connection between Allegiance and Sovereignty is founded in the Nature of Sovereignty itself, not in the Being or Constitution of any particular Kingdom; and the Obedience of Subjects must be fixed and permanent, not variable with the Changes and Interests in the State of Affairs, which could make all Government uncertain and precarious, and would leave every Subject at Liberty to pay or withhold his Allegiance, when he thought fit, if the Interest of the Government, and not the Laws of it were to be the Rule of his Obedience. And where should we stop? Or whither would not this Argument carry us? For if we may withdraw our Allegiance from the King, because his Right is not of equal Value with the Safety of all his Subjects, then for the same Reason we may rebel against him, or we may kill him, whenever we will suppose, That this single Life and Fortunes come into competition with those of the whole Nation. But this Argument has been often brought against the Doctrine of Non-Resistance, and as often confuted. And if it were true, it would not prove that Usurpers are set up by God, but by the People: For if God sets them up, Obedience is due to them for the Sake of his Authority, not upon these Considerations, which can only serve for Motives to the People to set them up, and are no Proof that God has done it. For we may

may suppose the Usurper, in possession of the Throne, to be so cruel and tyrannical, that the People have no way to provide for their own Safety; but by deposing him, which, if God have given him his Authority, it is sinful for them to do; but, if this Argument be true, it is a Duty: So that this Argument, if it prove any thing, must prove either that Kings are not God's Ordinance, or that God's Ordinance may be resisted for the Publick Good; but Evil is never to be done, tho' the greatest Good may come by it; and Obedience is due not to Convenience but to Law; and the Laws of God and Nature have respect not to any Society in particular, but to Society in General, and to particular Societies only so far as their Preservation may be consistent with the Welfare of Society in general.

The Objection which he makes against his own Doctrine is much more to the purpose, and deserves to be considered. He objects to himself, *That This will equally serve all Revolutions of Government, whatever they be, and upon these Principles we might submit and swear to a Rump Parliament, or to another Protector, or to a Committee of Safety, or whatever else you please.*

The Doctor is pleased to say, *That this is a great Prejudice, but no Argument;* but it is very strange that a Man who has built his whole Doctrine upon the Authority of a Convocation, and durst never have asserted it, if it had not been for that *Venerable Authority*, should now reject the Practice of the whole Church of England at that time; and the Judgment of it both then, and ever since, as *no Argument, no Objection*, but only a *great Prejudice*; I must take Leave to say, as the Doctor does of the Sense of the Convocation, that *this is a good Argument from Authority, and as good Authority as can be urged to the Members of the Church of England*; for if so many Years Suffering, and the great Veneration, all Good Men have for so excellent Examples to this very Day,

cannot declare the Judgment of the Church of England, I know not whence we shall learn it.

But he answers, *There is a vast Difference between these two Cases*; which is granted, or else the Objection would be needless, or none at all; But if notwithstanding the circumstantial Difference between them, they be both through Settlements, it is unanswerable, for we are concerned to consider none of those other Differences, which he reckons up, but only this of the Settlement of that Usurpation, the Question being not about any particular manner of Settlement, but in general of a *thorough Settlement*. And the Doctor must say, according to his Principles, and the whole Tenour of all the rest of his Book, that the most illegal and unnatural Usurpers, who have murdered the best of Kings, and excluded the right Heir, who have overthrown both Church and State, and have neither National Consent nor any other Pretence of Right but the Sword, yet if they can once settle themselves in their Injustice and Violence to the utter Ruine of Church and State, notwithstanding all this, have God's Authority as much as *Saul or David* ever had: And if the ancient Government be destroyed, and another erected in its Room, this is still the greater Evidence, that they have God's Authority, because it is the fuller Proof of a thorough Settlement. But if all those Terms and Conditions are required, which the Doctor remarks were wanting in the late Usurpations, the Providence of God will be confined and limited almost as much, as he complains it will be, by maintaining a Legal Right. For, how can God set over Kingdoms the basest, the most unworthy and wicked Men, who will have no regard to Forms of Law and Government, if the Fundamental Laws of a Nation can put any Bar to his Power? and if they can, is not the Legal Right of the King a Fundamental Law, and the principal too of those Laws? Nothing

thing then can make a difference between one Usurper and another, as to this matter; if both have a Thorough Settlement, their Authority must be the same, and the Duty of Subjects the same, to yield an entire Allegiance to them.

The only thing therefore to be considered is, whether there were such a Thorough Settlement, as the Doctor maintains, does infer Gods Authority, in those Usurpations. And the Doctor himself has determined the point: For, says he, *no Man could have foreseen how King Charles II. should have returned, who had a powerful Army against him; all the Plots and Conspiracies of the Royal Party were vain, and had no other effect but to bring some worthy and gallant Men to an unhappy end; but what they could not do, God did without them.* And when it was impossible to foresee, that King Charles could ever return, when all human endeavours proved in vain and to his disadvantage, when God alone could by his Providence restore him, this certainly was as full a Settlement of the Party, which kept him out of his Kingdom, as can be imagined: For if that be not settled, which God only can displace, there can be no such thing as a Settlement in the World.

But there were many alterations and changes of Government in those times: *It is plain that the Government was never settled; it was frequently changed and modelled, which was no Argument of Settlement, and which was more than that, they had not a National Consent and Submission. Men who were forced submitted to force, but the Nation did not by any National Act ever own them.* Yet when all those changes conduced nothing at all to the Kings Interest, but on the contrary were all fixed and centred in this, that he should not be suffered to return, this might be interpreted rather to signify, that God had determined, he should never be restored; because tho' they quarrelled amongst themselves, and their Frames of Go-

vernment so often fell to pieces, yet still new Models were erected against him, to set him at a further distance from the Throne.

And *Oliver Cromwel* at least was settled; for he was made *Protector* in the year, 1653. and from that time till his Death exercised all the Power of a King: He had brought the Three Kingdoms to an entire subjection so as to be able to crush those who would not submit, whenever he pleased, which is the description the Doctor gives of a Thorough Settlement; all the Bordering Nations feared his Power, or sought his Friendship, and he had a full and uninterrupted Possession for the space of five years. It was the common Theme of his Flatterers and of all the Enthusiasts of those times, That God had raised him up; and they had certainly been in the Right, if any Usurper, from a bare Possession of Power, can claim by Authority from God in prejudice of the Rightful King.

As for what he adds to make this Case Parallel with that of the Jews under *Antiochus Epiphanes*, it has been already shewn that that was a quite contrary Case. For if the Jews had made a National Submission to *Antiochus*, they had injured no Body, nor excluded any Right Heir by it: But a National Consent in this case could have been of no force whilst King Charles the Second, or any of the Royal Family had been alive. And by the Doctors Principles the Authority of Kings depends not upon any Consent of Men whatsoever, but solely and purely upon the will of God, who puts an Usurper in full Power and Possession of any Kingdom. If therefore God's Authority remained in King Charles, a National Consent could not have taken it away; if it did not remain, it must be in *Cromwel* without any National Consent.

But a National Consent would have been an Evidence of a Thorough Settlement: It would so; but this does not infer that no other evidence but that

P. 33.

P. 47.

P. 9.

that could suffice. The Doctor often says, that by what way or means soever an Usurper becomes fully possessed of the Supreme Power, he has God's Authority. So that a National Consent and Submission may be the more regular and orderly way; but if an Usurper come to the Throne against the Consent both of King and Subjects and settle himself upon the Ruins both of the Kings Rights and the Subjects Liberties, this is no prejudice to the Title he receives from God. For if the Sovereign Authority be obtained tho' by the destruction of the Government and the desolation of the whole Kingdom, against all Laws both of God and Man, when it is once acquired, it is by these Principles as much the Ordinance of God, as if he had succeeded as next Heir, or had been nominated by God himself, and were the best and most Rightful King, for all Kings are *Rightful with respect to God*.

I have now considered all that concerns the point in Question in the Doctor's Book, the rest concerns the Obedience to a King *de Facto* by the Laws of England, not as he is Gods Vicegerent, and invested with his Authority. But before I dismiss this Question, I shall shew that it was the constant Practice of the Primitive Christians to adhere to that Emperour, who had the Legal Title; and that they did not look upon the Usurpers, or, in the language of those times the Tyrants, who were set up against them, to have any Authority or Approbation from God, tho' sometimes their Power and the extent of their Dominions equalled, if not exceeded that of the Rightful Emperour.

The first Instance, I give, shall be that of the Christians, that lived under the Jews before they were subdued by *Adrian*. The Jews had made one *Cochabas* their King, who, it is said, reigned above thirty years over them; this is certain they were a most dangerous Enemy to the Romans for about

twenty years in the Emperours Reign. Their numbers were so great and their fury so desperate that they became formidable to the whole Empire: *Adrian* therefore chose out his best Captains to send against them, of whom *Julius Severus*, who was sent for out of *Britain*, was the chief, and he durst not engage with them in a pitcht Battel, but waited fit opportunities to take them at advantage, and set upon them apart; and so in time destroyed them by degrees. But at last the victory cost *Adrian* very dear, and lost him great part of his Army, which made him in his Letter to the Senate omit the usual stile, *Si vos libeniq; vestri valeatis, bene est: Ego quidem & exercitum*

valemus, (a) The Christians all this while refused to give any Assistance to the Jews, under whose usurped Government they lived, against the lawful Emperour; and because they would neither assist them in the War, nor acknowledge the Justice of it, they were put to excessive Torments by *Cochabas*, and the Emperour in reward of their Loyalty, granted the Christians liberty to inhabit *Jerusalem*, after he had forbid the Jews, under the greatest Penalties to come so much as in sight of it, above once a year to lament their calamity.

Ulsq; si Christianos (Hadrianos) quos illi Cocheba duxit, quod sibi adversus Romanos non assentarentur, exercebant, praeceptq; necui Judae introeundi Hierosolymam esset licentia, Christianis tantum civitate permessa. Oros. lib. 7. c. 13.

It will be objected here, that *Cochabas* pretended to be the *Messias* or that Star (as his name denotes) in *Balaam's* Prophecy, *Numb. 24. 17.* And that besides the Jews were to be no more a People, their destruction being decreed by God, and foretold in the Scriptures.

But this could be no reason, why the Christians should deny obedience to *Cochabas*, if his being, as he was, in full Possession of the Government had made him the Ordinance of God. For tho'

Dio. lib. 69.

(a) Co-

chebas dux

Judaicæ

factionis

nolentes si-

bi Christia-

nos adver-

sum Roma-

nium mili-

tem ferre

subsidium

omnimodis

cruciatibus

necat.

Euseb.

Chron.

tho' he had assumed to himself more than belonged to him, yet this had been no prejudice to that Right, which was truly his, and which must depend upon his Possession of the Supreme Power, not upon his behaviour, or pretensions in matters of Religion. And as long as God continued his Power and Authority, which he had committed to him, they would have been obliged to obey him, as God's Ordinance. For if his blasphemous pretensions did not provoke God to deny him his Authority, what could justify the Christians in withholding their Allegiance? Gods Authority must challenge the same Duty and Reverence, in whomsoever it is placed, in a *Herod*, or a *Pontius Pilate*, or a *Cochabas*: And if he had had God's Authority by usurping the Power and Title of a King, they would have submitted to his Authority at the same time, that they had confuted his Blasphemies with the Peril of their lives.

And tho' the Jews were to be utterly destroyed, and to be no more a Nation, the time of this was uncertain; but it was certain that the time was not yet come, because they had as yet a Powerful Government, and so, by these Principles, had Gods Authority; and therefore the Christians would have acknowledged their Authority, as the Apostles did that of the Governours of *Judea* in their times, if these Principles were true, and there had not been this difference, that they were lawful Powers in the time of the Apostles, being set over them by the Roman Emperors, who had the Supreme Authority in *Judea*, as well as in other Provinces: But *Cochabas* was set up in opposition to the Lawful Powers, which only are ordained of God, and for that reason no Obedience could be due to him; but the Christians chose to endure any Torments, rather than they would oppose their Lawful Sovereign in behalf of this Usurper, tho' his Power were never so great.

(b) The next Example, I shall bring of the Primitive Christians, shall *Cassij*, & be from these famous Passages of *Ter-Nigri*, & *Tullian*, one in his Apology, and the *Albini*? other in his Book *ad Scapulam*: He in — de both those places declares, and defies *Romanus* any Man to shew the contrary, that the Christians never sided with *Avidius id est, de Cassius* against *Marcus Antoninus*, or with *non Chri-Piscennius Niger* Governor of *Syria*, or *Albinus*. — *Clodius Albinus* Governor of *Britain*, *Sed* & qui who set themselves up as Emperors in nunc Scethe Provinces over which they presided; and upon enquiry it will be found, that these two last had as full Socij and Possession of their respective Dominions, as *Septimius Severus* the Lawful Emperour had in his part of the Empire.

racematio Superstes, &c. Tertul. Apolog. c. 35. *Sic & circa Majestatem Imperatoris infamamur tamen nunquam Albiniani, nec Nigriani, vel Cassiani inveniri poterunt Christiani. Sed iidem ipsi, qui per Genios eorum imprudie usq; juraverant*, &c. id. ad Scapulam c. 2.

(c) *Avidius Cassius* was soon taken off; for *M. Antoninus* was so well beloved, and so highly esteemed, that *Cassius* had never been proclaimed Emperour, if it had not been given out, that *Antoninus* was dead; And no City of note but *Antioch* took part with him, so that his Rebellion had little danger in it, being considerable neither for the Strength, nor for the continuance of it.

(d) But *Niger* was in Possession of all the Eastern part of the Empire a year and some Months besides odd days; and *Albinus* reigned as Emperour in the West between three and four years.

(e) When the Pretorian Bands had murdered *Pertinax*, they set the Empire to Sale, making open Proclamation, that he should be Emperour who would give most, and *Didius Julianus* outbidding *Sulpicianus*, was accordingly declared Emperour by them, and the Senate was forced to confirm their choice.

(f) *Æl. Spart. in Did. Julian.*

choice. But *Julianus* disappointed the expectations of the Soldiers in not being able to make full payment for his Purchase, and was cursed by the People, and abhorred by the Senate for so base an act. (f) And as both Senate and People had him in the highest degree of Detestation, so they likewise hated *Severus*, and all their hopes were placed in *Piscennius Niger*. He was renowned for all the virtues requisite to make an excellent Emperour; of great Conduct and Experience, of exact Discipline in Military Affairs, and of such admirable Prudence in Civil, that by his advice several Rules and Orders were first introduced, some by *M. Antoninus* and some by *Commodus*, and continued by succeeding Emperours, concerning the Government of the Provinces, and the Courts of Judicature. But *Severus* came behind him in these Qualifications, and was besides of a cruel disposition, which afterwards shew'd it self upon all occasions. These Vertues exceedingly recommended *Niger* to the Esteem and Love both of the Senate, and of the People, and there could have been no Competition between him and *Severus*, if they had had the Dicision entirely in their own Power. For the Senate openly favoured him, and the People scarce ever mentioned him, but with Applauses and Acclamations, calling him *Princes* and *Augustus*.

(g) *Herodian. lib. 2. c. 27. &c.*

(g) And he could not be less beloved in *Syria*, which was a Province of vast extent, taking in *Phenicia*, and all the Countries on this side *Euphrates*. He was there saluted Emperour by his Legions, who put the Royal Purple on him, and with all the State and Solemnity, which was used on such occasions, conducted him to the Temples at *Antioch*, to ratifie their own choice by the approbation of their Gods. Embassadors were sent to him from all *Asia*, and from beyond *Euphrates* and *Tigris* to congratulate his Accession to the Empire, and with Professors of Assistance, if that were needful:

But he dismissed them with Thanks and Rewards, saying, (b) he had no occasion for help, he was already Thoroughly Sealed in the Empire, and would reign without Blood. *Herodian. lib. 2. c. 31.*

Thinking himself therefore secure in the Affections of the Senate and People of *Rome*, and in the full Possession of all the eastern part of the Empire, having all *Asia*, (i) besides *Greece*, and (i) *Æl. Thrace* and *Macedon* in his Power, he *Spart. in* delayed his going to *Rome*, and by that *Piscen.* means gave an opportunity to *Severus Niger*, then Governor of both *Pannonia's* to be before-hand with him. For *Severus* being proclaimed Emperour by his Soldiers, hastened immediately to *Rome*, and was declared Emperour by the Senate; and *Julianus* was put to death. And afterwards getting together all the Force he could, *Severus* marched into *Asia* against *Niger*, who joyned Battel with him at *Cyricum*; but was overcome after a sharp Fight by the Treachery, as it was thought, of *Emilianus*, who had the chief Command in his Army: *Niger* making his way to *Antioch*, got together a vast Army, but was overthrown near the *Sinus Ifficus*, after a long and doubtful Battel, in which as the (k) Historian relates, so (k) *Herodian. lib. 3.* thereabouts ran with more Blood than Water: And then flying again to *Antioch*, he was taken and beheaded. And for this victory *Severus* had the Titles given him of *Arabicus*, (l) *Adiabenus*, *Parthicus*, from the Principal *Spart. in* Nations, that were interested in *Severo.* *gen's* cause; and to overcome him, was esteemed a Conquest over all those Nations.

(m) But the People of *Byzantium* (m) *Dio. lib. 74.* were the most considerable; for they made a most resolute defence for three years together against the Roman Forces; And the Siege of that City in all its circumstances is the most memorable

memorable of any that we meet with in History.

(n) *Ful.
Capitolin.
in Clod.
Albino.*

(n) But tho *Niger* were thus taken out of his way, *Severus* could not but think himself in great Danger, as long as *Clodius Albinus* had so formidable an Army, and the Provinces of *Britain* and *Gaul* at his Command; and being not willing to try Battle with him, he first endeavours to ensnare him by fair Words and treacherous Promises, and sends some with Letters to him in very affectionate and insinuating Expressions, desiring him to govern as Partner with him in the Empire, that by this means they might have an Opportunity to murder him, under the Pretence of communicating some Secret of State to him; but *Albinus* was aware of the Design, and this Plot not taking, they proceeded on both sides to open Hostilities.

Albinus had taken upon him the Name of Emperour at the same Time that *Niger* and *Severus* did; but *Severus* satisfied him with giving him the Title of *Cesar*, till he had overcome *Niger*, and then grew jealous of him. For *Albinus* ruled as a Sovereign Prince in *Britain*, erecting his Statues, and stamping Coyns with his Effigies on them: And no Prince was ever more beloved by the Senate of *Rome* than he, of which the Hatred they bare *Severus* was one chief Cause. And as *Albinus* had so much the advantage of him in this respect, so he was no way inferiour in the strength of his Army, but at *Lyons* gave him Battle, with that Success, that *Severus* fled, and fell from his Horse, and casting off his Robe was forced to hide himself, and had left *Albinus* an entire Victory, if *Latus* had not come in with fresh Forces, and overpowered him. For *Latus* stood by, expecting the Event, and had reserved himself, till he was told, That *Severus* was fled, hoping that the Empire might fall at last to his own share; for which *Severus* afterwards ordered him to be put to Death. The Issue was, that after abundance (n) of

Blood shed on both sides, *Albinus* had his Head struck off, which *Severus* commanded to be carried to *Rome* with a Letter to the Senate, upbraiding them with the Love they had for *Albinus*, whose Brother and other Relations, they had bestowed great Honours upon.

(p) *Herodian* esteems it the greatest thing in the Roman Story, for *Severus* at last to get himself the sole Possession of the Empire; and comparing it with the Victory of *Cesar* over *Pompey*, of *Augustus* over *Anthony* and *Pompey's* Sons, and of *Sylla* over *Marius*, he prefers this as the greater achievement. (p) *Herod. lib. 3. c. 23.*

It is evident that *Piscennius Niger* was fully possess'd of all the Eastern Part of the Empire, and had all in his Power to the Borders of *Illyricum*; and that *Clodius Albinus* had the entire Possession of *Britain* and *Gaul*; that they both exercised all Acts of Sovereignty; that in *Rome* it self first *Niger*, and afterwards *Albinus* was the Darling both of the People and of the Senate, and had their Hearts and their Wishes, tho not their Votes: Yet because *Severus* had prevented them, and had the Formal and Legal Consent and Choice of the Senate, and so was the only Lawful Emperour, the Christians refused to become Parties to either of the other two; which they could not have done, if they had look'd upon either of them, as invested with God's Authority; and yet this they must have been invested with, if full Possession could obtain it: For they were as fully settled in their Provinces, as *Severus* was at *Rome*; nay, more fully, because the Senate and People of *Rome* were zealous for their Interest, and hated *Severus*, and would have taken the first Opportunity of joyning with either of them against him. But *Severus* was the Lawful Emperour, and therefore the Christians knew, That their Allegiance was due only to him, in whatever part of the Empire they lived: And they never acted against

K 2 him,

(o) *Dio.
lib. 75.*

him, nor sided with *Niger* or *Albinus*, tho they were under their Power; and lived in the Territories which they had possessed themselves of; which were those where Christianity most flourished: For *Greece* and all the Eastern part of the Empire were under the Dominion of *Niger*, as *Britain* and *Gaul* were under *Albinus*; and besides *Polycrates* and many famous Men in *Greece*, it is enough to say, That *Irenæus*, the Disciple of *S. Polycarp*, was Bishop of *Lyons* at that Time.

But it is needless to mention Particulars; this was the Doctrin and Practice of the Catholick Church in that Age, to submit to him as Emperour, who was chosen by the Senate, and therefore Lawful Emperour; not to those who had set up, and strengthened themselves in their Usurpations, tho otherwise, their Government most desirable. For we must give *Tertullian* leave, at least, to understand a Matter of Fact of his own Time, in a case so notorious as this; since the Correspondence was so great between all Churches in those Days by their Communicatory Letters, and other ways of Intelligence, that if any one Church had acted differently from the rest in a thing of so general, and so mighty concernment, so considerable a Man, as *Tertullian*, could not have been ignorant of it; especially after he had informed himself in all Particulars necessary, in order to write an Apology for the whole Christian Church: And it was not in his Temper to have disssembled it, at least he would never have said so peremptorily, That the Christians alwaies kept themselves true to their Allegiance, which they acknowledged due only to the Rightful Emperours, upbraiding at the same Time the Heathens for a contrary Practice. The Heathens were of themselves too violent Enemies to need any such Advantage as this must have given them, if it could have been disproved; and *Tertullian*, instead of making their Apology, must have

exposed the Christians to farther Contempt and Hatred by such a Defence as must have been notoriously false in the most Tender and Important Part of it. To have told the World that the Christians never owned any other Emperour than *Severus* but a few Years after, while there were yet some Remains of these Factions, which he taxes the Heathens withal, had been a strange Apology, when the whole Empire could have witnessed against him, if it had been false. The Persecutors of that Time were too cunning and too cruel to be thus perswaded, or affronted rather, by what they must needs have known to be false, if it had been so. And not content to have said this in a General Apology, to repeat it again in his Book written to *Scapula*, Governour of the Province of *Africa*, upon the same Subject, had been to expose the Christians to the utmost Reproach and Infamy, as well as Torments. And what Credit could he expect in any thing he had said besides, if he had plainly lyed in a thing, which was fresh in every Man's Memory? This had been not to defend, but to betray the Christian Religion. *Tertullian* could not be guilty of so much Folly as to think to impose upon the World at this Rate; or of so much Baseness as to attempt it, if it had been possible. It is pretty well agreed among Learned Men, That he was no Natural; and a little Acquaintance with his Practice and his Writings would easily make one believe, That he would sooner have excepted all those Churches by Name that had acted otherwise, and have renounced their Communion; or that he would rather have separated from all the Churches in the World, than have made such an Apology as his must be, if this part of it were false.

This I have insisted upon the more, because some Men, when they have nothing else to say to those ample Testimonies for the Passive Obedience of the Primitive Christians out of *Tertullian*

lian in this and some other Particulars, make no Scruple to deny the Matter of Fact: Which must suppose, either that he was mistaken, or that he wrote what he knew to be false: But Mistaken he could not be in a thing so visible and notorious, especially in that Age, when the Church acted unanimously as one Body and Society of Men: And to say he falsified in things of this Nature, that his Enemies, to whom he directed his Apology, and all the World besides, must needs know to be false, is to take away the Credit of all History, unless *Tertullian* be the only Man that must not be believed, when he writes of things of his own Time, and of his own Knowledge, and with all possible Circumstances of Credibility.

The last Instance shall be that of the Christians under the Tyrants or Usurpers, *Maximus* and *Eugenius*. (a) *Maximus* held his Usurpations five Years and two Daies; and *Eugenius* near two Years. (b) And both were much superior to *Theodosius* in every thing, but the Goodness of his Cause; and it was by a wonderful Providence, that they were vanquished by him.

(c) *Sozom.* (c) *Maximus*, after the Murder of *I. 7. c. 13. Gratian*, was in full Possession of the Western Empire. For *Valentinian* left *c. 11. Italy*, and fled to *Theffalonica* with his Mother, and *Probus* the *Præfectus Prætorii*; So that *Maximus* had the Government of all the West in his Power. *S. Ambrose* was at that very time persecuted by the Empress *Fustina*, she being an *Arian*; and *Maximus* pretended to make War upon her Son *Valentinian* in his behalf; yet no (d) Man was more against the Proceedings of *Maximus* than *S. Ambrose*; and in the Negotiations he twice had with him, he maintained *Valentinian's* Cause with all the Freedom and Courage that became a Christian Bishop. (e) I know we have been told, That all the Bishops of the West, not excepting the Great *S. Martin*, who was called the Apostle of France, made their Applications to *Maximus*, and followed his Court, as much, if

(d) *Ambros. epist. l. 7. ep. 56.*

(e) Bishop of *Sarum's* Pastoral Letter, p. 13.

not more than they did any Princes of that Age. But it is worth taking notice of, That these Bishops are much blamed for it by *Sulpicius Severus*; he says, they were notorious for their base and servile Flattery; (f) and he gives (f) *Certe* such a Character of *Libacius*, one of the *Libacium* chief of them, as I with no other Bishop may ever deserve. But *S. Martin* *nihil sancti* was of another (g) Temper, he frequently refused to accept of his Invitations to his Table, because he had de-enim deprived one Emperour of his Life, and another of his Kingdom, till at last, when *quax*, *im-Maximus* had made the best Excuse he could, casting all the Blame upon the sumptuous Soldiers, who had forced him to take ventri upon him the Empire, and pretending gule pluri that there was something more than mum imper Human in it; *S. Martin* did conde-tiens. scend to sit at his Table with him, and *Sulpic.* he at all times (b) hindred him, as *Sever. hist.* much as he could, from doing Mischiefs, *l. 2. c. 63.* and from breaking in upon the Privileges of the Church; which was not *Martin.* owning his Authority: For, as *Sulpic. c. 23.* *cius Severus* informs us, (i) He rather (h) *Id. hist.* demanded than petitioned for what *l. 2. c. 64.* he asked of him. But, as the same (i) *Nam* Author represents him, (k) *Maximus* *cisi pro* wanted nothing but a Good Title to quibus sup-make an excellent Emperour, and plicandum *S. Martin* was willing to make the best Regi fait, Use of him, he could, for the Benefit imperavit of the Church.

potius quam
rogavit. Id.

vit. Mart. c. 23. (k) *Vir omni vitæ merito prædicandus, si ei vel Diadema non legitime, tumultuante milite, impositum repudiare, vel armis civilibus abstinere licuisset. Id. Dialog. c. 7.*

I shall not conceal, that, upon the like Occasion, *S. Ambrose* wrote a Letter to *Eugenius*, who had invaded the Empire after the Death of *Valentinian*, in which he gives him the Title of Emperour. The Design of it was to persuade him not to maintain the Charge of the Heathen Idolatrous Worship; for the Expences for the Publick Sacrifices were wont to be paid out of the Emperour's Exchequer, till *Theodosius* had

had forbid it: and this Custom was again revived by *Eugenius*. He wrote to him upon this Occasion, but would not do it before, tho *Eugenius* had written to him, and required an Answer.

(1) In his (1) In this Epistle he uses him with *vero in qui-* Respect, and owns that he ought to *bis vos ro-* make his Suit to him in such a Manner, *gari decet*, as became the Place he then held, if *etiam me* he would have his Request granted, *exhibere se-* and says, That since we must render Ho- *dulitatem* nour to whom Honour is due, and Tribute *potestati* to whom Tribute; he, who with all his *debitam*, Heart rendred him what was his Due, as *sicut & scri-* a Private Man, would not deny it him, *pium est*; now he was Emperour; or rather now *cui bono-* he assumed to himself that Power and *rem, bono-* Authority; for he immediately adds, *rem, cui* That if he required this Regard to be had *tributum*, to himself, he ought much rather to suffer *tributum*, it towards God, whom he would have *Nam cum* thought to be the Author of his Empire; *privato de-* and he had before told him, (m) That *tulerim cor-* if he were an Emperour, he ought so much *de intimo*, the rather to be subject to God. Which *quomodo* Expressions could not fall from him *non defer-* carelessly, but must be purposely de- *ratori sed*, signed, plainly enough to intimate, *qui nobis* Right to the Empire. For since after *deferre vul-* the Death of *Eugenius*, *S. Ambrose* does *ris, paumi-* so manifestly declare, That he never *ni, ut defe-* had any just Authority, we must ei- *ramus ei,* ther accuse him of Insincerity and Flat- *quem impe-* tery, in this Epistle, or we must un- *ris vestri* derstand him so as to make this Epistle *vultis au-* consistent with what he has said much *forem pro-* more clearly in other places. *bari.*

Ambros. Epist. lib. 2. epist. 15. (m) Et si es
Imperator, Deo subditus magis esse debes. Ib.

He calls *Eugenius*, after his Death, (n) — Quo (n) *Barbarous Robber, and base Usurper*; *Romanum* and says that both *Maximus* and *Euge-* *Imperium a* nius are in Hell, teaching by their *Mise-* *Barbari* rable Examples how sad a thing it is for *Latronis* Subjects to take up Arms against their *immanitate* Prince; of whom it is fully said, I have *& ab Usur-* seen the wicked exalted, and lifted up *patioris* in- above the Cedars of Libanus, and I pal-

sed by and behold, he was not for the right digni solis reous Man (meaning *Theodosius* and vindicares. *Gratian*, whom he just before menti- *Ambr. ep.* oned) passed from the Darkness of this 98. *World into Light Eternal, and the wicked — Contra* was not, who hath ceased to be unjust. *autem Max-* Which must necessarily suppose, That *imus &* both *Maximus* and *Eugenius* were as *Eugenius* *Guilty* in the retaining, as in the ac- in inferno *quiring* their Unjust Possessions, and *docentes* that they ceased not to be unjust till *exemplo mi-* they died, and were no more in this *serabili,* *World.* It had been strangely *uchari-* quam du- *table* to have said, that they were both *rum sit* certainly damned, because they had re- *arma suis* belled some Years before their Deaths, *Principibus* if afterwards they became Lawful Em- *irrogare.* *perours*, and had so long space for Re- *De quibus* *pentance*: But he supposed them to *pulchre* live and die in continual Usurpation, *dicitur*: and therefore to be tormented in Hell *Vidi im-* after Death, as Usurpers and Rebels. *pium super-* *exaltatum.*

Super Cedros Libani & transivi. & ecce non erat Tran- *sivi enim pius de caligine seculari ad lumen eternam,* *& non erat impius, qui esse desivit iniquus. Id de* *obitu Theodosi.*

(o) Our Countrey-man *Gildas* too (o) *Itemq;* gives such a Description of *Maximus*, *tandem ty-* as makes him no better than an Usur- *rannorum* *per* from the beginning to the end of *virgulis* his Government; he says, he was ad- *crecensibus* vanced against Law, without any Ti- *& in im-* tle, or in a Tyranical manner, that he *manem syl-* *vam jam*

jamque erumpentibus, Insula nomen Romanum, nec ta- *men morem legemque tenens, quin potius abiciens* *germen sue plantationis amarissimæ ad Gallias, magna* *comitante satellitum caetero, Maximum Imperatoris in-* *signibus, quæ nec decenter usquam gessit, non legitime,* *sed ritu tyrannico initiatum mittit. Ille callida primam* *are potius quam viriute finitimos quosque pagos vel pro-* *vincias contra Romanum statum retia perjurii, men-* *dacii sui facinoroso Regno adnectens, & unam alarum* *ad Hispaniam, alteram ad Italiam extendens, & Thro-* *num iniquissimi Imperii apud Treveros statuens, tanta* *insania in Dominos debacchatus est, ut duos Imperatores* *legitimos, unum Romæ, alterum religiosissima vitæ pel-* *leret; nec mora, tam feralibus vallibus audaciis apud* *Aquileiam urbem capite nefando excidit, qui decorata* *tonius orbis capita regno quodammodo dejecerat. Gild.* *de excid. Brit. strenghned*

strengthened himself by Lies and Perjury, and continued his Usurpation by the Murder of *Gratian*, and the banishment of *Valentinian*, and was the same unjust Usurper till his death.

(p) *Zos.*
lib. 4.

(p) *Zosimus* indeed says, that *Theodosius* had consented, that *Maximus* should be acknowledged Emperour, and commanded his Statues to be set up, that he might under a shew of Kindness and Friendship have the better opportunity to ruin him; but this is against the Authority of all other Historians, and *Zosimus* never omits any occasion to defame the Christian Emperours, and particularly *Theodosius*. And besides his hatred to Christianity, which he exactly copied from *Eunapius*, whose History he is said to abridge; he is singular in other circumstances relating to this very Story.

(q) *Omne
judicium
quod vasa
mentis con-
ceptum, in-
juria, non
juravenden-
do Maxi-
mus infan-
dissimus Ty-
rannorum
credidit
promulgan-
dum damna-
bimus nul-
lus; igitur
sibi lege e-
jus, nullus
judicio
blandiatur.
Theodos.
cod. lib. 15.
Tit. 14.
De infr-
mandis his,
quæ sub Ty-
rannis aut
Barbaris
gesta sunt.*

(q) But it is more material to observe, that *Theodosius* declared all the Laws and Edicts of *Maximus* to be of no Force or Authority, and that this was no more than the Christian Emperours used to do in such cases. Which implies that the Christians did not think Tyrants or Usurpers received any Authority from God; for if they had, all their Acts, which had been according to natural Right and Justice, must have been valid, as being made by such as had God's Authority to enact Laws, and decree Justice, and it would have been sinful to declare them void *ab initio* and of no effect. For if God had empowered them to act as Emperours against the standing Laws and Constitutions of the Empire, he had authorized them to give out Edicts and Decrees, which must have been as obligatory in Conscience, as those of the Lawful Emperours themselves, and whatever they wanted of the Formality of Law, ought to have been supplied by the Lawful Emperours, and not all their Acts to have been declared invalid, and never to have been of any Authority or Obligation. *St. Ambrose* was not the Bishop, that would tamely have seen Gods Autho-

rity in his Vicegerents thus despised, but *Theodosius* would have found him the same Man that he did upon some other occasions, if this had been the Doctrine of the Church.

But it may not be unfit to observe a little more particularly of *Eugenius*, how well settled he was in this Usurped Power. (r) The Historians relate that the disproportion and inequality was so great between his Forces and the Forces of *Theodosius*, that nothing less than that Miracle, which was wrought for him, could have delivered *Theodosius* out of his hands. *Eugenius* was so confident, and so secure of success, that he said *Theodosius* had a mind to be destroyed; and indeed if he had not been encouraged by a Revelation, he would never have ventured a Battel at that disadvantage, but must have been forced to protract the War, till he could have got together a much greater strength, which the Commanders of his Army all advised him to, but he was resolved to come to a Battel. *Eugenius* retired and stayed at a distance, expecting the news of the Victory, and gave Order to have *Theodosius* brought alive, bound, to him: And the overthrow of his Army was so unexpected to him and so incredible, that when some of his own Soldiers, who upon a conviction that God fought against them, had gone over to *Theodosius*, were sent to fetch *Eugenius* before him, he asked them whether they had brought *Theodosius* along with them, not suspecting but that they came to acquaint him with the Victory, they had gained him.

(r) *Theod.*
lib. 5. c. 24.
Niceph. lib.
12. c. 39.

(s) *Socrates* relates, that *Eugenius* had caused *Valentinian* to be strangled, as *Socrates* relates, tho' *Aug. Civ. St. Augustine* leaves it doubtful, whether he was murdered, or died by some other Accident; (u) but in *Theod.* (u) Ο' βασιλεὺς τῶν τε ἐν Οὐαλιντιανῶν παλατιῶν ἀνέμνησι, καὶ τῆς παρὰ τοὺς τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τῆς ἐν ὁμοῦ βασιλείας πολέμων. *Theod. lib. 5. c. 21.*

doet, the Emperour *Theodosius*, when *Eugenius* was brought to him, puts him in mind both of his Treason against *Valentinian*, and of his Rebellion and continued Usurpation afterwards, till his defeat. And not he alone, but *St. Ambrose*, as I have shewn, after the death of *Eugenius*, and, I think I may say, all Authors that have given any account of him, have esteemed him no better from the beginning to the end of his pretended Reign, than an Usurper, who never had any Right either from God or Man.

I know of but one example in Antiquity, that may seem to suit with the Doctors Notion, and it is that of *Theodorus* of *Alexandria*, who at the Battle between *Theodosius* and *Maximus* had sent *Isidorus* with Presents and with Letters to both of them, to be delivered to him that should come off Conquerour. This some censure him for very highly, and others think it a Calumny invented by his Enemies to defame him; but it had been so far

from any Aspersions, if *Maximus* had been immediately to commence God's Vicegerent; if he could but have subdued *Theodosius*, that it had been no more than what all the other Bishops must soon after have done; and he ought to have been commended rather for his zeal in attending the first Designations of Providence, to pay a ready and early Obedience to the new Emperour, and his Enemies had been strangely mistaken in reporting this as one of the worst Marks of Infamy they could fasten upon him.

I shall conclude all in Doctor *Sherlock's* own Words; *That we must obey and submit to our Prince, is a Duty, which the Laws of God and Nature enjoin: And we must not suffer any Man, be he Lawyer or Divine, to persuade us that this is not our Duty: But what Prince we must obey, and to what particular Prince we must pay our Allegiance, the Law of God does not tell us, but this we must learn from the Laws of the Land.* P. 54.

F I N I S.

An APPENDIX in Answer to Dr. SHERLOCK'S Vindication.

THE Vindication has little new in it, as to the main Controversy; and, notwithstanding there be some variations, I believe, the Doctor will give me leave to say, that if his *Case of Allegiance* be answered, the Vindication of it will need no Confutation. But because there are some things in it, that may seem to obviate several Arguments, that I have brought, I shall briefly endeavour to remove those Objections, and leave the rest to his learned Adversary.

Ch. 28.

The Convocation teaches, that when changes of Government are brought about either by the Rebellion of Subjects, or the Invasion of Foreign Princes, and the degenerate *Formes* of Government are established, the Authority either so unjustly gotten, or wrung by Force from the true and lawful Possessor, being always Gods Authority (and therefore receiving no impeachment by the wickedness of those that have it) is ever (when any such Alterations are thoroughly settled) to be revered and obeyed. From whence the Dr. argues, that it is plain, it is not a legal Authority, by the Death or Cession of the Rightful King; for we are to obey it as Gods Authority, though it be wrung by Force from the true and lawful Possessor; and though the present Possessor should have no other visible Title to it, but such unjust Force.

P. 8.

But why may not the Authority be said to be wrung by Force from

the true and lawful Possessor, when he is forced to resign his Right, or quit his Claim? May not Consent be extorted, and Oaths extorted? and may not a Prince be reduced to that Condition, as at last to resolve for ever to relinquish his Right when he has no hopes left of recovering it? and does not History furnish us with such examples? However, that which is wrung from a lawful Possessor by Death, is to be sure wrung by Force from him: and the words do not import that the Possessor is supposed to be living after this injustice and violence. And by these ways Authority may be said to be unjustly gotten, or wrung by Force from the true and lawful Possessor, though the Authority it self properly and strictly speaking cannot be so obtained. For in the Doctor's opinion, it is conferred by God, upon a Thorough Settlement, and in the opinion of others it is conferred by him, upon the Death, or Cession of the Person, in whom it before was: but whensoever it is transferred, it is certainly given by God, and cannot be torn or forced from the true and lawful Possessor; but the external Power and Exercise of Authority may; and when it is thus gotten, it may afterwards be an accidental Means of attaining to the Authority it self. And this is that the Convocation speaks of, that men by wicked Arts and Practices may arrive at Power, and at last, when there is no

better Pretence or Claim, may become invested with the Authority it self, as well as exercise the outward Acts of it. This the Instances sub-joined of the Authority of the Egyptian and Babylonian Kings over the Jews shew to be the meaning of the Convocation: for it would be absurd to take their words in such a sense, as all the examples immediately added for the explication of them doe not explain, but rather confute and contradict: and if the literal Sense, and Grammatical Construction, as the Doctor urges, seem to import this, we must certainly reject it, or else we shall make the Convocation argue, as wise and learned men never did, and then it will be to little purpose to enquire after their meaning, be it what it will. But indeed no Grammar nor Logick, I think, can prove from their words, that the true and lawful possessor, Is supposed to be alive, and to assert his Right.

P. 10.

The Doctor's observation concerning the mention of a *King de Facto* in the Convocation Book, I cannot think, will prove of any service to him; and I believe, he thought so himself too, when he wrote his *Case of Allegiance*, or else he would never have omitted it; though now he makes great use of it. But the plain meaning of a *King de Facto* there is no more than any Rightful King, under whom a man lives, whether he be his natural Sovereign, or any Foreign Prince, to whom he is become Subject, justly and lawfully, but not with prejudice to the Right of his own Sovereign. For, as the Doctor observes, this is spoke with reference to *Abud's killing King Eglon*, to whom the Israelites had been in Subjection eighteen years, without any Competition of another Prince to their Allegiance. Now *Abud* was not their natural Prince, but only the King under whom they then lived, and

who had then a Right to their Obedience; so that if here is not the least intimation, that a *King de Facto* is opposed to a *King de Jure*, but the *King de Facto* under whom he lived, is no more than the King under whom he *de Facto* lived, that is, whose Subject he actually was, whether he were his Natural Sovereign, or a Foreign Prince.

But it must be observed that this is not spoken only with respect to *Abud's killing Eglon*, but with respect likewise to *Adonijah's Usurpation* in the Reign of *David* his Father. For they say, that though a Subject should make never so specious and solemn pretences, that God had called him to murder the *King de Facto* under whom he lived, and should have first procured himself to be proclaimed and crowned, *King* as *Adonijah* did, yet this would not justify him, nor his Adherents, if he should afterwards have laid violent hands upon his Master; which is just the same thing that was before expressed in other words, by *murdering the King de Facto* under whom he lived. So that a *King de Facto* in this place cannot be opposed to a *King de Jure*, unless *David* himself were only a *King de Facto*.

Can. 27.

The Doctor moves a Dispute, what kind of Submission of the Rightful King may be sufficient to transfer his Right, and whether a King does not submit, when he leaves his Country without any legal Authority of Government, and leaves his People in the hands of a prevailing Prince; or whether nothing be a Submission but enouncing his Rights, and making an *Formal Resignation and Conveyance of Power*.

P. 17.

To this I answer, that it is of the Nature of Right, that it cannot be transferred without the Consent of the Person, whose Right it is, unless it be by some person, who has a superior Right to the thing disposed of: for what is a man's own cannot be given away from him against his will, but

but by one, who has a Superiour and better Right to it, than that which he holds it by. And it is sufficient, if any Submission or Consent of the Rightful King be necessary to transfer Allegiance; and if it cannot be proved, that God the Supream Lord and Proprietor of all things is pleased to dispose of the Right to Kingdoms otherwise, than he does of the Right, which private men have to their Estates, it must be necessary that such Acts intervene, as are required among men to convey a Right, which can be no other, than such as imply a Consent. But what kind of Consent is necessary, and how it ought to be expressed is quite another question, which depends upon particular Cases and Circumstances: and it is sufficient in the present case to say, that a forced Submission is a forced Consent, and that is some sort of Consent, and not an involuntary Act, though not so voluntary, as if there had been no Force. The Doctor cannot, but acknowledge that such a Submission of men, with respect to themselves, *is not a Right, for it is a voluntary Consent, though extorted by force, as all Moralists allow such a mixt choice and election to be.* But Flight is no Consent at all, but a declaration of the contrary, and therefore whether a forced Submission will transfer Allegiance, or no, is certain Flight cannot, and this is all we are now to enquire after.

P. 13.

P. 20.

He argues, that Jaddus begged God's Directions, not whether he should submit to Alexander, or not, for he was already resolved to submit, but about the manner of his Submission, that he might do it so, as that Alexander would accept it, after the Provocation he had given him by his denial before.

Josephus does indeed say, that Jaddus desired how he should meet Alexander, who was provoked by his former Answer, but what he means

by his *meeting him*, and to what intent and purpose he designed to meet him, is not said, much less that he was resolved to make an entire surrender of himself, and the whole City unto his power; and *meeting* an Enemy is a very different thing from making such a Submission to him. He appointed publick Prayers and Sacrifices to be offered up for their Deliverance, but whether they should be delivered by their Submission, or by any other way, we must suppose, they left it wholly to God Almighty to determine. And whatever Jaddus might think with himself, it cannot be imagined he would come to a Resolution, and would openly declare it too, but since he sought to God for his direction and assistance in so extraordinary a way, he would in all humility and devotion refer the whole matter, and not only the manner and circumstance of it, to his Determination. Thus Jaddus ought to have done, and thus probably he did, and there is nothing in Josephus, that contradicts it. If Jaddus stood to his first Answer he could not be resolved to submit, and it is most unlikely that he would appoint solemn Supplications and Sacrifices to be made to God about the Circumstance only, and overlook the thing it self, resolving with himself, before he knew Gods pleasure in it, to submit, when he had so lately answered peremptorily that he might not do it so long as Darius lived: this must be a great and sudden, and a very improbable change, and very rash and unwarrantable, and not to be drawn into example, if true.

For suppose, that Jaddus was resolved to submit, suppose he was resolved to do the thing, which he but just before protested, he ought not to do, this makes no difference in the thing, nor in the Judgment of the Convocation about it, who men-

tion his first resolution, but take no notice of this new own, nor of his Submission it self neither; and perhaps for this Reason, because they might not give much credit to the Account in *Josephus* of the Revelation, and without this his Surrender could not be justified either by their Principles, or his own. But we are concerned only for the matter of Fact, and for the Authority he had to act upon, not for the opinion, with which he acted. He first refused Submission, and that the Convocation approves; he afterwards submitted, and this the Convocation takes not the least notice of: but if there were a Revelation for it, his Submission was lawful; if not, it was contrary to that Duty, which he so lately owned to *Darius*; and to the Judgment of the Convocation. The Doctor says, *if they believed any of the story upon Josephus's Authority, they must believe all.* But why so? some of it may be probable, and that they might believe; and other parts of it so improbable, that his Authority might not be sufficient to give it Credit with them: and it is likely they rejected what they did not mention, when it was so very material to the Subject before them, that if they had believed it, they would scarce have omitted it.

The Doctor is forced to own, that *Athaliah*, if she were thoroughly settled, had God's Authority, till the Right Heir was known to be alive: though if she had, it may be not only Lawful, but a Duty, to resist Gods Authority, since he maintains that *Jehoiada*, supposing her thoroughly settled, was nevertheless bound in Duty to *Joash*, to depose her, and set him up.

But as soon as the true Heir appeared, she fell from her Power, as much by the express Ordinance and Command of God, as *Joab* did, when *Jehu* was anointed; for a Divine Entail as the

Convocation asserts, is equivalent to an express Nomination.

I Answer, the Appearance of the true Heir respects only the People's Duty: but the Question is concerning *Jehoiada*, and what could the Appearance of *Joash* signify to him, who all the while knew, that he was alive, and acted all along for his Right and Interest, and was obliged at the first fit opportunity to make the true heir known: and if so, he must be found to do it by virtue of an Hereditary Right, which was in *Joash*; and by consequence he could not be bound to obey *Athaliah*, though she were never so well settled; for it is a contradiction to say, that he was bound to obey her, at the same time, that he was bound to depose her; or which is all one, when he was bound to make the Right Heir known in order to depose her. It may perhaps be said, that *Jehoiada* was not bound in Duty to *Athaliah*, it was only lawful for him to submit, as the Doctor now distinguishes. But if so, then a Providential Right may oblige some Subjects to Obedience, and not others, which is as strange as any thing besides; for sure Gods Authority must oblige all Subjects alike, and if she were invested with Gods Authority, or to use the Doctors word, if she were Gods *Providential Queen*, I cannot see how any Subject in her Dominions could be exempted from Gods Authority, nor consequently from Obedience to her, while it remained in her.

Besides, how did she fall from her Power as soon as the true Heir appeared? According to the Doctor's Principles, she could never have fallen from it, till she had fallen from her Actual Dominion; and her Authority was at an end, not because the Right Heir was known, but because she was dispossessed: for the Doctor tells us, that Actual Dominion is the Sovereign Power makes a King, that it is certain

P. 36.
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F. 38.
P. 50.
P. 56.

he who has the Exercise of the Regal Power and Authority, is King, and he is no King, who has no Regal Power, whatever his Title be, and that it is certain no Prince can have God's Authority, who is not in Possession of the Throne, and then no Allegiance can be due to him: and the Doctor cannot guess how these Princes, who, whatever the Right be, have no Authority of Government, should have God's Authority. And if this be so very certain from the nature of the thing, that Sovereignty is founded in the Actual Administration of Government, or in the Actual Possession of Power and Authority to govern, if Possession of Power be of the very Essence of Sovereign Authority, so that no Prince can be possessed of actual Power without God's Authority, and no Prince that is not actually possessed of Power can have his Authority, then how came the Nature of things to be changed so in the Case of Joash and Athaliah, that Joash upon his first Appearance had an immediate Right to the Allegiance of the Subjects, and Athaliah even without Dispossession lost all her Authority?

But she was dispossessed. I grant it: But the Argument proceeds not upon her Dispossession, but upon the first Appearance of the true Heir, and supposes, as the Doctor acknowledges, that immediately upon his Appearance she had no more Authority or Right to their Allegiance before her Dispossession, than she had after it; and that she must therefore have reigned, and must have been in the Actual Administration of Government without any Authority from God, if she could have kept Possession never so long a time, though he maintains, that this Actual Administration and nothing else is required to Invest any Prince with God's Authority. Suppose then that Athaliah had had a strong party, that she had not been surprised, as she was, and suddenly taken off, but that the generality of

the Subjects had stood by her, and had not admitted Joash to reign over them; this is no impossible Supposition, for the same thing happened to David himself, when Ishboseth was set up against him, and therefore might have happened to any of his Line: When then would the Authority have been? or what would the Divine Entail have signified to Joash, according to these Principles? Could Joash have had God's Authority, tho' he was out of Possession? Then other Kings, though they be dispossessed, may have it too, and Possession is not necessary to the being invested with God's Authority: Or did God by this Entail alter the Nature of things, and was Sovereignty quite another thing in the Kingdom of Judah, than it is in other Kingdoms? Then all the Examples the Convocation brings from that Kingdom are to no purpose.

We are told, that if Joash did but appear, or was known to be alive, it was enough to put Athaliah out of all her Providential Right, and therefore it could not be necessary, that he should be either accepted or recognized to make the Subjects Allegiance become due to him. And in other Kingdoms a thorough Settlement is necessary only for Usurpers: For when there is a Right, nothing more is necessary to give Possession, but that Subjects actually own and recognize that Right, and accept him for their King in whom the Right is: For his Right makes their Obedience a Duty, when he is in Possession, how weak and unsettled soever his Government is. But when a Prince has no legal Right to the Crown, nor consequently to the Obedience of his Subjects, it is only a thorough Settlement, which makes Obedience a necessary Duty.

But there is no ground for this Distinction, because if God have disposed of a Crown, all human Claims can be of no validity against his Disposal,

P. 28.

P. 45.

posal, and that Prince must be an Usurper upon Gods Authority, who will attempt to recover it. For, since both Legal Entails, and thorough Settlements are Acts of Gods Providence; since it is all but Providence still, as the Doctor says, the latter Act of Providence must stand good against the former, the effect whereof must be abolished by the latter: If God first gives a Kingdom to one, and afterwards takes it away to bestow it upon another, certainly the last Gift must take place: And therefore the Usurper is to be adhered to rather than the late Legal King, unless Providence advance him to a thorough Settlement, and so cancel the Usurpers Claim, making the Crown over again to the Legal Possessor by a new Gift.

P. 34.

Jeroboam was placed on the Throne of Israel by Gods Nomination, and reigned as long as he lived, but for his sin God would not entail the Kingdom on his Family.

At the same time that God nominated Jeroboam by his Prophet Abijah, he made a conditional Entail of the Kingdom upon his Family, 1 Kings 11. but Jeroboam not performing the conditions, it was of no benefit to him.

And it is not certain that Jeroboam was placed on the Throne of Israel by Gods Nomination: For though he was at first nominated by God, yet very Learned Men understand *Hos. 4. 8.* to be meant particularly of him, expounding it, that Jeroboam is said to reign but not by God, because when God had promised to give him the Ten Tribes, he did not wait Gods Time, to receive the Kingdom from him, but was set up by the People, and strengthened himself by Idolatry, and the Israelites are said to have rebelled against the House of David unto this Day, that is, from the beginning of Jeroboam's Reign, to the time of the writing of that Book 1 Kings 12. 19.

As to the Arguments which prove, that Fraud and Violence may give a Right to an Estate, as well as Usurpation to a Crown, the Doctor says, P. 46. that all private Injuries are reserved by God himself to the Correction and Redress of publick Government, and human Courts of Justice, and therefore his Providence has no effect at all on such personal Rights, but the very nature of the thing proves that such disputes, which are too big for a legal Decision, or any human Courts, for the Decision whereof God has erected no universal Tribunal on Earth, he has reserved to his own judgment, such as the Correction of Sovereign Princes, and the transferring Kingdoms and Empires, &c.

P. 12.

But he says in his Case of Allegiance, that the Scripture never speaks of Gods bare permission of any Events, but makes him the Author of all the Good or Evil, which happens either to private Persons or publick Societies, and that all Events which are for the good or evil of private Men or publick Societies are ordered by him. Here he makes God the Author of all Events alike, whether they befall private Men or publick Societies, and if he will now argue that God disposes of Kingdoms otherwise than of private Estates, first this must be proved; and if it were proved, yet he must maintain the Consequence of his own Principles about Events, or else renounce them: For when he is charged with the Consequence of some of his Principles, it is not enough to say, that the same thing may be proved by another Argument; though this might be sufficient for his Cause, yet it would not be sufficient for his own Vindication.

Besides, the Dispute is neither concerning unjust Possessions of Kingdoms by Usurpation, nor of private Estates by Fraud, or any other Injustice, till both are thoroughly settled: Suppose then that by false Witnesses, or by false Deeds, or Bribery, or by whatever other wicked means a Man gets

gets into quiet Possession of anothers Estate; suppose the Cause has gone against the lawful Possessor in all the Courts of Judicature; the Question is what Title this Man has to this Estate, who has thus unjustly got it. Providence has given it him; he is fully possessed of it, the Courts of Judicature have all determined for him; there is no higher Appeal upon Earth, and God, if he be the Author of all Events, and does not only permit them, has bestowed it upon him. The Doctor says, that when a private Man has the Possession of his Estate given him by Law, whether right or wrong, he must not be violently dispossessed again: But has he a Divine Right to this Estate or no? Providence has as evidently declared for him, as ever it did for any Usurper, and he wants nothing but human Right, &c. that according to these Principles makes no difference: But he has the Colour and Formality of that too, having the Decision of the Law on his side. Suppose again, that a Man finds a Summ of Money, which he knows the Owner of, and that the Owner has no proof of his having found it, and the Laws of the Land cannot force him to restore it; must this Man restore this Money, which is the Gift of Providence, or may he keep it? Or has the Owner lost his Right by losing the Possession, when it is beyond all possibility of Recovery? And is an Usurper after a thorough Settlement obliged to resign his Throne to the Rightful King? Or is not he and his Party as much obliged in Conscience to make Restitution and Reparation to the Rightful King, as private Men are obliged to make Reparation for those Wrongs and Damages, which no human Courts may be able to take Cognizance of?

P. 62.

He says, that all, which he undertook to prove is, that when a Rightful King is dispossessed, Subjects may own and submit to the King, who is settled

in the Possession of the Throne. But when the Arguments from the late Usurpation come to be answered, he makes a Distinction between what is lawful to be done, and that which is a necessary Duty, confessing that it was lawful to submit to Cromwel, though he never was thoroughly settled, but asserting that it was not a Duty; and that he never was thoroughly settled he proves, because he never was settled by a National Submission and Consent, which he makes necessary to a thorough Settlement.

I answer 1. The Distinction was no Rule of Practice to the Loyalists of those times who never owned, that they might lawfully comply, but always professed, that they were bound in Conscience not to do it. And the Doctor himself sets it down in the Objection, that the Loyal Nobility, Gen- Case of Al-
try and Clergy thought themselves bound P. 46, 47.
in Conscience to oppose that Usurpation at their utmost Peril: And in his Answer says, that there was then such an Invasion on the Rights and Liberties of their Country (which are as sacred as the Rights of the King) as required the utmost Opposition that could be made.

2. They must have been obliged in Conscience to Submission by the Dr's Principles, though Cromwells Government had been never thoroughly settled. For the Doctor lays down several Duties, which in Reason we ought to pay to an Usurper, before a thorough Settlement. As to live quietly and peaceably under his Government, and to promise or swear, or give any other security, that we will do so, if it be demanded. And we must pay Taxes to him, for these were due to the Administration of Government, as St. Paul observes, For this Cause pay ye Tribute also, &c. We must give the Title of King to such a Prince, when we live in the Country, where he is owned for King. Nay we must pray for him, under the Title of King, for we are bound to pray for all who are in Authority. All this is

lb. P. 17.

is as applicable to a Protector as to a King, and thus far the Doctor thinks the doubtful Possession of the Throne obliges us. He supposes indeed that the generality of the Nation have submitted to the Usurper, and that his Possession is doubtful upon the account of the formidable Power which the lawful King yet retains: but I would know, why all Settlements of Usurpers, if they be in the same Degree, do not oblige to the same Duties, since it is the Settlement in it self considered, and not the manner, or kind of it, which lays the Obligation upon the Subjects, and therefore if there may be the same Settlement in Degree, without the Consent of the generality of the People, when the Forces of the Rightful King is quite broken, that there may be with their Consent, when he has yet a formidable Power, the Subjects must in both cases stand obliged to pay the same Duties to an Usurper; and upon these grounds no Duty could be justly denied to Cromwell, which is owing where the Possession is doubtful, when by the Doctor's confession, no man could have foreseen how King Charles 2d. should have returned, and God alone was able to effect it.

Ib. P. 33.

Ib. P. 5.

Vind.
P. 22.

3. The Doctor is not consistent with himself in his account of a Thorough Settlement: when the whole Administration of the Government, and the whole Power of the Nation is in the hands of the Prince, when every thing is done in his Name and by his Authority, when the Estates of the Realm, and the great body of the Nation has submitted to him, and those who will not submit can be crushed by him, whenever he pleases, if this be not a settled Government, he despairs of every knowing what it is. And in his Vindication he says, that in this place he has stated what a Thorough Settlement is: yet here he has not determined, what is necessary to it, nor whether all these things must meet together, or whether some one or

more of them may be sufficient. Soon after he observes there are very different ways, whereby Princes ascend the Throne, sometimes by the Election of the People; sometimes by Conquest: but all these ways, or any other that can be thought of, are governed and determined by the Divine Providence, and the Prince thus advanced is as truly placed in the Throne by God, as if he had been expressly nominated and anointed by a Prophet at Gods command, as Saul and David were. Here is all ascribed to Gods Providence in placing a King upon the Throne, and therefore the Submission of the People cannot be necessary, unless God cannot do it without their Submission, or unless Saul and David were not Kings upon Gods Nomination, till the People had accepted them, or would never have been Kings, if the People had refused to admit and acknowledge them. Upon these Grounds he asserts in his Fourth Proposition, that it is impossible there should be a wrong King &c. but it is very possible, there may be a King without a National Submission to him, and therefore either this Submission is not necessary to a thorough Settlement; or a thorough Settlement is not necessary to the constituting one of the Providential Kings. Afterwards the Doctor supposes, that though the generality of the Nation submit to such a Prince, and place him on the Throne, and put the whole Power of the Kingdom into his hands, yet it may be, we cannot yet think the Providence of God, has settled him in the Throne, while the dispossessed Prince has also such a formidable Power, as makes the event very doubtful. But in the same Page, he says, he is indeed King while he administers the legal Right Power, though we may not think him so well settled in his Government, as to all intents and purposes to own him for our King. So that Submission may make a King even before a Thorough Settlement, though not perhaps to all intents and purposes. Again I cannot

Ib. P. 14.

Ib. P. 17.

Ib. P. 24. cannot see when to fix the foundation of Government, but in the Providence of God, who either by the Choice of the major or stronger part of the People, or by Conquest, or by Submission, and the long successive continuance of Power, or by humane Laws, gives a Prince and his Family Possession of the Throne, &c. In this place he joyns Submission and Continuance of Government together, but makes Conquest as well as any of the rest to be alone sufficient; and the Providence of God makes Kings by the choice of the stronger though they be not the major part of the People.

Ib. P. 25. In the next Page; if the sole Authority of Government be from God, and God gives this Authority only by placing a Prince in the Throne, then by whatsoever means he does it, is the same thing, and therefore if he does it without the Submission or Consent of the People.

Ib. P. 48. In the case of Antiochus Epiphanes the Doctor determines, that a long Continuance is required to settle a Government, when there is no National Submission; And when there is nothing but

P. 51. mere Force, it may admit some Dispute, when the Government is settled. By this it seems that though it may perhaps admit of some dispute, whether Cromwell's Government was settled or no; yet a Government may sometimes be settled by mere Force, and Continuance may be sufficient without a National Consent. But In the

Vind. P. 32. the Vindication, the general Submission of the People is necessary to a thorough Settlement of such new Governments; and

Ib. P. 22. the principal part of it is this, viz. when the Estates of the Realm, and the

Ib. P. 67. great Body of the Nation has submitted to such a Prince: though once more, either Submission, or Continuance will suffice.

Ib. P. 16. But it must not be omitted, that the Doctor now says, that the Consent and Submission of the People, turn that which was originally no more but Force into a Civil and Legal Authority, by giving themselves up to the Government of

the Prince: this, if Submission be necessary to a thorough Settlement, takes away the subject of the question, which is whether a thorough Settlement without any Civil or Legal Authority, be of It self sufficient to entitle an Usurper to the Allegiance of the Subjects by virtue of Gods Authority, notwithstanding any Claim, Right, Title, or Interest, which the dispossessed Prince can challenge to his Country, Kingdome or Empire. And besides, this raises a new and a very nice dispute; Whether the legal Kings civil and legal Right, or the Usurpers civil and legal Authority make the better Claim, and ought to have the preference.

4. A National Submission and Consent is not necessary to a thorough Settlement by the Doctor's Principles. By his Principles the thorough Settlement is made by God himself, and the People are not necessarily supposed to have any thing to do in it, but only are obliged in conscience to submit, when it is once brought about by the Divine Providence. For if God be the Author of all events, if all Kings be equally rightsful with respect to God, by whatsoever way that can be thought of, they are advanced to the Throne, and settled in it, then a National Submission and Consent cannot be necessary to a thorough Settlement: because a Prince may by Foreign Force, or by an Army of his own Subjects attain to a thorough Settlement against the Consent of the People, and without any but a forced Submission, at most; and this the Doctor will not allow to be sufficient. For he cannot deny but that in the late times, Men who were forced, Case. submitted by Force, and his only ex- P. 47.

ception is that the Nation did not by any National Act own those Usurpations. And this is all, that, what he has now added in his Vindication, can amount to. So that Cromwell was thoroughly, that is, fully settled, because

Case.
P. 15.

because the whole Nation was forced to submit to him, and could never rescue themselves from that Force till his Death: he was not settled by any National Submission and Consent; but he was settled by a forced Submission, which is one way whereby a thorough Settlement may be attained, and a *National Act* of Submission and Consent is another; but by whatever way the thorough Settlement be obtained, God must certainly be the Author of it, if he be the Author of all Events, and whatever kind of thorough Settlement *Cromwell* had, 'tis certain, he had the Supream Power fully in his own hands, and therefore by the Doctors Principles could not fail of having Gods Authority. *For since Power will govern, God so orders it, by his Providence, as never to entrust Sovereign Power in any mans hand, to whom he does not give the Sovereign Authority; Power does not give Right and Authority to govern, but is a certain sign to us, that where God has placed and settled the Power, he has given the Authority.* Now no man can say that God never places and settles Power without the Peoples Submission and Consent, or that *Cromwells* Power was not settled for five years together as much as it could be without a National Consent, and consequently he must have had Gods Authority by the Doctors Principles, though the Nation did not by any National Act ever own him.

And it is the same thing, as to the extent of Power: for God cannot be confined to give just such a Measure of Power, as shall suit with the Model of this or that particular Government. Who will say, that God cannot turn a Civil into a Despotick Government, or can deny by the Doctors Principles, that he has constituted him an Arbitrary Monarch, whom he has entrusted with Arbitrary Power? The Question is not, whether God

cannot make Kings by his Providence, who yet may be limited in the Administration of their Government by humane Laws? But, whether God does not invest them with an unlimited Sovereign Authority, who can by any means attain to a settled Possession of it, or even but to the Exercise of it? For I shall shew that by the Doctors Principles the Exercise of Power is sufficient without the Settlement of it. God changes times and seasons, Governments, and Governours, and all this he does only by his Providence, that is, in the Drs. sense merely by the Events of things: and therefore when any Prince makes himself Arbitrary, God has changed the Government, as when an Usurper gets into the Throne he has changed the Governour. And according to the Dr. Authority is inseparable from the Possession of Power, and therefore the Exercise of Arbitrary Power, or the actual Possession of Power to Govern Arbitrarily implies an Authority from God to govern so. For if *Actual Dominion and Sovereign Power make a King*, then Actual Arbitrary Power makes an Arbitrary King. Vind. P. 86.

4. But the necessity of a thorough Settlement, before the full and entire Allegiance of the Subjects can become due to an Usurper, is inconsistent with the Doctors Principles. For in his Account of the Relation between a King and a Subject he makes no mention of a thorough Settlement, nor supposes it in the least, but on the contrary places the *Relation in Actual Dominion and Sovereign Power, on the one hand, to make a King; and the Obligations to Subjection and Allegiance, on the other hand, to make a Subject.* Ib. P. 38. Why there should not as well be actual Subjection and Allegiance to make a Subject, does not concern me now to enquire: it is enough to my present purpose, that Actual Dominion makes a King, and therefore

Ib.

fore a Settled Dominion cannot be necessary to make one. *If the Relation then of a King to his Subject be Dominion and Government, does he continue a King, says the Doctor, when he has lost his Dominion and Government? And does he continue an Usurper, say I, who is actually possessed of Dominion and Government; till he is thoroughly settled in it? If he does, how can Actual Dominion and Sovereign Power make a King? How can it be true, that where Actual Dominion and Government ceases, the Kingship is lost, and the Obligation to Subjection and Allegiance with it; if it be not likewise true, that where-ever there is Actual Dominion and Government, there is Kingship, and the Obligations to Subjection and Allegiance with it? For the Actual Possession of Power and Authority to govern, and Allegiance, or that Obedience and Subjection which is due to Government are Relations, and do mutually ponere & tollere.*

Ibid.

P. 37.

Thus all that he discourses about this matter wholly excludes the very Notion of a thorough Settlement as necessary to make Allegiance become due: The Substance of it all is, that there must of necessity be always some Government, some actual Power in every Nation, whom the People are bound in Conscience to obey, that therefore this is always from God, and that there can be no *Interregnum*, no time, wherein there is no visible Authority ordained by God in any Kingdom: For if there were, God could not be said to rule in such a Kingdom (of which more by and by.) Now how is this consistent with the Notion of a thorough Settlement, which supposes that there may be an Interval of Time, more or less, when there is none with Authority from God to govern? In short, if *Actual Dominion* make a King, what need can there be of a thorough

Settlement to make Allegiance become due to him? If there be a necessity for a thorough Settlement, how can Actual Dominion make a King?

I am perswaded, the Distinction between Usurpers, that are settled; and those that are not settled, is, at least, as *unknown to Scripture*, as the Distinction between Usurpers and lawful Kings: And therefore, as the Doctor urges that if *St. Paul, Rom. 13.* had intended any such Distinction, he ought to have said it in express words, or else no body could reasonably have understood him to intend this Precept of Subjection to the Higher Powers, only of Powers that had a Legal Right: So I may with much greater Reason say, that if *St. Paul* had intended any Distinction between Usurpers before, and after a thorough Settlement, he ought to have said it in express words, or else no body would reasonably have understood him to intend this Precept of Subjection only to Usurpers who are thoroughly settled. *Αἱ ἐξουσίαι, &c. The Powers that be, are ordained of God; not that are settled, but that are in being, that actually are: And if αἱ ἐξουσίαι be αἱ ἐξουσίαι, and do evidently relate to the Exercise of Civil Authority, not to a Legal Right, it is as evident, that it can as little relate to a thorough Settlement; for the Exercise of Civil Authority may be long before any Settlement, and continue as long after, and it may be wholly without it from first to last.*

Case P. 19.

5. If it be necessary there should be a thorough Settlement, before an Usurper can have Gods Authority, and from the Death of King *Charles the First*, to the Restauration of the Royal Family, we had no settled Government, then by the Doctors Principles we had none of Gods Authority amongst us. For Gods Authority is no longer in a dispossessed Prince, and

and therefore I desire to know, whether
I will put the Question, which the
Doctor puts to his Adversary in the
like Case, I desire to know, whether
God rules in a Kingdom, while an
Usurper sits the Throne (or while it
is not thoroughly settled.) The Reason
of the Question is plain, because the Pro-
phet Daniel pronounces Universally, that
God rules in the Kingdom of Men,
and as a proof of it, adds, and giveth
it to whomsoever he will; and then it
should seem, that God does not rule in
these Kingdoms; which he does not
dispose of by his own Will and Counsel
(which are not yet thoroughly set-
tled) which he does not give to whom
he will; (which he has yet given to
no body.) But I desire to know, whether
the Government of them is not subject
to Usurpers, to tyrannize over them
without coming to a full Settlement;
or being invested with his Authority.
In the Case of the English Govern-
ment, during the Exile of King Charles
the Second, it is impossible for the
Doctor to hold the Force of his
own Objections, though he really
have no force in it against any bo-
dy, but himself. For God rules the

World, when he permits all manner
of Wickedness in it, and he rules
Kingdoms, when he permits Kings,
who have his Authority to use
it to the worst purposes of Violence
and Persecution, and when he permits
Subjects to rebel, and throw off the
Yoke. He does not always govern
Kingdoms by a visible Authority, or
by a Person authorized or ordained
by himself to act as his Vicegerent:
But it is yet to be proved, that God
cannot govern Kingdoms, if he suffer
Men to exercise all the outward Acts
of Power and Sovereignty without
any Right and Authority to do it;
it remains to be proved, that
when God suffers Subjects to cast
off that Authority, which he has
appointed, to reject his Vicegerent,
and to say, We will not have this Man
to rule over us, they are then no
longer under Gods Rule and Go-
vernment. And when this is proved,
it will still remain to be shewn,
how by these Principles God could
rule in such these Kingdoms, if
there was no thorough Settlement;
and consequently no Person invested
with Gods Authority, for so many
Years together.

In the next place, I desire to know,
whether God rules in a Kingdom, when
there is no visible Authority, or when
the People are divided, and no one
Person is acknowledged as the
Vicegerent of God. In this Case, I
desire to know, whether God rules
in a Kingdom, or whether he does
not. For if he does not, then the
People are not under his Rule, and
he does not rule in a Kingdom.
But if he does, then the People are
under his Rule, and he does rule
in a Kingdom. This is the Question
which I desire to know, whether
God rules in a Kingdom, when
there is no visible Authority, or when
the People are divided, and no one
Person is acknowledged as the
Vicegerent of God.

